







Constructing Knowledge-based Industries in the Globalization Era: 

























In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in the 






















Constructing Knowledge-based Industries in the Globalization Era: 





























Dr. Kirk S. Bowman 
Jon R. Wilcox Term Professor in 
Soccer, Global Politics, and Society 
Sam Nunn School of International 
Affairs 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Dr. Dan Breznitz 
Adjunct Professor 
Sam Nunn School of International 
Affairs 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Munk Chair of Innovation Studies 
Munk School of Global Affairs 
University of Toronto  
 
Dr. Alasdair Young 
Associate Professor and Jean Monnet 
Chair 
Sam Nunn School of International 
Affairs 








Dr. Steven Casper 
Dean of the School of Applied Life 
Sciences 
Henry E. Riggs Professor of 
Management 
Keck Graduate Institute 
 
Dr. Elisabeth B. Reynolds  
Research Professor 
Executive Director 
Industrial Performance Center 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 
 





































I am grateful to many faculty, colleagues, friends and family who have supported 
me throughout this intellectual journey. In particular, I would like to thank: Kirk 
Bowman, who has an amazing ability to balance optimism, encouragement and humor 
with constructive criticism and advice; Dan Breznitz, for his patience and dedication to 
helping me through this intellectual challenge, from the very beginning to the very end. 
He knew when to test me, and, when to let me find my way; Alasdair Young who’s 
thoughtful approach yielded pearls of ideas; Bill Long for his wise counsel, support and 
friendship; and Vicki Birchfield for her enthusiasm, guidance and creativity as we 
worked together at the European Union Center of Excellence. The camaraderie of my 
fellow PhD colleagues Phil Baxter, Hank Blumenthal, Tarun Chaudhary, Liz Dallas, 
Dejie Fajebe, Yujia He, Jim Hoadley, Jonathan Huang, Alborz Parcham-Kashani, 
Amanda Meng, Jon Schmid, Taylor Smith, Molly Taylor, and Aselia Urmanbetova, 
provided both intense intellectual discussion and moments of light-hearted breaks from 
the usual grind. 
I also thank several other faculty and staff across schools at Georgia Tech 
including Maryam Alavi, Joe Bankoff, Rahul Basole, Jennifer Clark, Molly Cochran, Sy 
Goodman, Stewart Graham, Ansley Hynes, Bob Kennedy, Maggie Kosal, John 
McCintyre, Vince Pedicino, Jackie Royster, Zak Taylor, Fei-Ling Wang, Katja Weber, 
and Brian Woodall for many stimulating conversations over the years. For administrative 









A project of this nature required extensive fieldwork, which could not have been 
accomplished without many friends and colleagues in Canada, Australia and the United 
States. In Canada, special thanks to Jeurgen Krause and Godfrey Baldacchino at the 
University of Prince Edward Island and Steve Casper in California at the Keck Graduate 
Institute, School of Life Sciences for a wonderfully rewarding research collaboration; 
Kirk Youden at the Newfoundland Department of Innovation, Business and Rural 
Development; Rory Francis at the Prince Edward Island BioAlliance; Louise Fortin of the 
Quebec Trade Office in Atlanta; John Argall at BioAtlantech in New Brunswick; Bruce 
McLellan and Sheillach McDougall in Nova Scotia for their tireless efforts to help me 
arrange interviews with key representatives in their provinces. In Australia, I thank Bruce 
Coyne for his encouragement over many, many years and help in recommending 
interviewees. In the United States, I thank Doug Wood, Crystal Porter and Carrie Golden 
as well as many colleagues in Georgia and Washington, D.C. for their insights and 
contacts. 
Erica Fuchs at Carnegie Mellon University and Liz Reynolds at the MIT 
Industrial Performance Center provided collegiality at conferences and useful insights. 
And finally, David Dessler, Mike Tierney, Marlene and Bill Davis from the College of 
William and Mary have been lifelong friends and model scholars providing a home away 
from home when I needed time to gain perspective and courage.  
For financial support and dissertation research awards in Canada, I thank the 
Canadian Studies Grant Program, the Canadian Embassy in the United States, the 
Association Internationale des Etudes Québécoises and the Quebec Ministry of 









the International Studies Association, Industry Studies Association, Georgia Tech’s 
Graduate Conference Fund and the GTRC, the Natural Sciences and Engineering 
Research Council of Canada (NSERC), the Canadian "CONNECT" seminar and 
Llewelyn Hughes and Jennifer Spencer at the GWU CIBER Summer Doctoral Institute 
for their invaluable insights and collaboration. 
I thank my parents who have stood by me during the most difficult and rewarding 
times including my father, John, who unfortunately passed away during these years but 
who inspired me throughout my life. His love of learning, genuine curiosity and 
enthusiasm for living up to one’s potential are all qualities to which I aspire. My mother, 
Margaret, and twin sister, Lynn, were the model confidants, engaging with me in many 
intellectual discussions and providing constant encouragement especially when I thought 
I could not finish this task. David Alleva, Brian Alleva and Jeff Lilley understood 
completely why I wanted to pursue this dissertation despite all odds.  
Finally, words cannot express how much I value the devotion of my husband, 
Mark, and daughter, Sophie who has grown up over these years. Mark’s quiet nature, 
unparalleled patience and enlightened character provided the steady comfort that I needed 
to complete the dissertation. I could not have endured without him. Sophie brought much 
needed joy during at times a lonely experience and kept me laughing when I needed it. 
And her many successful swim meets at the Georgia Tech pool inspired me along the 













DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iv 
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................... xvii 
CHAPTER 1: COMMITMENT STRATEGIES AND SCIENCE-BASED INDUSTRIES
............................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Introduction and Puzzles ......................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Theory in Brief ........................................................................................................ 3 
1.2.1 Dependent Variable: Commitment Strategy .................................................. 3 
1.2.2. Independent Variable: Knowledge-Oriented Strategy Team (KOST) .......... 8 
1.2.3 Limitations ..................................................................................................... 9 
1.2.4 Hypotheses ................................................................................................... 10 
1.3 Research Design, Method and Data Collection .................................................... 10 
1.3.1 Cases Studies ............................................................................................... 11 
1.3.1.1 Why Regional Cases? ......................................................................... 12 
1.3.1.2 Why Canada? Comparing Industrialized, Federalist Countries .......... 15 
1.3.1.3 Why Bioscience? ................................................................................ 18 
1.3.1.4 Observation Period: Before and After The 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis ............................................................................................................... 22 
1.3.1.5 Problem-focused Approach ................................................................ 22 
1.3.2 Data Collection ............................................................................................ 23 
1.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 24 
1.4.1 Preview of Case Studies............................................................................... 24 









CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: "PUZZLING AND POWERING 
THROUGH" ..................................................................................................................... 31 
2.1 Introduction and Theory ....................................................................................... 31 
2.2 Variables and Measures ........................................................................................ 33 
2.2.1 Dependent Variable: Commitment Strategy ................................................ 35 
2.2.1.1 Generating Commitments: Roles, Incentives and Relational Contracts
......................................................................................................................... 37 
2.2.1.2 Separating “Commitment Strategies” from “Social Learning” and a 
KOST .............................................................................................................. 39 
2.2.1.3 Typology of Commitment Strategies .................................................. 41 
2.2.1.4 Selected Bioscience Strategy Choices ................................................ 46 
2.2.2 Independent Variable: Knowledge-Oriented Strategy Team (KOST) ......... 48 
2.2.2.1 How Does a KOST Differ from a Policy Community and Policy 
Network? ......................................................................................................... 51 
2.2.2.2 How Does a KOST Differ from Knowledge Cluster Mechanisms? ... 53 
2.2.2.3 Varying Characteristics of a KOST: Social Learning and Iterative 
Bargaining ....................................................................................................... 56 
2.2.2.4 Interaction Effects ............................................................................... 68 
2.2.2.5 Causal Mechanisms: Puzzling and Powering Through ...................... 68 
2.2.3 Additional Explanations ............................................................................... 71 
2.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 75 
CHAPTER 3: DESIGNING THE BIOECONOMY: SCHUMPETARIAN 
COMPETITION STATES? .............................................................................................. 77 
3.1 The Role of the State in the New Bioeconomy..................................................... 77 
3.2 Research Questions and Arguments ..................................................................... 80 
3.3 Comparing R&D Spending ................................................................................... 83 
3.4 The 2008 Global Financial Crisis: Divergence beneath Convergence? ............... 85 









3.4.1.1 The Challenge and Strategy Choice .................................................... 86 
3.4.2 Canada: To Protect or Compete - A New Economic Order? ....................... 91 
3.4.2.1 Introduction: Response to the Challenge ............................................ 91 
3.4.2.2 Finance ................................................................................................ 96 
3.4.2.3 Skill Development .............................................................................. 97 
3.4.2.4 Corporate Governance ........................................................................ 97 
3.4.2.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................... 98 
3.4.3 Australia: Building a “Modern” Economy .................................................. 99 
3.4.3.1 Introduction: Response to the Challenge ............................................ 99 
3.4.3.2 The Innovation System ..................................................................... 100 
3.4.3.3 The Strategy Debate .......................................................................... 101 
3.4.3.4 Finance .............................................................................................. 103 
3.4.3.4 Skill Development ............................................................................ 105 
3.4.3.5 Corporate Governance ...................................................................... 106 
3.4.3.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 107 
3.4.4 United States: Toward a Coordinated and Integrated Bioeconomy ........... 108 
3.4.4.1 Introduction: Response to the Challenge .......................................... 108 
3.4.4.2 The National Innovation System and the “Bioeconomy” ................. 109 
3.4.4.3 The Strategy Debate .......................................................................... 110 
3.4.4.4 Finance .............................................................................................. 113 
3.4.4.5 Skill Development ............................................................................ 114 
3.4.4.6 Corporate Governance ...................................................................... 115 
3.4.4.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 116 
3.5 Conclusion: Industrial Restructuring and the “Competition State” .................... 117 
CHAPTER 4: QUEBEC AND ONTARIO: LOCAL RESPONSES TO GLOBAL 









4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 121 
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics: Comparing Quebec and Ontario ............................ 123 
4.2 Background: 1980s Discovery of Recombinant DNA Techniques .................... 127 
4.2.1 A Problem-Focused Approach: Capturing the Benefits of a New Technology
............................................................................................................................. 127 
4.2.1.1 Quebec: The Unsustainable “Good Years”....................................... 128 
4.2.1.2 Ontario: The Province that “Does Not Change Well” ...................... 130 
4.3 The 2008 Global Financial Crisis: ...................................................................... 134 
4.3.1 Context: Industrial Reorganization and Strategic Responses .................... 134 
4.3.1.1 A Problem-Focused Approach: Understanding Opportunities, 
Leveraging Scarce Resources, and Creating Competencies ......................... 135 
4.3.1.2 Quebec: Picking up the Pieces .......................................................... 135 




4.3.1.3 Ontario: Fragmentation and Path Dependence? ............................... 157 
4.4 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 173 
4.4.1 Empirical Findings ..................................................................................... 173 
4.4.2 Theoretical Findings .................................................................................. 174 
CHAPTER 5: ATLANTA CANADA: COMMITMENT STRATEGIES IN ASPIRING 
BIOSCIENCE REGIONS ............................................................................................... 179 
5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 179 
5.2 Research Questions, Design and Method ........................................................... 181 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics: Comparing Atlantic Canadian Provinces ........................ 182 
5.3.1 Structure and Nature of the Industry and Markets ..................................... 183 
5.4 Bioscience Industry and Strategy Evolution: 1980 – 2007 ................................. 186 









5.4.1.1 New Brunswick ................................................................................. 187 
5.4.1.2 Newfoundland and Labrador ............................................................ 188 
5.4.1.3 Nova Scotia ....................................................................................... 188 
5.4.1.4 Prince Edward Island ........................................................................ 189 
5.4.2 Strategy Evolution ..................................................................................... 190 
5.4.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 194 
5.5 The 2008 Global Financial Crisis: A Change in Commitment Strategies? ........ 194 
5.5.1 Problem-Focused Approach: Balancing Traditional and Knowledge-Based 
Industries ............................................................................................................. 194 
5.5.1.1 New Brunswick ................................................................................. 198 
5.5.1.2 Newfoundland and Labrador ............................................................ 201 
5.5.1.3 Nova Scotia ....................................................................................... 207 
5.5.1.4 Prince Edward Island ........................................................................ 212 
5.6 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 217 
5.6.1 Empirical Findings ..................................................................................... 217 
5.6.2 Theoretical Findings .................................................................................. 219 
5.6.2.1 Potential Variables Affecting Bioscience Industry Performance ..... 221 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION: TOWARD LEARNING ECONOMIES? .................... 227 
6.1 Summary of Findings .......................................................................................... 227 
6.2 Theoretical Contribution ..................................................................................... 236 
6.3 Policy Contribution and Future Research ........................................................... 238 
APPENDIX A ................................................................................................................. 241 










LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1 List of Biotechnologies ........................................................................................ 21 
Table 2 Variables and Measures ....................................................................................... 34 
Table 3 Sample Elements of Bioscience Commitment Strategies .................................... 36 
Table 4 Orders of Social Learning and Indicators of Policy Change ............................... 40 
Table 5 Who Learns What? .............................................................................................. 50 
Table 6 Key Biotechnology Statistics Comparing Australia, Canada and the U.S. 
Biomedical R&D Expenditures (US$B) by Public Sector and Industry* ........................ 84 
Table 7 Snapshot: Comparing Country Strategies and Institutions .................................. 88 
Table 8 Bioscience Finance, Skill Development and Corporate Governance (Post-2008 
Financial Crisis) ................................................................................................................ 89 
Table 9 Finance, Skill Development and Corporate Governance ................................... 145 
Table 10 Finance, Skill Development and Corporate Governance ................................. 166 
Table 11 Atlantic Canadian Provinces Bioscience Statistics (2005/7) ........................... 185 
Table 12 Governance Organization, Policy and Key Individuals by Province (Pre-2008)
......................................................................................................................................... 193 
Table 13 Bioscience Finance, Skill Development and Corporate Governance (Pre/Post-
2008 Financial Crisis) ..................................................................................................... 196 











LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Bioscience Relations to Underlying Knowledge Base and Varied Applications
........................................................................................................................................... 20 
Figure 2 Theoretical Framework ...................................................................................... 32 
Figure 3 The Political Process: Puzzling & Powering Through ....................................... 75 
Figure 4 Bioscience Region: Technology Specialization & Market Diversification ..... 126 
Figure 5 Post-2008 Quebec Bioscience (Human Health) Network ................................ 142 
Figure 6 Canadian Technological and Institutional Changes ......................................... 242 
Figure 7 Australian Technological and Institutional Changes ........................................ 243 














ACOA Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency 
AAFC Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada  
AIMS Australian Institute for Marine Science 
ASX Australian Stock Exchange 
BCG Biotechnology Consultative Group  
BDC Business Development Bank of Canada  
BioNB Bio New Brunswick 
BMCC Biotechnology Ministerial Coordinating Committee  
BRI Biotechnology Research Institute 
BUDS Biotechnology Use and Development Survey - Canada 
CAFTA Canadian Free Trade Agreement 
CAN College of the North Atlantic 
CBAC Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee 
CBS Canadian Biotechnology Strategy 
CIPO Canada Intellectual Property Office 
COMET Commercializing Emerging Technologies 
CQDM Québec Consortium for Drug Discovery  
CRO Clinical Research Organization 
CSL Commonwealth Serum Laboratory  
DBF Dedicated Biotechnology Firm 
EACSR External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GMiA Generic Medicines Industry Association 
HRSDC Human Resources and Skill Development Canada  
IBRD Department of Innovation, Business and Rural Development  
IIO Innovation Institute of Ontario 
INB Invest New Brunswick  
IP Intellectual Property 
IPO Initial Public Offering 
IPR Intellectual Property Rights 
IR&D Industry Research and Development 
IRAP Industrial Research Assistance Program 
LSO Life Sciences Ontario 
MaRS Medical and Related Sciences  
MDEIE Ministry of Economic Development, Innovation and Exports  
MEDEI 










MEIE Ministry of Economy, Innovation and Exports  
MNC Multinational Corporation 
MOSST Ministry of State for Science and Technology 
MoST Ministry of Science and Technology 
MRI Ministry of Research and Innovation 
NAFTA North America Free Trade Agreement 
NAS National Academy of Sciences 
NATI 
Newfoundland and Labrador Association of Technology 
Industries 
NB New Brunswick 
NBAC National Biotechnology Advisory Committee 
NCATS National Center for Advancing Translational Science 
NCE New Chemical Entity 
NHMRC National Health and Medical Research Council's  
NIH National Institutes of Health 
NIS National System of Innovation 
NL Newfoundland 
NLAN Newfoundland and Labrador Angel Network  
NLCHI Newfoundland Center for Health Information (NLCHI) 
NRC National Research Council 
NS Nova Scotia 
NSERC Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada 
NSF National Science Foundation 
NVCF Northleaf Venture Catalyst Fund LG 
NYSE New York Stock Exchange 
OBEST Ontario Bioscience Economic Strategy Team 
OBIO Ontario Biotechnology Industry Organization  
OCGC Ontario Capital Growth Corporation  
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OETF Ontario Emerging Technologies Fund  
ON Ontario 
ORFAB Ontario Research Fund Advisory Board 
OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy 
OTA Office of Technology Assessment 
OVCF Ontario Venture Capital Fund LP  
PBS Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme  
PEI Prince Edward Island 
PFC Project-focused companies  
PIC Pharmaceuticals Industry Council  
PLQ Quebec Liberal Party 









PQ Parti Québécois  
PRO Public Research Organization 
QB Quebec 
R&D Research and Development 
RDC Research and Development Corporation  
rDNA Recombinant DNA 
RFP Request for Proposal 
RIS Regional Systems of Innovation 
ROI Return on Investment 
S&T Science and Technology 
SBI Science-based Industries 
SEUS-
CP Southeastern United States - Canadian Province 
SME Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
SR&ED Scientific Research and Experimental Development 
SSI Sectoral System of Innovation 
STEM Science, Technology, Engineering and Math  
TBI Toronto Biotechnology Initiative 
TPC Technology Partnerships Canada  
TRIPS Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
USPTO U.S. Patent and Trade Office 
VC Venture Capital 
VCR Venture Capital Registration  
VOC Varieties of Capitalism 
WIPSI Workplace Innovation and Productivity Skills Incentive  












Over the last few decades countries have been promoting knowledge-based industries, 
especially those requiring a significant scientific base like bioscience, as engines of 
economic growth.  Developed and, increasingly, developing economies see knowledge-
based industries as providers of skilled jobs, higher wages and technological innovation. 
Not only do industries heavily reliant on finance, research and development (R&D) and 
skilled labor innovate, but more traditional industries like agriculture use new 
technologies to upgrade products and processes. This transformation of the economic 
base, the argument continues, creates wealth and sustainable economic growth. 
This research address two puzzles: Why do similar regions within countries pursue 
different commitment strategies towards growing their bioscience industries? Why do 
some change in response to a global financial shock and others do not? 
I argue that the presence and strength of a knowledge-oriented strategy team (KOST) 
helps to explain different levels of and changes in bioscience commitment strategies. 
Different degrees of social learning – disruptive or incremental, and type of iterative 
bargaining – coordinated or fragmented distinguish a strong KOST from a weak or non-
existent one. This explanation as well as province’s size, natural resources, national 
institutions and path dependence more fully explain variation in commitment strategies.  
The research design includes comparisons at the national and sub-national level. The 
study compares three similar industrialized and federalist countries – Canada, Australia 
and the United States – emphasizing Canada. The study applies a most similar systems 
approach comparing the two large, industrialized provinces of Quebec and Ontario. 
Separately it compares the small, rural provinces of Atlantic Canada including New 
Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. Together these cases 
form a national composite of regional differences. 
The most significant finding of this research is that those Canadian provinces that 
established a strong KOST prior to the 2008 global financial crisis “puzzled and powered 











COMMITMENT STRATEGIES AND SCIENCE-BASED INDUSTRIES 
 
 
1.1 Introduction and Puzzles 
 
Over the last few decades countries and regions within them have been promoting 
knowledge-based industries as engines of economic growth. Strategies have specifically 
addressed those industries requiring a significant scientific base such as 
bioscience.
1
Industrialized and increasingly developing economies see them as providers 
of skilled jobs, higher wages and technological innovation. Science-based industries rely 
heavily on finance, research and development (R&D), and skilled labor to innovate, 
while traditional industries such as agriculture also use new technologies to upgrade 
products and processes.
2
 This transformation of the economic base creates wealth and 
strengthens global economic competitiveness.  
However, global shocks including a technological discovery or a financial crisis often 
disrupt this process. In response, regions and countries develop different commitment 
strategies in support of these industries. This dissertation attempts to improve our 
understanding of and explanations for what happens immediately after a global shock. It 
                                                 
 
1
The OECD defines “knowledge-based economies” as “economies which are directly based on the 
production, distribution and use of knowledge and information…In the knowledge-based economy, 
innovation is driven by the interaction of producers and users in the exchange of both codified and tacit 
knowledge; this interactive model has replaced the traditional linear model of innovation” (OECD, 1996, 
p. 7). Powell provides a more balanced definition, capturing both the productive and destructive 
elements, “…production and services based on knowledge-intensive activities that contribute to an 
accelerated pace of technical and scientific advance, as well as rapid obsolescence…The key component of 
a knowledge economy is a greater reliance on intellectual capabilities than on physical inputs or natural 
resources”  (Powell & Snellman, 2004, p. 5). Since I am primarily interested in how countries and regions 
choose strategies and change institutions in support of bioscience industry growth, I employ the Powell’s 
definition. 
2
I rely on Noisi’s definition of a “Science-based Industry” for this study. Here, firms and organizations with 
a relatively high ratio of R&D spending as a percentage of revenue is a key factor in determining whether 
or not the industry draws significantly from the development or use of scientific knowledge (Niosi, 2000, 















Puzzle: Why do similar regions within countries pursue different commitment strategies 
towards growing their bioscience industries? Why do some change in response to a 
global financial shock and others do not? 
 
Bioscience institutions help create opportunities for growth while managing risks 
associated with it. This is not surprising since theories of institutional change claim that 
individuals and organizations design institutions to capture opportunities that they could 
not on their own. Some organizations are constantly experimenting with new ways of 
coordinating economic activity to effectively facilitate the development of a bioscience 
industry since rapid technological change and uncertainty characterize the process 
leading to unusually high costs. But few theories explain how and why these formal and 
informal rules develop in the first place, how they change over time and why they vary 
across similar jurisdictions trying to tackle the same problem. 
Regions within countries are arguably the source of innovation. They design different 
institutions with varying degrees of success in transforming their industrial base despite 
the fact that they face the same globalization pressures and operate within the same 
national context (D. Wolfe & Gertler, 1998).
4
Initial conditions such as the type and 
amount of natural resources, existing industrial structures, population and land size partly 
explain the different types of commitment strategies and ultimately industrial 
                                                 
 
3
 I refer to Dahl’s definition of federalism, “a system in which some matters are exclusively within the 
competence of certain local units – cantons, states, provinces – and are constitutionally beyond the scope 
of the authority of the national government; where certain other matters are constitutionally outside the 
scope of the authority of the smaller units” (Dahl, 1986, pp. 114-126). 
4
I examine provincial level strategies since authority for designing industrial policies is shifting to or at 
least shared with provinces or states within countries and across many types of organizations. In addition, 
provinces both implement and influence national bioscience institutions. This is not to say that cities are 
not important actors in the process. But provincial agencies can aggregate interests across cities in the 









transformations. Holding these variables constant we still observe significant variation in 
both formal and informal rules with implications for industrial change. 
I draw upon the comparative political economy, historical institutionalism, 
institutional economics, economic geography and economic sociology literature to 
explain different commitment strategies associated with the bioscience industry. Below is 
a summary of the theory. Chapter two more fully elaborates the variables and causal 
mechanisms. 
1.2 Theory in Brief 
 
I examine the presence and strength of a knowledge-oriented strategy team (KOST) 
to explain varying levels of and changes in commitment toward a bioscience industry. 
States and regions typically generate formal strategies that inform that institutions are 
created, changed or decommissioned. But not all design formal strategies and even those 
who do often end up not implementing them. Some countries and regions follow the 
normal policy-making process by changing levels and types of investment in finance, 
skills and corporate governance without a major paradigm shift. Other countries change 
paradigms and overarching goals in partnership with society. All represent different 
levels of commitment towards capturing the benefits of the new technology while 
minimizing its risks. The presence and strength of a KOST helps to understand this 
variation. 
 
1.2.1 Dependent Variable: Commitment Strategy 
 
The dependent variable is “commitment strategy” including both the change in and 
degree of commitment. I conceive of commitments as institutions that have been created 
or changed as part of a larger strategy to develop a bioscience industry. Institutions can 
act as credible commitments necessary to facilitate low-cost transactions especially when 
they are specialized, difficult to reverse, and include incentives that are aligned  with the 
skills and knowledge perceived to offer the highest payoff (Kreps, 1996; D. C. North, 
1993). In other words, given the rising complexity of the science and nature of the 









rules that enable organizations to capture new opportunities at a lower transaction cost 
are necessary.  
I define a high commitment strategy as one where institutional complementarity in 
areas of finance, skill development and corporate governance exists. Each area includes 
formal and informal rules designed to reach shared, overarching goals among them. This 
complementarity represents a more holistic and strategic approach in support of 
bioscience industry goals.  
A mixed commitment strategy includes complementarity between two institutional 
areas like corporate governance and finance but not a third such as skill development. In 
this example industry and its firms may improve competencies by creating advisory or 
governing boards. The expectation is that boards will bring global networks of “angel” 
investors or venture capitalists who can contribute much needed financing and advice 
regarding corporate strategy. Without access to trained technicians, specialized 
researchers, or commercialization experts the strategy is in jeopardy of not reaching its 
goals. This approach is not holistic. 
A lack of institutional complementarity among the three areas equates to a low 
commitment strategy. In this case the commitment may include R&D investments but not 
immigration policies, technical programs or new university degrees designed to attract or 
produce bioscience skills required to conduct R&D effectively. 
To capture change in commitment strategies I first compare in each case the level of 
institutional complementarity before and after the 2008 global financial crisis and 
determine whether or not there was a change. Did any jurisdiction shift from lower R&D 
spending levels, few training programs and little collaboration experience between small 
biotech and large pharmaceutical firms to a fundamental paradigm change leading to 
higher levels of commitment? The direction of change toward higher or lower levels of 
institutional complementarity should become clear using this approach. This method also 
captures cases where there was no change before and after the crisis.  
I examine the presence and strength of a KOST to explain levels of and changes in 
bioscience commitment strategies in institutional levels of settings, programs and 
overarching goals. Settings include measures like the amount of R&D spending. 









Overarching goals reflect how countries and provinces frame the industry’s opportunities 
and costs within a vision for growth. Goals change when a paradigm shift occurs about 
where the opportunities lie and how to capture them. Shifts from basic research to 
technology commercialization or from individual firm R&D to collaboration projects via 
alliances with other organizations represent such changes. The section below illustrates 
the types of strategic choices that jurisdictions face and their relation to levels of 
commitment. 
Increased competition, rapid innovation, scarce resources and the rising complexity of 
the science have combined to shape common understandings of the problem and its 
solution. Post-2008 countries and regions embraced strategic approaches to developing 
their bioscience industries. Elements included leveraging resources across and within 
public and private sector organizations, creating interdisciplinary means to skill 
development, and establishing overarching goals directly related to economic growth. But 
tactically they differ in the commitment strategies they create. This difference is partly 
due to how choices are framed.  
 
The list below illustrates tensions inherent in these choices. 
 
 Public versus private sector leadership 
 Macro versus micro-level (top-down, big successes faster versus 
 “bubbling up” from the bottom at slower pace) 
 Horizontal versus specialized R&D and industry focus 
 FDI-led versus local industry-led development (creating knowledge- 
 spillovers) 
 Basic research versus commercialization 
 User versus producer of biotechnologies 
 Finance (public versus private, local versus global) 
 Skills (local versus global) 
 Bioscience versus other knowledge-based industries like ICT and  











High commitment strategies include institutional complementarity at all levels of 
settings, programs and overarching goals within finance, skill development and corporate 
governance. For example, increasing and diversifying R&D financing within the context 
of new ways of thinking about the role of finance can be coupled with similar changes in 
developing the skills and corporate strategies required to achieve new industry goals. 
The process of creating the commitment involves a strong KOST led by a specific 
government agency or industry association. Disruptive social learning occurs as 
participants frequently interact, sharing and reviewing technical reports, market trends, 
competitor analyses, new discoveries as well as monitoring and evaluating industry 
results, generating lessons learned from previous approaches and changing them as 
necessary. Decisions to change settings, tools and overarching goals result from regular 
discussions among diverse stakeholders and sometimes in response to a global shock or 
to a gradual understanding that future economic growth lies in knowledge-based 
industries. 
The diversity of stakeholder involvement in the strategy team can ultimately cultivate 
more opportunities for solutions. While these deliberations are often conflict-laden they 
can lead to consensus around how to proceed. But clearing this high bar is difficult and 
rare. 
Maintaining high levels of commitment to bioscience strategies is difficult and 
includes learning mechanisms that maximize the effectiveness of seemingly competing 
approaches. For example, jurisdictions like PEI and Quebec take nuanced approaches to 
solving the risk and return challenge. PEI balanced specialization with diversification 
rather than choosing between horizontal or specialized R&D. The province drew from its 
natural resources and committed to developing a bioactives niche broadly applicable to 
human and animal health.
5
 
Rather than choosing between FDI-led or local industry-led growth, addressing 
weaknesses in relationships between multinational corporations (MNCs) and local firms 
can create sustained opportunities and improve the quality of FDI. Weaknesses include 
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lack of local firm science or project management capabilities and scant information on 
local industry and incentives for MNCs to collaborate. Based on these measures and 
according to the data, Prince Edward Island and Quebec pursued high commitment 
strategies before and after the 2008 global financial crisis. 
In mixed commitment strategies the nature of the political process involves a weak 
KOST or the absence of a KOST but multiple policy communities. A weak KOST 
engages in incremental social learning combined with a coordinated, iterative bargaining 
approach. It is incremental and coordinated when there is some search globally for 
lessons learned, but changes in particular policy settings and techniques occur mostly in 
response to previous policy experience. There is no change in overarching goals or in 
political paradigms. Typical strategy elements include framing the problem as states 
versus markets and letting individual firm strategy lead. Ontario pre-2008 and Nova 
Scotia post-2008 fits this description. 
The other type of mixed commitment strategy involves the absence of a KOST. 
Separate policy communities engage in disruptive social learning within their own 
community, but compete among each other for resources. Elements of this type tend to 
reflect the tensions in the policy choices elaborated above. These include favoring 
commercialization over basic research, downstream over upstream R&D, investing in 
high-potential R&D rather than “R&D democracy” where financing is spread equally 
among firms and regions. Ontario, New Brunswick and Newfoundland post-2008 and 
Nova Scotia pre-2008 are representative cases (McKenna, 2011, p. 1). 
In low commitment strategies neither a KOST nor a bioscience strategy exists. 
Minimal social learning occurs and is reflected primarily in changes in settings like levels 
of R&D funding to universities. The bargaining process is fragmented since few if any 
strategy communities coordinate their efforts. The benefits of growing a bioscience 
industry are either not understood or compete with industries that are perceived to be 
more promising like digital media, oil and gas. New Brunswick and Newfoundland 
before the 2008 financial crisis pursued low levels of commitment to growing their 









1.2.2. Independent Variable: Knowledge-Oriented Strategy Team (KOST) 
 
I argue that a knowledge-oriented strategy team (KOST) with varying social learning 
(disruptive or incremental) and iterative bargaining (fragmented or coordinated) 
characteristics helps explain different types of and changes in commitment strategies. 
This process occurs especially after a global shock. Decision-makers seek ideas and 
lessons learned regarding what strategies and institutions are considered both legitimate 
and effective and combine them with inherited practices and principles in support of new 
goals. A process of iterative bargaining ensues as to what to do next and how as decision-
makers’ interests and preferences change in response to the shock. The results fall into 
high, mixed and low levels of commitment. 
I borrow Hall’s concept of social learning. It involves state organizations not only 
acquiring and assimilating information and building competencies but a concerted effort 
among participants to create mutual understandings about a particular industry, policy, 
strategy, set of techniques and goals (Hall 1993). I build on Ansell’s “project team” in his 
concept of the networked polity along with Hall’s, Bennett and Howlett’s understanding 
of a “knowledge-oriented policy community” as the agent of learning (Ansell, 2000, p. 
306; Bennett & Howlett, 1992, p. 285). I re-conceive of it as a knowledge-oriented 
strategy team indicating that strategy precedes policy development. Strategy involves the 
state and industry assuming roles to learn and build consensus around overarching goals 
and objectives while tactics involve steps and methods required to achieve them (Stiglitz 
& Greenwald, 2014). The resulting policy can involve creating new or changing existing 
formal or informal institutions. The team concept breaks down silos and pulls together 
disparate strategy networks around common rules and goals. 
A strong KOST has multiple and diverse stakeholders including national and sub-
national economic development and other relevant agencies, industry associations, local 
and multinational pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms, service providers, public 
research organizations, and universities. It is typically led by a government economic 
development agency or a peak industry association, not elected officials; involves written 
strategies, work plans with clear time-lines to complete agreed-upon tasks; clearly 









information, but improves competencies. Similar to a policy community, a strong KOST 
survives successive governments. The team is deliberative, flexible, inclusive, and 
members have clear roles and responsibilities as well as knowledge of latest science and 
industry trends.  
A strong KOST differs from policy networks and communities in that it consciously 
designs structures enabling it and its members to “learn by learning.” Institutions learn by 
self-monitoring and engaging in “reflexive” processes that apply institutional memory 
and intelligence to regular evaluations of goals, tools and processes (Gertler, Wolfe, & 
Shaw, 2002, p. 3). This social learning process can unleash new ideas, information and 
ways of doing things while disrupting previous understandings and processes.  
A strong KOST is more likely to generate consensus around goals by coordinating the 
iterative bargaining process. This effort helps to identify opportunities, problems and 
solutions to them while building competencies. It is a very high bar and ideal-type 
construction but a useful way to differentiate various types of policy networks and to 
create a theory of change in commitment strategies.  
A weak KOST engages in incremental social learning through regular information 
exchange rather than competence-building. A non-existent KOST implies that 
fragmented policy communities or networks drive low levels of commitment. I argue that 
as the presence and strength of a KOST changes so does its bioscience commitment 




A comprehensive analysis of social learning and bargaining would have to analyze 
dynamics within and among organizations and individuals at all levels (Gertler et al., 
2002).The analysis would have to examine learning within organizations like ministries 
of industry, health or agriculture that aspire to develop bioscience policy; learning among 
states and provinces about how to regulate biotechnology; learning among small 
biotechnology, large pharmaceutical and service firms around the most effective forms of 
collaboration; learning among individuals involved in the bioscience industry from VC 









These other levels and actors do impact the bioscience industry. I examine as much as 
possible the state, industry and university role in a KOST to account for the most 
transformative type of social learning, Hall’s third order that involves state and societal 
coordination around a new policy paradigm. For the sake of clarity and due to space 
constraints I use this systemic approach while emphasizing the changing role of the state 
at all levels. My main research goal is to explain the level and degree of change in 




This approach enables me to build a theory explaining variation in level of and 
change in commitment strategies drawing from the existing literature and empirical 
analysis of cases. I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A strong KOST in place prior to a global financial crisis is likely to 
maintain a high commitment strategy afterwards. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A weak KOST in place prior to a global financial crisis is likely to 
maintain a mixed commitment strategy afterwards. 
 
Hypothesis 3: When no KOST is present prior to a global financial crisis a low 
commitment strategy is likely to persist afterwards. 
 
 
1.3 Research Design, Method and Data Collection 
 
To test these hypotheses my research design captures regional variation within 









separate comparisons between the established bioscience regions of Ontario and Quebec 
and among the aspiring bioscience provinces in Atlantic Canada. Each group of 
provinces’ commitment strategies should be affected similarly and we should expect the 
jurisdictions to respond in the same way to the 2008 global financial crisis. 
While path dependence theorists claim that we should expect commitment levels to 
change, little is known about how this change occurs and why it varies. I set parameters 
around the type of institutions examined targeting three: finance, skill development, and 
corporate governance. Industry acknowledges that all three are critical to bioscience 
industry evolution and sustainability. 
The dissertation applies a comparative, longitudinal case study method to test 
hypotheses. It uses an inductive approach, letting the evidence from these cases unveil 
patterns and explanations that are externally valid (George & Bennett, 2005; Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Ragin, 1987).To identify and elaborate causal mechanisms, I apply 
George’s “structured, focused comparison of cases”(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 67). 
This technique makes theory-building possible as the same questions are asked of each 
case producing comparable data. Finally, my research errs on the side of capturing 
complexity and nuance rather than on parsimony and simplicity. 
 
1.3.1 Cases Studies 
 
The research first compares the evolution of bioscience strategies and configuration 
of institutions across similar federalist countries emphasizing Canada. It broadly 
compares the changing role of the state and its interactions with industry and the 
university, their interests, processes of learning about new ways of creating knowledge-
based industries and the resulting strategies and institutions. The study then compares and 
evaluates sub-national cases within Canada using a most similar systems approach. I 
explore the three critical areas in that bioscience institutions operate: finance, skill 
development and corporate governance. 
The two established regions are Ontario and Quebec. These are large, industrialized 
economies that drive Canada’s growth. They also represent the majority of the country’s 









to see high levels of commitment to bioscience given the provinces’ access to resources 
and the success that each has had in industrializing over decades. But since the 1980s 
Ontario and Quebec pursued different strategies leading to different bioscience 
commitment levels.  
I chose to compare the four “catch-up” provinces of Atlantic Canada including Nova 
Scotia, Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island since they are 
representative of small, rural regions experimenting with different strategies to catalyze 
bioscience niche areas. Why did the smallest Canadian province and “crucial case,” 
Prince Edward Island, design and implement a high commitment strategy leading to early 
signs of industry sustainability (Eckstein, 1975, pp. 94-137)? The three remaining 
provinces committed at mixed or low levels despite benefiting from the same national 
institutions like the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency and sharing common histories 
and socioeconomic status.  
Including both established and “catch up” regions within a single country case 
enables me to get the full variation on both independent and dependent variables while 
holding several variables constant. This approach enables greater control over 
explanatory variables while facilitating relative independence among cases (Linz & De 
Miguel, 1966; Snyder, 2001). Finally, this research advances Owen-Smith and Powell’s 
conclusions that “there are multiple pathways to similar outcomes” and not necessarily a 
“‘standard’ model of regional innovative success” or failure (Owen-Smith, Powell, & 
Figures, 2006, p. 5). 
 
1.3.1.1 Why Regional Cases? 
 
Comparative political economy research fails to adequately address institutional 
disparities related to science-based industries (SBIs) among regions within countries.
6
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According to the OECD, “A country's science system takes on increased importance in a knowledge-based 
economy.” The science system includes PROs, universities, firms, financial institutions, service 
organizations and contributes to the key functions of knowledge production, transmission and transfer. 
The science system’s main challenge is in transforming its traditional functions with its newer role as “an 









Usually these scholars compare national-level data across countries to explain variation 
in institutional design, technological innovation and industry growth. These data typically 
include spending on research and development (R&D), the value of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), intellectual property rights and patent legislation, and, the effects of 
these variables on technological innovation measured by various indicators including 
patent counts. Furthermore, even national-level institutions are sometimes the result of 
negotiating compliance with international regimes such as the Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). So the sub-national level is still ignored. 
On the other end of the spectrum, scholars argue that regional institutions facilitate 
information-sharing and learning among organizations located within close proximity to 
each other (P. Cooke, 2001). This learning leads to new products, processes and 
technologies, which sustain long-term growth. Studying regions as a unit of analysis, 
therefore, is important for three reasons. 
First, scholarly research reveals that authority for designing industrial strategies and 
policies is shifting to or at least shared with regions within countries and across many 
types of organizations from firms to industry associations to specific government 
agencies (P. Cooke & Morgan, 1998; Hooghe, Marks, & Institut für Höhere Studien, 
2003). Second, regions have become the center of innovative activity, facilitating 
knowledge-sharing and learning while impacting national-level growth (P. Cooke, 
Uranga, & Etxebarria, 1998; Saxenian, 1996). Scientists, venture capitalists, 
biotechnology firms, large pharmaceutical companies and government agency 
representatives residing in close proximity to each other are more likely to engage in 
repeated interactions (P. Cooke, 2002; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). This 
behavior can build trust, reciprocity and create social capital that explains variation in 
levels of industrial growth among regions within countries (Putnam, 1993). 
Third, successful regional policies design local institutions such as financial 
regulations and labor markets to fit industry-specific needs (Locke, 1995; Malerba, 
2002). They do not simply implement a one-size fits all national strategy. But national 
level policies and global networks do have an impact (D. Breznitz, 2007; Edquist, 1997; 
B. Ä. Lundvall, 1992). National strategies often provide funding, technical assistance and 









conflict with local institutions. Ultimately, local individuals and organizations who share 
similar beliefs about technology objectives make innovation policy (P. N. Cooke, 
Heidenreich, & Braczyk, 2004; Segal & Thun, 2001). 
In addition to bringing regional strategies and institutions into the analysis, evaluating 
high-tech, innovative industries as opposed to traditional commodity-producing 
industries is important since scholars recognize them as key drivers for long-term growth 
in today’s global economy (Nelson & Winter, 2002; Niosi, 2000; Schumpeter, 1950). For 
example, governments invest in bioscience research institutes, university degree 
programs in microbiology designed to meet industry’s labor demands, and R&D grants. 
At the same time, firms strategically take advantage of these institutions to develop new 
products, processes and technologies (Gertler & Vinodrai, 2009; B. Ä. Lundvall, 1992; 
Nelson, 1986; Niosi & Tomas, 2003). This interaction can increase competitiveness and 
long-term growth as new ideas for products and processes are continually uncovered and 
exploited. 
I argue that evaluating this variation improves our understanding of industrialized and 
federalist countries’ science-based industries as a national composite of regional 
differences. Not only does it provide insights into why established bioscience regions 
design different strategies and institutions, but this approach explains why decision-
makers in similar, aspiring bioscience regions develop different strategies and 
institutional configurations conducive or not to industry emergence. 
Regional strategic choices can involve whether to dedicate resources in support of 
niche elements of the product value-chain, like clinical research services, and subsectors 
such as nutraceuticals and bioinformatics, or, to the entire value chain such as 
pharmaceutical drug research, development, manufacturing and distribution. They 
involve the varying ways that regional economic development agencies decide to 
implement national strategies. Regional institutions range from tax incentives designed to 
attract FDI to blended national-regional R&D funding, public-private partnerships in new 
research fields such as genomics, and financing like venture capital funds. 
While other comparative political economists have explained varying levels of 
economic performance using a similar research design and applying it to traditional 









based industries like bioscience (Herrigel, 2000; Locke, 1995; Segal & Thun, 2001; 
Sinha, 2003). Economic geographers have extensively analyzed various factors 
explaining knowledge cluster emergence and sustainability, from a sufficient knowledge 
base to second generation entrepreneurs to institutional reforms, but relatively little work 
has examined the processes by which clusters develop and how political interests at 
multiple governance levels affect them (P. Braunerhjelm & M. P. Feldman, 2006; S. 
Breznitz, Tahvanainen, & Tutkimuslaitos, 2010; Gertler & Vinodrai, 2009; D. Wolfe & 
Holbrook, 2000).  
Innovation systems scholars debate whether national or regional institutions explain 
industry growth and whether factors vary among sectors and technologies (Bergek, 
Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark, & Rickne, 2008; P. Cooke et al., 1998; Edquist, 2001; B. 
Ä. Lundvall, 1992; B. Å. Lundvall, 2007; Malerba, 2004). But few weave together these 
levels and types of analysis to explain how commitment strategies are created in the first 
place with implications for performance.
7
 Opening the “black box” of the political 
process helps to understand changes in commitment strategies after the 2008 global 
financial crisis and variation among regions. 
 
1.3.1.2 Why Canada? Comparing Industrialized, Federalist Countries 
 
Canada is a typical case of an industrialized, federalist country that spends a 
significant amount on bioscience R&D and embraces the “bioeconomy” concept but has 
difficulty patenting research and innovating products and processes. The country is 
known for its globally competitive bioscience research base compared to other 
industrialized, federalist OECD countries. In 2008 Canadian public and private sector 
investment in biotechnology R&D reached 6.7% and 7.2% of GDP, respectively.
8
 These 
proportions are well above Australia’s at 1.3% and 1.1% and similar to the United States’ 
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 I build on Marshall’s concept of agglomeration as well as Porter’s definition of clusters as, “geographic 
concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field.” I use clusters as a way 
to study their collective impact on the region, though the region is the primary unit of analysis. (Porter, 
1998) 
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private sector investment at 7.8%. They are significantly less than Germany’s and Spain’s 




These investment figures do not necessarily correlate with each country’s global 
share of patents, which is an indicator of technological innovation. For example, 
Australia and Switzerland spend very different amounts on biotech R&D as a percentage 
of GDP but their global share of patents is the same at 1.6%. I argue that while these 
R&D investment levels are an important element of a commitment strategy they can lead 
to policies that rely primarily on R&D spending versus other important factors. 
To identify and understand these factors I look to the subnational level where federal 
and provincial stakeholders interact, creating variation in bioscience commitment 
strategies. Even though nationally Canada has embraced the promise of a “bioeconomy” 
and has made significant institutional changes after the 2008 financial crisis to capture 
new opportunities, these changes do not represent all that is being transformed. Beneath 
the surface the country’s provinces and their stakeholders engage in different types of 
social learning and iterative bargaining around their own bioscience industry goals and 
strategies. These dynamics create a national composite of regional differences.  
The study pays attention to institutions that provide structure governing federal – 
provincial relations within the context of the bioscience industry. Canada’s federalist 
constitution prescribes financial support for welfare and income equalization across the 
provinces, which is an element not found in all federalist constitutions such as the United 
States’.
10
 These rules directly relate to the creation of organizations and mechanisms like 
the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency that provides R&D financing to the “catch-
up” provinces of Canada. This study focuses on the three institutional areas of finance, 
skill development and corporate governance. It more broadly addresses regulations 
critical to the industry’s growth including intellectual property rights. I examine 





Many federations such as Germany, South Africa, Australia, India and others include similar rules that 









commitment strategies as my dependent variable while uncovering implications for 
performance. 
Canada represents an important, useful case since historically natural resources and 
traditional industries like agriculture, mining, transportation, oil and gas and tourism have 
driven its economy. Federal and provincial policy-makers over time created commitment 
strategies designed to facilitate science and technology-based industries as drivers of 
economic development. This case enables the researcher to examine drivers of these 
institutional changes representing different levels of commitment and changes to them 
before and after the 2008 financial crisis. 
While scholars have examined Canadian regional innovation systems related to a 
variety of science and technology-based industries, none have systematically compared 
separately both groups of established and aspiring bioscience regions over specific phases 
of development within a single study (Niosi, 2005; Niosi & Bas, 2001; D. Wolfe & 
Gertler, 1998).
11
Most other countries do not offer the same opportunity to conduct 
controlled comparisons.  
Nor have scholars examined the idea of a KOST and its impact on commitment 
strategies within this context. To keep the scope of this dissertation manageable, I focus 
on the role of the state and its interactions with industry, the broader KOST and related 
policy networks rather than trying to examine every type of actor at all levels and their 
learning relationships, which would be nearly impossible. 
Despite its competitive global position, Canada is a relatively understudied case 
compared to other countries like Germany, Italy and the U.S. Canada’s biotechnology 
industry is sizeable measured in terms of number of companies, 293 in 2010, which 
places it 9
th
 after the UK and Australia and before Switzerland and the Netherlands 
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See Biotechnology Use and Development Surveys (BUDS) beginning in 1996 by Statistics Canada. The 
first survey, “Survey of Biotechnology Use in Canadian Industries – 1996”, assessed the use of 
biotechnology by selected Canadian industries: Aquaculture and Forestry, Agro-industry, Wood, Pulp and 
Paper, Coal/Oil/Gas, and Chemicals. Strong indications of widespread biotechnology utilization by the 
Canadian industry gave rise to the Biotechnology Firm Survey – 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005. 
Surveys from 1999-2005 went beyond measuring the use of biotechnologies to emphasize the development 









(OECD).In addition to being the world’s second largest country by land mass it is the 
world’s 11
th
 largest economy with a GDP in 2011 of $1.74 trillion. Canada was the 10th 
largest economy in the world until 2011 when Russia surpassed it. The above evidence 
reveals Canada’s federalist structure making it conducive to analysis of regional variation 
in bioscience commitment strategies as well as its significant yet understudied place in 
the global knowledge economy. 
 
1.3.1.3 Why Bioscience? 
 
The value of the global bioscience industry -pharmaceutical, medical and assistive 
devices, and biotechnology – is significant. The market for products, services and 
technologies exceeded $2 trillion in 2010 and is expected to grow to $4 trillion by 
2020.
12
Many countries and regions within them, both industrialized and developing, have 
explicitly targeted the growth of bioscience as part of their industrial policies. Financing 
is critical to the industry at all stages of product development. 
This evidence represents a shared, explicit recognition that a knowledge-based 
industry like bioscience is likely to yield significant economic and social benefits. 
Whether or not this is truly the case is debatable (Wong, 2011).Technological, economic 
and temporal uncertainty in biotechnology all play a role in shaping not only the 
construction of institutions and organizational structures, but the elusive possibilities for 
the industry’s growth (Wong, 2011).
13
 
It is helpful to clarify a few definitions. The field of bioscience is defined as 
knowledge gained from the study of living organisms and applied toward health goals 
(OECD). Subfields underpinning bioscience range from molecular biology and genetics 
to biophysics and biochemistry. 
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 See Ontario Life Sciences Commercialization Strategy – 2010 
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Wong distinguishes between mitigating risk and managing uncertainty in his analysis of East Asia’s 
attempts to growth a biotech sector. Risk relates to calculated probabilities based upon quality 
information while uncertainty, a step prior to risk evaluation, involves only possibilities since within 









Biotechnology, on the other hand, involves the use of biological techniques applied to 
new health research and product development like biopharmaceuticals. The world’s first 
biotechnology drug, a human insulin product called “Humulin” launched by Eli Lilly in 
1982, is an example. In particular, biotechnology refers to the use by industry of 
recombinant DNA, cell fusion, and new bioprocessing techniques. This method contrasts 
with traditional pharmaceutical development. 
In the latter case, firms and their biochemists screen thousands of new chemical 
entities through a trial and error approach to determine which combinations are effective 
against disease. Biotechnology, on the other hand, is concerned more with understanding 
disease mechanisms then developing larger molecules from living organisms to fight the 
disease. 
Since the 1960s, scientists and those involved in the application of biological 
processes have been shifting from applying biotechnology at the “macro level” – 
including breeding animals and crops – to the “micro level” - manipulating cells and 
biological molecules (Guilford-Blake & Strickland, 2008). Using biotechnology at this 
micro-level to develop products enables a much higher level of specificity, preciseness 
and predictability, much different from the previous trial and error approaches at the 
macro level (Guilford-Blake & Strickland, 2008). 











Source: Data collected and configured by the author.








The table below identifies specific biotechnologies used to develop new therapies for 
human and animal health, food security, environmental and industrial purposes. 
 
 
Table 1 List of Biotechnologies 
Selection and modification technologies Recombinant DNA 
 Antibodies/antigens 
 Peptide synthesis 
 Rational drug design 
 Monoclonal antibodies 
 Gene probe 
 Gene therapy 
 DNA amplification 
  




 Bio gas cleaning 
  
Culture and use of biological material Tissue culture 





 Microbial inoculant 








1.3.1.4 Observation Period: Before and After The 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
 
I chose to examine variation in response to one global shock: the financial crisis of 
2008. The choice of this shock is most important since finance is critical to the bioscience 
industry. Early stage market failures and long product development times require finance 
at all stages of growth. I first evaluate Canada’s, Quebec’s and Ontario’s bioscience 
strategy evolution since the 1980s as context. I then compare their commitment strategies 
just before and in response to the 2008 financial crisis. This approach enables me to 
capture the change in strategy. For the four aspiring bioscience regions, I only compare 
their commitment strategy development just before and in response to the 2008 financial 
crisis. During the 1980s and 1990s these jurisdictions did not have significant bioscience 
capabilities. 
 
1.3.1.5 Problem-focused Approach  
 
I apply the same set of questions to each case and follow Gourevitch’s approach by 
exploring problem-focused issues and where they intersect (Gourevitch, 1986). In the 
1980s the problem was how to create the capabilities to learn the new biotechnologies 
and how to successfully apply them to agricultural, environmental and health challenges. 
Over time and during the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the problem became how 
to leverage scarce resources while still innovating to meet both corporate growth and 
government economic development goals. This particular challenge involved several sub-
issues including how to ensure continuous financing from diverse sources over the 
product cycle, fill the skills gap in both the private and public sectors, successfully 
translate basic research into new technologies and how to commercialize them, and 
managing uncertainty. 
I examine bioscience because the majority of developed countries incorporate 
bioscience in their industrial policies. Bioscience is a broad sector that includes a diverse 
group of industries that apply knowledge gained from living organisms to improve our 








technologies based on cellular processes. In this dissertation I use the terms 
interchangeably as required. 
Choosing a more broad-based industry such as bioscience, rather than biotechnology 
alone, facilitates comparison among subfields. It enables analysis of the political process 
– social learning and iterative bargaining - involved in deciding which activities should 
be included in regional and national strategies. These subfields range from agricultural, 
forestry and marine biotechnology to bioinformatics and bioactives. Comparing countries 
and regions over two distinct time-periods enables me to determine who learns what and 
how as well as changes in these. 
 
1.3.2 Data Collection 
 
My primary data-gathering technique involves semi-structured interviews with a 
representative sample of biotech and pharmaceutical company owners and researchers, 
provincial and national government bioscience industry specialists, policy decision-
makers, national and provincial research institutions, clinical research organizations, 
industry associations, banks and venture capital fund managers and service providers. 
Since response rates by bioscience organizations to email, phone and on-line surveys is 
known to be quite low primarily due to sensitivity of corporate information, face-to-face 
interviews are the most effective method of securing reliable data. 
Between 2010 and 2014, I held 110 interviews in Canada. My many years of 
experience working with Canadian, Australian and U.S. federal and provincial 
government agencies on different trade and investment projects some of which related to 
the bioscience industry inform this dissertation. These interviews are based on a set of 
predetermined and tested question. They enable not only consistent acquisition of data 
but the opportunity for interviewees to elaborate on questions of particular relevance. 
This process often uncovers explanatory variables previously unknown. 
Some data was drawn from interviews with individuals who have been active in the 
Canadian bioscience industry in each province under study and during the timeframe of 
this study from 1980s to the present. These individuals provided useful information on 








second-generation entrepreneurs, scientists, managers and investors who entered the field 
over the last 10-15 years. The individuals interviewed specified recent trends in 
bioscience R&D, financing and organizational management. I collected names of 
individuals from industry associations, conference organizers and used a snowball 
technique by asking interviewees for additional references in order to follow 
conversational threads pertinent to the research. 
By attending key industry conferences including BIO in 2010 in Atlanta, SEUS-CP 
Alliance conference in Raleigh, NC, and BioContact in 2012 and 2013 in Quebec City, 
Canada I gained greater technical understanding of bioscience and interviewed executives 
and researchers. I conducted additional industry research with a neuroscientist, bio-
psychologist, and biochemist in order to gain greater technical understanding of the field. 
I reviewed existing survey data collected by Statistics Canada (BUDS), the OECD, 
USPTO, CIPO and other agencies as well as local and federal government bioscience and 
industrial policy documents, corporate profiles, and industry publications. 
The study involved data collected from a survey conducted with bioscience 
executives in Prince Edward Island, an aspiring bioscience region. The research team 
analyzed results using social network analysis. It was more feasible to conduct longer 
surveys in this region where there are fewer organizations. This analysis enabled me to 
make conclusions specific to aspiring regions that could be tested with other similar cases 




1.4.1 Preview of Case Studies 
 
After the 2008 global financial crisis the bioscience industry restructured. The state’s 
role in coordinating economic activity changed. Interventionist states and market-led 
economies converged towards the “Competition State” and its supply-side support for 
technological innovation, promotion of open global markets, and power-sharing with 








Canada and its provinces are useful case studies as they puzzle and power through 
different ways of creating bioscience commitment strategies. Knowledge-oriented 
strategy teams at the provincial level play a role in this process. Evidence supports the 
claim that a strong KOST in place prior to the 2008 global financial crisis maintains a 
high commitment strategy afterwards.  
 
Canada: Country Context 
 
Canada is known for its strong, globally competitive bioscience research base. Yet 
like many similar countries, Canada has difficulty commercializing new technologies. 
The country embraced the “bioeconomy” and made significant institutional changes 
before and after the 2008 global financial crisis to address this weakness.  
Early in the discovery, patenting and commercialization of products using rDNA 
techniques, Canada, in contrast to other similar states like Australia, sought to 
aggressively capitalize on the value of the new technology. In 1983 the country 
established its first explicit biotech strategy, the National Biotech Strategy and its 
Advisory Committee. A policy community formed around the new science and ways to 
commercialize technologies to address natural resources and environmental challenges. 
Since 1983 the federal government has adapted its strategy to changing domestic and 
global circumstances. A strategic shift towards human health, new R&D funding 
mechanisms, a stronger regulatory environment, and the establishment in 2008 of 
National Centers of Excellence throughout the provinces illustrate the breadth of reforms. 
But by the early 2000s progress in sustaining the growth of new biotech firms and 
attracting FDI slowed. The 2008 financial crisis immediately shrunk the number of 
bioscience firms and risk financing supporting them.  
In response, the Harper government in 2012 enacted Canada’s latest innovation 
strategy, “Innovation Canada: A Call to Action.” It focused less on basic research and 
more on public sector-industry collaborations leading to product commercialization. The 
goal was to improve Canada’s economic competitiveness globally by funding 








from Canada’s traditional approach of “R&D democracy” involving the spread of 
financing equally across provinces (McKenna, 2011, p. 1). 
A centralization of innovation strategy development was occurring. To tighten links 
among science, technology, and global economic competitiveness, the government 
reinstated the Ministry of Science and Technology, which now reports directly to the 
Prime Minister. This shared common paradigm values commercialization and industry 
over a previous emphasis on basic university and NRC R&D. In fact, government and 
industry R&D spending decreased between 2007 and 2012. Even though a shift in 
overarching goals with a new emphasis on industry collaborations occurred, the reduction 
in federal R&D funding, disagreements and lack of coordination with the provinces and 
with basic research advocates may prevent goal attainment. 
This research uncovers the nature of changes in the country’s commitment strategy. 
But at the federal level it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine in detail the 
social learning and iterative bargaining processes nationally. The country’s provinces 
engaged in different types of social learning and iterative bargaining to construct their 
own bioscience industries. Understanding these diverse approaches helps to explain 





Quebec and Ontario 
 
Large, industrialized provinces like Quebec and Ontario should contain the requisite 
resources and capabilities to capture opportunities offered by growth industries like 
bioscience. Significant financial resources, many high quality universities and an 
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 Canada is an important case of a country trying to rebalance its traditional industries with knowledge-
based ones like bioscience.  The Canadian case offers an opportunity to make comparisons at the sub-
national level. Regions within federalist countries retain authority to design their own industrial strategies 
and technological innovation occurs among organizations within close proximity. Furthermore, it is one of 
the few federalist countries with an income and service equalization clause in its Constitution. Specific 
federal organizational institutions like the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency are designed to help New 
Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island “catch-up” with other wealthier 
provinces like Quebec and Ontario. I make controlled comparisons among the Atlantic Canadian provinces 








agglomeration of firms are all present in these provinces. Furthermore, knowledge gained 
from successfully facilitating the growth of traditional industries like automotive, 
aerospace, plastics, and agriculture should spillover to new industries (Stiglitz & 
Greenwald, 2014). However, while Quebec has secured relatively high levels of 
commitment to sustaining the bioscience industry, Ontario has not. Quebec’s strong 
KOST and previous experiences with public-private partnerships versus Ontario’s weak 
KOST before the 2008 global financial crisis and competing policy communities 




Because the aspiring bioscience provinces of Atlantic Canada – New Brunswick, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island – were all “catch-
up” regions during the 1970s and 1980s, none were capable of responding with economic 
strategies or regulatory changes to the modern biotechnology discoveries at the time. 
Most relied on previous practices and principles supporting traditional industries. This is 
not to say that historically the regions did not apply simpler forms of biotechnologies. For 
example, in 1820 Alexander Keith began making beer in Nova Scotia using the 
fermentation process. University research in biology and chemistry continued. By the 
1980s larger firms along with universities acted as anchors in provinces like New 
Brunswick in areas of plant science and agriculture. 
Today, Newfoundland and New Brunswick suffer from path dependence as vested 
interests favor innovations in traditional industries such as offshore oil and gas as well as 
forestry. Others, including Nova Scotia enjoyed early success in bioscience industry 
growth led primarily by individual firm commitment strategies and some effort by the 
industry association to develop a broad strategy. However, old paradigms framing the 
challenge as “states vs. markets” have prevented the creation of a strong KOST and a 
high commitment to the industry.  
The least likely case, Prince Edward Island, illustrates why and how a strong 








Island’s small size - it is the smallest province by population and land mass in Atlantic 
Canada - makes it easier to gather stakeholders, deliberate, share information, build 
competencies, and reach consensus around industry goals, this argument does not stand. 
Other provinces similar in size, like Newfoundland or New Brunswick especially their 
largest cities St. John’s and Fredericton, have not been able to develop the same high 
level of commitment.  
In addition to the strength of a KOST and multiple policy communities, other 
variables help explain different levels of and changes in commitment strategies. These 
include factor endowments, size, rival industries, national institutions, and previous 
decisions and events. This research explores these variables alongside the presence and 
strength of a KOST. 
  
1.4.2 Plan of Dissertation 
 
The rest of the dissertation follows the following structure. Chapter two develops the 
theory further. It defines, conceptualizes and operationalizes the dependent variable, 
commitment strategies, and independent variable, a KOST. It explores characteristics of a 
KOST including social learning and iterative bargaining and how these affect its strength. 
It also explains how the KOST engages in these processes to affect bioscience 
commitment levels. The chapter explains how the dissertation builds on alternative 
explanations and again previews case findings. 
Chapter three situates Canada in global context. It first explains the role of the 
“Schumpeterian Competition State” in designing the new bioeconomy. This is important 
particularly for policy recommendations since many states and regions are experimenting 
with new roles as they facilitate knowledge-based industries. The chapter compares 
Canada with the United States and Australia, two other industrialized, federalist 
countries, and each country’s response to the 2008 global financial crisis. The analysis 
uncovers a convergence around the concept of the “bioeconomy” but divergence of 









Chapter four evaluates the Quebec and Ontario cases representing large, 
industrialized provinces with significant bioscience assets. It briefly examines how each 
province developed strategies in response to the 1980s discovery of recombinant DNA 
techniques in order to capture the benefits of the new technology. It reviews major policy 
decisions and strategies leading up to the 2008 global financial crisis as well as the actors 
involved. This section is followed by an in-depth analysis of Quebec and Ontario’s 
commitment strategies just before and after the 2008 global financial crisis. By this time 
the problem changed toward how to create a common understanding of challenges and 
opportunities, leverage scarce resources and create competencies. The chapter determines 
whether or not commitment levels changed and explores the role of a KOST and other 
variables throughout the process. It provides insights into how large, industrialized 
regions can either maintain high commitment levels through disruptive social learning 
and iterative bargaining processes after a global shock, as in the Quebec case, or mixed 
levels through fragmented policy communities such as in Ontario. 
Chapter five analyzes the four aspiring bioscience provinces of New Brunswick, 
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island in the Atlantic region of Canada. 
It is similar in structure to chapter four. The least likely case of Prince Edward Island and 
its strong KOST leading to a high bioscience commitment strategy is contrasted against 
the other three provinces and their low and mixed commitment levels. Natural resources, 
national institutions, rival industries and size also influenced both the nature of the 
strategy as well as the level of commitment. 
Chapter six concludes by evaluating results of the case studies in relation to the 
hypotheses established in this chapter. It summarizes why and how a strong KOST prior 
to a global financial crisis can maintain high levels of commitment to a bioscience 
industry afterwards. It also explains why a weak KOST or a few fragmented policy 
communities can create mixed commitment strategies while the lack of a KOST and any 
significant policy community leads to low levels of commitment to bioscience. The 
chapter provides implications for theories of institutional creation and change, filling 
gaps in the comparative political economy literature. It explores policy implications for 



















THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:  
 




2.1 Introduction and Theory 
 
In this chapter I present a theoretical framework explaining the way that commitment 
strategies related to science-based industries develop after a global shock. Opening this 
black box facilitates greater understanding of what the specific governance mechanisms 
are for transmitting ideas, information, knowledge, and building consensus around the 
way forward. This activity can lead to high (holistic), mixed or low levels of commitment 
to industry goals. Understanding this process and the factors that drive it is important as 
they create different trajectories with long-term effects. These consequences can be 
positive in terms of stabilizing the industry while capturing opportunities or negative by 
remaining trapped in outdated, ineffective institutions. 
The dependent variable is commitment strategy. The independent variable is the 
knowledge-oriented strategy team (KOST). I argue that the presence or not and strength 
of a KOST helps to explain variation and change in commitment strategies. The degree to 
which the KOST engages in the process of social learning and iterative bargaining 
influences the level of commitment. I conceptualize social learning as either disruptive or 
incremental. The iterative bargaining process can be either coordinative or fragmented. 
These components comprise a political process that impacts commitment strategies in 




















2.2 Variables and Measures 
 
Governing a bioscience industry compared to other technology-based industries like 
ICT is difficult. The high level of uncertainty, rapid innovation and many scientific 
disciplines, application areas and actors involved create distinct challenges. 
Pharmaceutical multi-national corporations (MNCs), biotech start-up firms, clinical 
research organizations, hospitals, universities, government agencies, patient groups, 
venture capitalists and various service providers all carry distinct knowledge domains 
creating a potential source of technological innovation. But these stakeholders also bring 
competing interests.  
Actors like state agencies or industry associations respond to this challenge by 
developing strategies and institutions in order to help individual organizations capture 
opportunities that they could not on their own. In bioscience the most significant 
institutions include formal and informal rules governing finance, skill development and 
corporate governance. These institutions are detailed in Table 2. Rules range from R&D 
funding to training programs to corporate “make or buy” decisions. Attempts to govern 
these complex forms of economic organization among groups often fail because of 
information asymmetries, competing interests, potential opportunism, or incompatible 
time-lines (Alleva-Caceres, 2014; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).  
Prior to creating institutions states typically generate formal strategies and plans that 
inform which institutions are created, changed or decommissioned. Despite this trend not 
all countries and regions design formal strategies and even those who do often end up not 
implementing them. Some take a more tactical approach changing levels and types of 
investment in finance, skills and corporate governance but do not change overarching 
goals. All represent different levels of credibility and commitment towards capturing the 
benefits of the new technology while minimizing its risks. Table 1 defines commitment 








Table 2 Variables and Measures 
Variable Characteristics/Claim Measures/Indicators Literature 
DV     
 
Commitment Strategy Comprised of goals, techniques and settings (e.g. amount of R&D 
investment) in three institutional areas of finance, skill development and 
corporate governance. Commitments are specialized; difficult to 
reverse; result from repeated interactions; create trust; facilitate 
information/knowledge/resource-sharing, more certainty, help reach 
individual and collective goals. 







(P. A. Hall, 1993; P. A. Hall & Soskice, 2001; Morgan, Campbell, 
Crouch, Pedersen, & Whitley, 2010; D.C. North, 1990; Williamson, 
1983) 
IV     
 
Knowledge-Oriented 
Strategy Team (KOST) 
Deliberative, flexible, inclusive – knowledge of previous 
policies/institutions latest science & industry trends. 
Varying Characteristics: 
Strong, Weak, None (Ansell, 2000; Bennett & Howlett, 1992; P. A. Hall, 1993; Rhodes, 
2006) 
 Social Learning: Involves Information acquisition, assimilation and 
competency-building +  concerted effort to create mutual 
understandings about a particular industry, policy, strategy, set of 
techniques and goals. 
 
Disruptive, Incremental (Gertler et al., 2002; P. A. Hall, 1993) (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; P. 
Cooke, 2001; McDermott, 2007; McDermott & Corredoira, 2010) 
 
 Iterative Bargaining: Political bargaining model; Actors with both 
competing and complementary interests can make room for 
cooperation; negotiating occurs regularly in light of new information. 
Fragmented, Coordinative (Dunning, 2001; Eden, Lenway, & Schuler, 2005; Quirk, 1989; 
Schelling, 1980)  
 
Control Variables & 
Alternative Explanations 
   
Factor Endowments 
 
Natural& human resources, specialized infrastructure impact 
commitment strategy level and type (e.g. focus on bioactives vs. 
bioinformatics) 
Type of natural resource; 
infrastructure 
 
[add here] Powell etc. 
 
Size A jurisdictions size affects commitment levels. Easier for smaller 
jurisdictions to commit than it is for larger provinces given higher 
number of competing interests. 




Rival Industries Traditional industries compete for resources; related institutions 




National Institutions National institutions shape provincial strategies. Not all provinces 
implement national strategies similarly.  
S&T/Biotech R&D 
funding; IPR; PROs & 
their core knowledge areas 
 
Global Shock 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Affected majority of countries/regions. Sudden scarcity of finance  
Path Dependence 
 
Previous decisions and related institutions resist change; vested 
interests; institutional change occurs only after major shock then new 
equilibrium reached. 
How actors react to GFC 
in light of previous 
industrial policy decisions 
and new information 








2.2.1 Dependent Variable: Commitment Strategy 
 
My dependent variable is “commitment strategy” including both the change in and 
degree of commitment. I conceive of commitments as institutions that have been created 
or changed as part of a larger strategy to develop a bioscience industry. Critical 
institutional areas in bioscience include finance, skill development and corporate 
governance.  
Institutions act as credible commitments necessary to facilitate low-cost transactions. 
They are specialized, difficult to reverse, and include incentives aligned  with the skills 
and knowledge perceived to offer the highest payoff (Kreps, 1996; D. C. North, 1993). In 
other words, given the rising complexity of the science and nature of the industry it is too 
costly for bioscience organizations to act alone. Formal and informal rules that enable 
organizations to capture new opportunities at a lower transaction cost are necessary. I 
apply nominal measures including high, mixed and low levels of commitment to 
developing a bioscience industry. These commitment strategies can change in either 
direction or not at all especially after a global shock. 
Creating and maintaining long-term credible commitments among bioscience 
stakeholders is difficult. I borrow the credible commitments concept from the 
institutional economics literature. This research stream focuses primarily on firm-firm 
level commitments. I expand it to include a broader array of organizations including 
multi-level government agencies, industry associations, leading MNCs and local firms, 
universities and other stakeholders. These commitments require “irreversible, specialized 
investments” involving “reciprocal acts” designed to support alliances and exchanges 
more efficiently (Williamson, 1983, p. 519).
15
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For example at the firm level, Biovectra, Inc. is a contract manufacturer of active pharmaceutical 
ingredients and the largest local firm based in Prince Edward Island (PEI), Canada. To expand its innovative 
manufacturing process in support of global partner needs, the province provided a portion of funding 
required over the course of 10 years that BioVectra, Inc. leveraged to secure a U.S. investor, Questcor 
Pharmaceuticals. These investments are considered specialized and represent reciprocal acts among 
Biovectra, Inc., provincial and federal funding agencies - Innovation PEI, ACOA, and a foreign direct 
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Mechanisms are somewhat different from the rules themselves. Formal mechanisms involve specific programs and processes through which agents 
implement rules. Informal mechanisms include learning and information sharing through various channels like networks and collaborations producing shared 
beliefs and understandings. Formal rules prescribe or proscribe certain behavior while informal rules are understood as accepted norms of behavior. 
Rule Category Formal Mechanisms Formal Rules Informal Rules/Norms 
Finance •  Gov’t R&D grants 
Tax incentives (FDI, local) 
• Gov’t-backed & 
Privately owned 
Venture Capital (VC) 
funds 
•  Rules governing use of R&D 
incentives 
•  Gov’t has an obligation to invest in basic, 
applied and/or commercialization projects 
•  Markets allocate finance to the most 
promising therapies 




•  Gov’t tax incentives- 
labor; immigration 
policies 
•  University degree 
programs 
 
•  Corporate training & 
hiring policies 
•  100% tax credit per local 
scientist hired;  
•  Ratio of local/foreign hires 
(immigration policy) 
•  Corporate hiring practices favoring local 
over global scientists 
•  Flexible labor market 
Corporate Governance •  Contracts 
•  Ownership and 
management 
governing mechanisms 
•  “Make” or “Buy” decisions 
•  Rules governing stockholder 
and management interests 
•  Transparency in governance model 
(owners/managers) 









2.2.1.1 Generating Commitments: Roles, Incentives and Relational Contracts 
 
Williamson’s definition of a credible commitment does not include the need for a 
shared understanding of who takes on which tasks, incentives to engage or renege, and 
consensus around the way forward. The political process neither guarantees getting there, 
nor ensures that actors can maintain what is necessary. This dissertation explores how 
actors establish credible commitments as part of a strategy to expand the opportunity 
structure, reduce uncertainty, and encourage risk-taking behavior among organizations?
17
 
The role of a KOST is central. 
North’s analysis asks how can institutions provide the credible commitment necessary 
to facilitate low-cost transactions (Kreps, 1996; D. C. North, 1993). In other words given 
the complexity of the science and nature of the industry it is too costly for bioscience 
organizations to act alone. Formal and informal rules that enable organizations to capture 
new opportunities at a lower transaction cost are necessary instead. These institutions will 
include incentives that are aligned with the skills and knowledge perceived to offer the 
highest payoff.  
Williamson’s understanding can shed light on the high level of risk and uncertainty 
associated with an industry like bioscience. His key characteristics of credible 
commitments involve irreversible, specialized investments and reciprocal acts 
(Williamson, 1983). For example when government invests in specialized research 
centers, like the Institute for Marine Bioscience in Halifax, NS or Genome Quebec as 
well as in R&D related to specific disease areas like cancer or Alzheimer’s and firms 
reciprocate by matching investments over time, these repeated interactions evolve into 
social norms around what are considered credible commitments for the industry. 
The critical challenge is designing beforehand the most efficient and effective 
incentive scheme especially since it is almost impossible to know in advance all the 
possible risks associated with an alliance. Firm-firm relations and public-private sector 
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I thank Steve Casper for making the author aware of the concept of credible commitments as well as 








partnerships confront this challenge especially when building a bioscience industry that is 
by nature highly uncertain and risky.
18
 
Gibbons and Henderson elaborate the challenges associated with both incomplete 
contracts and credible commitments. The problem is that there is no way to specify all 
contingencies in a written contract. These scholars emphasize the need for clarity and 
understanding of promises as a critical element of credible commitments in order to 
reduce uncertainty. However, the process of achieving it is extremely difficult (Gibbons 
& Henderson, 2012).This again is where a centralized industrial governance structure can 
help by anchoring a government agency or industry association to aggregate interests, 
clarify roles and responsibilities, and facilitate repeated interactions. Reducing 
uncertainty is central to economic reform and growth. 
Getting this approach right is not pre-determined. Maintaining industry sustainability 
amidst complexity is the central challenge to all bioscience clusters. Legal scholars and 
sociologists have argued that relational contracts underpinned by trust and social norms 
are important in generating commitment to relationships (Macneil, 1978). Empirical 
studies support the relational contracting view by showing that social norms rather than 
explicit legal provisions frequently structure economic behavior between parties 
(Ellickson & Ellickson, 2009). Within intricate, long-term relationships, parties can 
develop social strategies to achieve cooperation, often resulting in the creation of credible 
commitments not to behave opportunistically (Kreps, 1990; Miller, 1993). Examples 
include the creation of a reputation not to exploit weaker parties or ‘signaling’ strategies 
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For example, during late 1990s and early 2000s, mapping the human genome was a major goal for the 
global bioscience industry. Research and technology had advanced to the point where mapping at least a 
segment of the genome was close at hand. Governments at both the provincial and federal level as well as 
big pharmaceutical firms invested in new research centers like Genome Quebec with the promise of 
making break-through discoveries leading to a plethora of technologies to be commercialized, creating 
economic wealth and highly skilled jobs in the province. However, while in 2003 scientists in the United 
States succeeded in mapping the human genome, the new knowledge did not lead to the blockbuster 
biotechnologies or drugs personalized to groups with particular diseases. Anyone can now take a blood 
test, have the results analyzed and receive information on which disease-carrying genes they have – from 
Alzheimer’s to various cancers. The tests are now so simple and relatively affordable that the service has 
become a commodity and considered a weak source of regional competitive advantage. Furthermore, 
scientists have learned that the science behind the study of genomics is much more complex than 
originally thought. Therefore, developing cost-effective therapies for particular diseases based on the 








such as making contingent investments in relationship-specific assets with the 
expectation that one’s contracting partner will reciprocate, allowing norms of cooperation 
to develop (Axelrod, 1984; Casper, 2013). 
Relational contracting is problematic despite these possibilities. Managers find it 
difficult to get the organization to establish and implement commitments in a way that is 
clear to other parties. Do the parties understand what they have promised? Credibility 
and clarity could also interact in different ways making it difficult for organizations to 
build both (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012). It is not easy to specify all the necessary 
actions in advance because relational contracts are informal and collaborative (Gibbons 
& Henderson, 2012). Building a relational contract is difficult for all these reasons. To do 
so it takes a shared understanding among the parties of their required tasks as well as the 
potential for and consequences of reneging (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012).  
A knowledge-oriented strategy team (KOST) can help address some of these 
challenges. I argue that the presence of a strong KOST is a major factor driving high 
levels of commitment to cultivating and sustaining a bioscience industry. A strong KOST 
can build credibility through relational contracting among organizations and can generate 
spillover effects to the broader community. This relational contracting can change social 
norms in support of collaboration projects among organizations, promises not to renege 
on agreements, and learning structures. 
 
2.2.1.2 Separating “Commitment Strategies” from “Social Learning” and a KOST 
 
I treat commitments as institutions. These formal and informal rules can vary and 
change in different directions or not at all when a KOST engages in different magnitudes 
of social learning and types of iterative bargaining. I draw from Hall’s orders of social 
learning and their relation to policy change to capture change in commitment strategies. 
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Table 4 Orders of Social Learning and Indicators of Policy Change 




Changes in settings of 
particular policies.  
A change in bioscience R&D 
spending levels. 
Incremental 
    
Second 
Order 
Changes in both settings and 
techniques - or policy tools. 
A change in both R&D spending 
levels and shift from R&D tax 
incentives to incentives for industry-
backed VCs.  
Incremental 
    
Third 
Order 
Changes in settings, techniques 
and overarching goals 
A change in the above plus shift in 
basic research to commercialization 
and industry collaboration projects. 
Disruptive 
 
Source: Peter Hall and Examples Selected by the Author 
 
First order learning is reflected in changes in settings like R&D spending levels. 
Second order learning is reflected in changes in techniques or the tools used to disburse 
funding like government-backed VCs or grants. Third order learning relates to changes in 
overarching goals underpinned by a paradigm change such as shifting from basic research 
to university-industry collaboration projects with the goal of improving technology 
commercialization. 
First and second order learning involves mostly the state as decision-maker. Third-
order learning represents a fundamental paradigm shift involving stakeholders within 
both the state and society interacting through a knowledge-oriented policy community (P. 
A. Hall, 1993). This community frames the problem, the types of commitment strategies 
designed to solve it, and builds consensus around the way forward. Social norms change 
in order to take advantage of the new opportunities during this process. However, it is the 
most difficult type of learning and policy change to achieve considering the range of 
often conflicting interests. 
Hall’s approach reveals weaknesses. He creates a tautology by not clearly separating 
social learning indicators from those of policy change (and it follows, change in 
commitment strategies). Hall argues that we know that communities learn when we see a 








in settings and programs that are part of the normal policy process. By definition major 
policies change when fundamental social learning occurs but the same indicators are used 
for both the independent and dependent variables. Furthermore, he does not clearly define 
“who learns.”  
I create new indicators of social learning to solve this problem and associate them 
directly with the KOST as the independent variable. I argue that the presence or not of a 
KOST and its relative strength leads to different levels of commitment towards 
bioscience industry development. I am also explaining the direction in which 
commitment strategies change before and after the 2008 financial crisis. For example, 
what causes a change from a mixed to high level commitment is the change in relative 
strength of a KOST from weak to strong defined by indicators such as inclusiveness, 
deliberative nature, flexibility, and competence-building. 
In the next section I elaborate on the dependent variable: Commitment strategies. I 
structure commitment strategies as high, mixed and low along with related indicators. 
The case studies evaluate how commitment strategies can change from one category to 
another over time. This section is followed by an examination of the KOST and its social 
learning and iterative bargaining characteristics. 
 
2.2.1.3 Typology of Commitment Strategies 
 
I argue that the presence and strength of a KOST impacts both the level of 






I define a high commitment strategy as one where institutional complementarity in 
areas of finance, skill development and corporate governance exists. Each area includes 
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 I am grateful to Steven Casper for his elaboration of the “High Commitment Strategy” concept. I expand 








formal and informal rules designed to reach shared, overarching goals. This 
complementarity represents a more holistic and strategic approach in support of 
bioscience industry goals.  
 
A strong KOST is established credible commitments among members. The 
commitment each makes to a new bioscience strategy is specialized, difficult to reverse 
and entails repeated interactions over time. This process builds trust, facilitates 
information-sharing, improves competencies, reduces uncertainty and creates 
relationships that help individual and collective goal attainment. This process also 
changes the mindsets of state and society participants towards a learning culture resulting 
in fundamental changes in overarching goals.  
Categories of actors involved in this process include private sector organizations such 
as small biotech firms, large pharmaceutical MNCs, manufacturers and professional 
service providers, public agencies pursuing varied objectives from improving human 
health to promoting economic development, and universities and medical schools 
engaging in science and health research. Actors can form a single or a few knowledge-
oriented policy communities depending upon the level and type of shared understandings 
about bioscience and its promise. Often either the state or an industry association initiates 
the process. But managing the process of establishing credible commitments is 
complicated and often does not work due to information asymmetries, competing 
interests, potential opportunism and incompatible time-lines among actors. 
If successful, the rules and norms themselves reflect mutual understandings of what 
the specialized, irreversible investments as well as repeated interactions among actors 
should be and are reinforced by this dynamic. The process is influenced by the relative 
strength of the KOST.  
For example at the firm level a “high commitment” strategy entails a sophisticated 
FDI firm not only entering a local bioscience cluster like Montreal or Halifax, but also 
engaging in higher value activities (e.g. R&D) and participating in local cooperative 
networks when doing so. It is this type of behavior that could lead to the upgrading of 








experienced firms from engaging in high commitment activities within an emerging 
cluster? 
The institutional economics literature can help frame the commitment issue facing 
actors within emerging clusters (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). This literature claims that 
complex forms of economic organization often fail because parties cannot develop 
adequate formal or informal governance rules needed to overcome a variety of dilemmas 
(Miller, 1993). Cooperative R&D networks are inherently failure prone largely because 
of unforeseen scientific challenges but can also fail due to a lack of commitment by one 
of the parties, poor social skills by one or both parties (i.e. difficulties in successfully 
participating within a collaboration), and fear of intellectual property expropriation. 
(Casper & Matraves, 2003). While contracts can be written setting out basic rules over 
funding, the division of labor, and intellectual property rights within R&D projects it is 
difficult to write contracts specifying all contingencies.   
Governments confront some of these same challenges especially when engaging with 
industry and universities. A disruptive social learning approach combined with a 
coordinated bargaining process can unleash new ideas and create social norms about how 
to achieve collective goals. At the same time the interaction can help to solve some of the 
commitment and credibility problems.  
 
2.2.1.3.1 Indicators: Level of commitment strategy: A high commitment strategy equates 
to institutional complementarity (holistic approach) among finance, skill development 
and corporate governance at all levels of settings, techniques and overarching goals. A 
holistic approach involves a paradigm shift favoring change in overarching goals within 
and coordination across all three institutional areas. These can include diversifying 
financial sources, developing interdisciplinary skills to align with industry needs; and 
promoting FDI-local firm collaboration in order to create learning spillovers necessary 
for industry sustainability. A change in nature of these formal and informal institutions in 
response to the 2008 financial crisis can still occur while maintaining institutional 









2.2.1.3.2 Indicators: Change in level of commitment strategy. If a high commitment 
strategy was in place prior to the 2008 financial crisis, then I capture no change or a 
change to mixed/low levels by comparing whether institutional complementarity broke 
down after the crisis  
 
 
Mixed Commitment Strategy 
 
A mixed commitment strategy includes complementarity between two institutional 
areas like corporate governance and finance but not a third such as skill development. A 
weak KOST may have established its credibility within a region through repeated 
interaction in developing financial markets and corporate responses to them. This effort 
can result in increased levels of R&D funding and diversification of risk finance vehicles. 
However, the same level of commitment may not be made in the critical area of skill 
development because of a lack of knowledge about what skills are required by industry, 
competing views of the importance of basic versus applied research, and whether to 
invest in high-potential R&D versus “R&D democracy” that spreads funding more 
broadly.  
In this sense a lack of consensus around the way forward in skill development may 
reduce effectiveness of changes made in finance. Furthermore, firms may choose to 
outsource more R&D thereby decreasing internal R&D spending and the need to train 
scientists and portfolio managers. A mixed commitment strategy lacks credibility and 
constrains the region’s ability to develop necessary governance rules. But short-term 
gains in industry growth can occur. The strategy can also signal progress in certain areas 
and an expectation that complementary changes will be made as a result of the social 
learning and bargaining process in other bioscience areas. 
 
2.2.1.3.3 Indicators: Level of commitment strategy. Institutional complementarity 









2.2.1.3.4 Indicators: Change in level of commitment strategy. If a mixed commitment 
strategy were in place prior to the 2008 financial crisis, then I capture no change or a shift 
to low/high levels by comparing whether or not institutional complementarity existed 
after the crisis.  
 
2.2.1.3.5 Low Commitment Strategy 
 
A lack of institutional complementarity among the three areas equates to a low 
commitment strategy. In this case the commitment may include government but not firm 
R&D investments and no new university degrees designed to attract or produce 
bioscience skills required to conduct R&D effectively.  
A low commitment strategy involves a few actors, typically state agencies, setting the 
rules and making simple changes in investment levels and types. Incremental social 
learning and fragmented bargaining underpin the process. While some investments in 
hard infrastructure may be made, these are non-specialized and reversible investments 
with little effect on alliances among firms particularly between sophisticated FDI and 
small, local biotech firms or on public-private partnerships. The rules and norms of the 
game may change but they represent low level commitments. This type can generate 




For example, to attract FDI governments routinely locate companies and provide 
incentives such as tax credits, subsidies, and access to low rent land and infrastructure. In 
bioscience, governments commonly set up incubators and technology parks on or near 
universities with the promise of enticing entrepreneurial new technology firms to take up 
residence. Companies often respond positively to such incentives, particularly if basic 
factor advantages such as access to relatively low cost labor exist within a region. But 
these MNCs do not always actively engage in collaborations with local biotechnology 
firms, reducing knowledge and technological spillovers as well as opportunities for local 
firms to upgrade. While some MNCs engage in low levels of commitment, governments 
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that create favorable R&D environments through infrastructure investments and tax 
policies often view their strategy as a high level of commitment. Governments are also 
pressured to attract FDI while growing the local biotechnology cluster. The gap between 
the two can be filled by improving relational contracting capabilities between public and 
private sector organizations. 
 
2.2.1.3.6 Indicators: Level of commitment strategy. No institutional complementarity. 
Elements tend to include traditional university R&D, investment in hard infrastructure, 
government grants to firms but little monitoring. 
 
2.2.1.3.7 Indicators: Change in level of commitment strategy. If a low commitment 
strategy was in place prior to the 2008 financial crisis, then I capture no change or a shift 
toward mixed/high levels after the crisis utilizing indicators associated with these levels.  
 
2.2.1.4 Selected Bioscience Strategy Choices 
 
Governments and industry face a strategic choice set when it comes to the creation of 
new institutions to help reach bioscience industry growth goals. These range from basic 
research versus technology commercialization to horizontal versus specialized R&D to 
FDI-led versus local industry development. Governments must navigate the puzzle of 
appearing to “pick winners” versus letting markets allocate resources toward the most 
productive R&D areas. Often it is some combination of the two. 
 Governments must also ask the question: How formal and how specific should the 
strategy be? In bioscience strategy development should the country or region focus on 
facilitating platform technologies
22
 with broad or narrower application areas like 
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In biotechnology and pharmaceutical development, platform technologies help drug firms discover, 
identify, process and develop new chemical entities more quickly and efficiently. The platforms range 
from large chemical libraries and ultra-high throughput screening to genetic databases in discovery and 
predictive toxicology platforms, to specialized knowledge of particular therapeutic areas. Small, virtual 
biotech firms can more easily ascertain the transaction cost associated with developing their own 
platform technology, or, outsourcing and using a platform developed by others. Large pharmaceutical 








genomics or nutraceuticals? Under what circumstances can states create new institutions 
to help capture new opportunities while reducing costs, uncertainty, and risk? Social 
learning and a coordinated iterative bargaining process involving the triple helix of 
government, industry and university research can unleash new ways of solving the 
problem and lead to more informed strategy choices. 
I argue that a key factor that helps facilitate the learning process is the presence and 
relative strength of a KOST. A KOST is typically led by an industry association or 
economic development agency whose members are firms, governments at all levels, 
university and other societal representatives. A KOST becomes critical as its volunteer 
membership represents the general bioscience ecosystem and can bring diverse 
perspectives to bear.  
For example in industry big pharmaceutical firms and small biotechnology companies 
differ in their business models based on the drug development processes. Big 
pharmaceutical firms cannot copy asset-centric drug development activities that small 
biotech firms do. Pharmaceutical MNCs maintain large platform technologies that are 
used to develop multiple drugs, not just one. Society may pressure government to fund 
new research into vaccines that inoculate against disease but industry may be reluctant 
because of insufficient market size. Universities may favor basic cancer research rather 
than collaboration with industry due to conflicting time-lines. Yet these initial interests 
shaped by participants’ cognitive frames can change through the social learning process. 
Repeated interactions, talk, communication among stakeholders, building competencies 
and negotiation around the way forward can shape commitment strategies. 
A major challenge involves how to facilitate learning spillovers. Industrialized 
countries typically host significant FDI. This is true as well in the bioscience industry as 
large, incumbent pharmaceutical firms expand their technological base by acquiring or 
merging with biotechnology firms or investing in in-house bioscience R&D. But it is far 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
these systems are expensive to maintain and difficult to value return on investment, platform 
technologies are a complementary asset not easily replicated by competitors. Increasingly, though, big 
pharma and small biotech firms are forming pre-competitive consortia to keep platform technologies 
cutting edge. These new institutions involve rules and norms that stipulate how resources are shared, 








from given that FDI will engage with local start-ups or create positive spillovers 
including the sharing of ideas, information and technologies as well as the expansion of 
highly skilled labor that could sustain industry growth. Local firms may not share the 
same level of sophistication in their ability to collaborate or their assets may not be 
valuable enough. Even small firms that succeed in developing a new chemical entity 
(NCE) like a new fish anti-freeze protein in Newfoundland often license out the new 
technology to a foreign buyer only to see jobs created elsewhere.  
There are two challenges. The first involves finding a way to entice FDI while 
transferring skill, technologies and financing to grow and sustain the industry. The 
second includes creating environments for local start-up firms to grow toward medium-
size and stay. These two goals are interrelated as the more medium-sized local firms there 
are in a particular jurisdiction the greater the likelihood of attracting FDI. MNCs are 
more likely to effectively collaborate with experienced local firms, transferring skills and 




2.2.2 Independent Variable: Knowledge-Oriented Strategy Team (KOST) 
 
I define a strong KOST as a group comprised of multiple and diverse stake-holders 
typically national and sub-national economic development agencies, industry 
associations, local and multinational pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms, service 
providers, public research organizations, and universities. Members have clear roles and 
responsibilities as well as knowledge of the latest science and industry trends. An anchor 
organization, often an industry association, leads the strong KOST. The team is 
deliberative, flexible, inclusive, creates strategy and work plans with clear time-lines and 
builds competencies over time.  
I provide a list of indicators in Table 3. First, I determine whether or not a KOST is 
present in the cases analyzed. If yes, then I determine whether it is strong or weak, 
indicated by the way in which it engages in the social learning and iterative bargaining 
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process. A strong KOST is inclusive, flexible, deliberative and engages in disruptive 
social learning and coordinated bargaining processes. The social learning process is 
disruptive as the KOST continually monitors, collects, disseminates, deliberates and acts 
on new information and ideas about the industry and reflects on the effectiveness of its 
previous commitment strategy. Its own competencies change, displacing old ways of 
thinking and approaching problems, which has spillover effects among its members who 
also design their own organizational strategies. With this intentional and consistent 
approach to accessing the latest information and ideas about the industry and how to 
sustain it, the process results in a more holistic, high level commitment strategy.  
A weak KOST engages in some of the same activities as a strong KOST except that it 
pursues them irregularly, has weak channels of cooperation and does not build 
competencies. The focus is more on information-sharing. No KOST exists when few of 
these attributes are present. However, a region with no KOST can still have multiple 
policy communities, each engaging in its own learning and bargaining process. These 
processes involve competing interests with no consensus around strategy, goals and 
institutions required to reach them. If there is no KOST, then the region is likely to 












Table 5 Who Learns What? 
Who learns: KOST 
 
Indicators Sources: 
   
Knowledge-Oriented 
Strategy Team (bioscience) 
Strong: 
-Clear structure and mechanisms for 
information-sharing and competence-
building. Creates a “learn-by-learning” 
mindset and structure. 
-Inclusive, deliberative (state-society 
actors) 
-Anchor organizationecon. dev. 
agency/industry assoc. 
-Written strategic and work plan  
-Regular meetings; monitoring, evaluation, 
change in light of new information 
-Access to formal knowledge networks 




Irregular monitoring, evaluation  
Few channels of cooperation 
Focus on information-sharing, less on 
competence-building 
Key policy documents;interviews; 
committee reports; surveys, policy 
reports, industry studies, excerpts from 
official statements 
 
   
What is learned: 
 
      Sources: 
 
Ideas: Core beliefs, strategy 
goals, and means of 
implementing them 
 
Ex: Science underlying 
bioscience industry; 
assumptions about the 
industry; how to frame the 
problem; what goals to set; 
what has worked in the past 
and in other jurisdictions, and 
what has not; new models for 
organizing economic activity; 
how to implement effectively; 
how to build competencies 
  
     Interviews 
     Surveys 
     Industry studies 
     Policy documents 












2.2.2.1 How Does a KOST Differ from a Policy Community and Policy Network?  
 
Other more traditional means of information-sharing and consensus-building do exist, 
some of which contain elements of a social learning structure. Many countries and 
regions sustain various policy communities and networks. In policy-making both involve 
relationships among actors whether individuals or organizations but “vary along a 
continuum in terms of the closeness of these relationships” (Rhodes, 2006, p. 427). 
Policy communities are at one end of the spectrum and encompass close relationships 
while networks are at the other end with relatively loose relationships. 
 
According to Rhodes a policy community typically involves: 
 
A limited number of participants with some groups consciously excluded; 
frequent and high-quality interaction between all members of the community on 
all matters related to the policy issues; consistency in values, membership, and 
policy outcomes that persist over time; consensus, with the ideology, values, and 
broad policy preferences shared by all participants; and exchange relationships 
based on all members of the policy community controlling some resources. Thus 
the basic interaction is one involving bargaining between members with 
resources. (Rhodes, 2006, p. 427) 
 
A network is “complex and dynamic; there are multiple, over-lapping relationships, 
each one of which is to a greater or lesser degree dependent on the state of others”(Elkin, 
1975, pp. 158-184) . Policy networks mediate interests, enable inter-organizational 
analysis and are a form of multiplex governance especially in contrast to traditional 
hierarchical forms led by central governments. 
Different policy communities often numbering up to four and associated with a single 
issue can exist within a country or region (Sabatier, 1988). These communities compete 
among each other rather than coalesce around common goals and means of achieving 








health information technology with the explicit goal of improving patient care and access 
while maintaining privacy. Another policy network strives to grow the industry in niche 
areas of bioinformatics and marine biotechnology in order to increase the number of 
firms and well-paying jobs. The two goals are not always seen as compatible. In the area 
of environmental biotechnology two competing networks exist. One strives to develop 
new products based on bioactives derived from plants and trees while the other pursues 
completely different goals including forest preservation. 
A strong KOST shares some characteristics of a policy community but differs in 
several ways. First, because I am interested in understanding industrial policy and 
specifically how regions develop commitment strategies towards growing knowledge-
based industries the anchor organization in this highest form of policy network is either a 
government economic development agency or a peak industry association. It is not led by 
regional elected officials. The industry association typically plays a coordinating, 
catalytic role while government agencies at all levels are partners and in many cases 
provide financial and technical resources. 
Second, a strong KOST is more inclusive than a traditional high-level policy 
community. All relevant government agencies, universities, research organizations and 
firms can become members on a volunteer basis. Their power lies in the value of 
resources that each brings to the KOST. There are boundaries of the KOST when it 
comes to its content and goals including bioscience industry development. This goal 
naturally excludes organizations in disagreement over whether or not bioscience should 
be a “targeted” industry that competes with alternatives such as investing in the 
traditional industries of agriculture, oil and gas. By and large a KOST is inclusive within 
its defined scope.  
Third, a strong KOST involves written strategies, work plans with clear time-lines to 
complete agreed-upon tasks, and clearly understood roles and responsibilities assigned to 
its members. A weak KOST suffers from unclear roles and responsibilities of its 
members. Fourth, a strong KOST does not just share information and gain consensus 
around goals and strategies which is more characteristic of a weak KOST, it involves 








as through implementation of tasks. These competencies range from gaining new 
research skills in particular fields to learning how to manage collaboration projects.  
Fifth, a strong KOST consciously designs structures enabling it and its members to 
“learn by learning.” Institutions learn by self-monitoring and engaging in “reflexive” 
processes that apply institutional memory and intelligence to regular evaluations of goals, 
tools and processes (Gertler et al., 2002) This effort helps to identify opportunities, 
problems and solutions to them. I elaborate further on the “learning by learning” concept 
in the next section. A strong KOST survives successive governments similar to a policy 
community. This is a very high bar and ideal-type construction. However, it is a useful 
way to differentiate various types of policy networks and to create a theory of change in 
commitment strategies. I argue that as the presence and strength of a KOST changes, so 
does its bioscience commitment strategy. 
 
2.2.2.2 How Does a KOST Differ from Knowledge Cluster Mechanisms? 
 
The rise of knowledge clusters led by industry rather than government agencies or 
traditional industry associations that play a lobbying role creates a third category of 
learning organization. The difference between a strong KOST and a knowledge cluster 
coordinator is that a strong KOST can aggregate interests across spatial boundaries within 
a region and country. While clusters of organizations, relationships and processes may 
exist in Montreal, a province-wide KOST is in a stronger position to pull together 
Montreal’s, Quebec City’s and Sherbrooke’s resources and interests.  
Cluster theory is rooted in Marshall and his examination of industrial districts and 
agglomeration where firms locate near each other creating advantages and disadvantages 
(Marshall, 1919). Porter’s later influential work on competitiveness launched multiple 
studies of clusters (Porter, 1990, 1998).  
Clusters are “geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions 
in a particular field” (Porter, 1998, p. 78). Institutions are “… universities, standards-
setting agencies, think tanks, vocational training providers, and trade associations - that 
provide specialized training, education, information, research, and technical 








with organizations that differ from North’s distinction separating the two. Knowledge 
clusters are distinctive in that they rely on cutting edge research concentrated within 
specific organizations like universities and public research organizations and rely on 
mechanisms that create and transfer knowledge derived from this research (Orsenigo, 
2006).  
Knowledge clusters differ from industrial clusters focusing on production in that they 
see knowledge as an engine of economic growth (Orsenigo, 2006). The emphasis is on 
knowledge production leading to technological innovation and a regional competitive 
advantage. For example, Newfoundland is a fledgling marine biotech cluster in the midst 
of mobilizing its specific knowledge base in fish genomics. The province intends to 
commercialize basic and applied research leading to large and more productive fish 
species. Quebec bioscientists engage in basic and applied research in the area of 
genomics and stem cells with the hopes of commercializing this knowledge in the form of 
new drugs and regenerative technologies.  
Scholars generally agree that even though initial conditions like a significant 
university base that concentrates scientific knowledge, a history of entrepreneurship, 
research labs, and incentives are necessary and support the idea that biotechnology 
clusters do not locate in a particular place by chance, they are not sufficient to explain 
success, failure or types in between (Feldman & Braunerhjelm, 2006; Orsenigo, 2006). 
As Orsenigo (2006) notes, “…as much as agglomeration forces are influenced by 
structural initial conditions – processes are the essence of what clusters are made of” 
(p.39). In knowledge-based industries, what makes space relevant is more the nature of 
the relationships and mechanisms that facilitate knowledge-sharing leading to 
agglomerations (Orsenigo, 2006).  
Cluster scholars treat institutions as geographically embedded in the field of 
bioscience, both affecting and affected by the behavior of organizations and their 
relationships. Small biotechnology firms, big pharmaceutical companies, clinical research 
organizations, hospitals, PROs, raw material suppliers and service providers locate in 
biotechnology clusters. They engage in formal relationships through contracting and 
informal ones via repeated interactions at industry events, networking sessions, or 








upon the opportunity and the organizations’ capabilities (Casper, 2007; Lazonick, 1993; 
Porter, 1990).  
Finally, global R&D and production networks shape both knowledge and production 
clusters. Both type of networks involve a large number and variety of organizations 
engaged in many stages of R&D and production (Markusen, 1996; Piore & Sabel, 1984; 
Saxenian, 1996). No single firm has the capability to successfully work in all areas of 
biotechnology making strong networks crucial. 
Clusters also involve learning where individuals and organizations share information, 
ideas about what works and what does not and incorporates these lessons into innovation 
activities. These efforts to develop knowledge occur “upstream” during the research 
phase as well as downstream during product or technology commercialization (P. Cooke 
& Morgan, 1998). The mechanisms that diffuse knowledge are either formal, through 
contracts, or informal through individual scientists collaborating on projects.  
Spillovers result from innovative activities that impact actors not directly involved in 
the process. They can be positive or negative. When Pfizer publishes positive results of a 
clinical trial or promising basic research involving its obesity drug other firms not 
involved in the process benefit from the knowledge, which leads to further research and 
testing. On the other hand, competitors may scrap their efforts in the same area if Pfizer is 
able to secure a first mover advantage. 
Not all knowledge is the same. Knowledge is generally divided into two categories: 
codified and tacit. While organizations in knowledge-based clusters like biotechnology 
rely on codified knowledge in the form of patents and publications, in a globalized world 
this type of knowledge is increasingly accessible by competitors even though rights to the 
inventions are protected (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). Organizations’ ability to produce, 
access and control tacit knowledge is most important (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999) to 
remain competitive. Tacit knowledge is found in organizations’ daily routines. They 
enable learning and are difficult to replicate especially by competitors, giving firms an 
edge (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Teece D, 1997). 
Clusters also act as magnets attracting large MNCs from around the world (Kenney & 
Florida, 2004). These firms tend to locate where there is a large pool of skilled labor, 








global pharmaceutical firms and their R&D centers due to the considerable number and 
diversity of research universities, its competitive R&D tax incentives, and the province’s 
pharmaceutical market. While local decision-makers hope that knowledge transfer either 
through formal mechanisms or spillovers occurs between the FDI and local firms, this is 
not always the case. Niosi’s study of Quebec’s biotechnology cluster and evidence 
presented in this dissertation shows that two distinct networks dividing big pharma and 
small, local biotech firms, existed until fairly recently. 
 
2.2.2.3 Varying Characteristics of a KOST: Social Learning and Iterative Bargaining 
 
Social Learning  
 
Scholars have defined social learning differently but all involve some process of 
acquiring and combining new information with knowledge from past experiences. Hall 
elaborates that, 
 
learning occurs when “…individuals assimilate new information including that based 
on past experience, and apply it to future actions…a deliberate attempt to change the 
goals and techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information … 
Learning is indicated when policy changes as a result of this process”(P. A. Hall, 
1993, p. 278).” 
 
Furthermore, the learning process can take different forms and needs to be broken down 
into more specific types. These include policy settings, techniques, and goals  (P. A. Hall, 
1993). 
In Gertler’s and Wolfe’s terms learning involves the “ability to acquire, absorb and 
diffuse relevant knowledge and information throughout the various institutions that affect 
the process of economic development and change” (Gertler et al., 2002, p. 1). But 
Lundvall and Borras (Lundvall & Borrás, 1997) link learning to capacity building. Social 
learning requires creating competencies and acquiring skills more than just accessing 








I use Hall’s definition that claims social learning involves not only information 
acquisition, assimilation and competency-building, but a concerted effort among 
participants to create mutual understandings about a particular industry, policy, strategy, 
set of techniques and goals (P. A. Hall, 1993). This conceptualization enables me to 
evaluate governance structures including the presence and strength of a KOST and its 
impact on commitment strategies. 
 
Mechanisms and Conditions for Learning 
 
This definition also suggests that no longer do individual firms or organizations have 
all the relevant knowledge necessary to sustain growth. Social learning provides an 
external source of competitiveness in addition to internally derived ones. The process 
involves organizations developing relationships among each other, sharing information, 
know-how and resources in order to solve problems. 
Scholars have developed a typology of mechanisms to describe this learning process 
particularly as actors adapt to rapid technological change: learning-by-doing, learning-by-
using, and learning-by-interacting (Gertler et al., 2002). But while these mechanisms deal 
mostly with firms as the unit of analysis, the question now is how do organizational 
institutions like National Research Centers or Genome Quebec and the range of 
bioscience organizations learn collectively to keep pace with this change? How do they 
help rather than impede efforts to sustain a competitive advantage? 
The mechanism of “learning-by-learning” provides clues. This concept explores how 
institutions learn by self-monitoring and engaging in reflexive processes. These processes 
apply institutional memory and intelligence to regular evaluations of goals, tools and 
ways to identify opportunities, problems and solutions to them (Gertler et al., 2002; P. A. 
Hall, 1993; Sabel, 1993). But this process of organizing intelligence in social ways rather 
than on an individual basis can either lead to change or hold it back. It depends upon the 
ability of institutions to be reflexive and to monitor their success in adapting to changes 
in environment (Gertler et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, to gain a competitive advantage it is no longer sufficient for 








quickly become commodities since our knowledge in a variety of industries changes 
rapidly. The capacity to learn, to combine new knowledge in different ways, is now 
crucial to gaining a sustained competitive advantage. The capacity for social learning 
through the creation and expansion of a strong KOST comprised of stakeholder 
organizations and networks can drive this advantage (Ansell, 2000; Bennett & Howlett, 
1992). 
Finally, authors like Tony Porter argue that there are certain conditions that must exist 
prior to any organizational learning. These are the capacity for managing information 
flows like highly technical reports, and, institutionalized forms of open deliberation that 
lead to consensus around new rules and informed by the shared knowledge. Elements 
such as channels of cooperation, clear division of labor, improved procedures for 
information-sharing, minimum standards, regular rule changes and adjustments towards 
goals, and technological complexity all take many years to test and develop (Gertler et 
al., 2002). 
 
Agents of Social Learning and “What” They Learn 
 
The concept of a KOST builds on Hall’s, Bennett and Howlett’s understanding by 
focusing on “knowledge-oriented policy communities” as the agent of learning (Bennett 
& Howlett, 1992, p. 285). However, I emphasize strategy that necessarily precedes policy 
development. Strategy involves building consensus around overarching goals and 
objectives while tactics embody steps and methods required to achieve them.  
Furthermore, members of the knowledge-oriented policy community vary. In Hall’s own 
words: 
 
Every state is tied to society by a network of institutionalized relations that 
structure the flow of information, resources and pressure between public and 
private sectors. They include: established networks for interest intermediation, 
institutional arrangements for the provision of public finance, and organizational 








significant impact on the state’s capacity to implement certain policies and they 
deserve further scrutiny.(P. A. Hall, 1988, p. 380)  
 
There is a clear distinction between policymakers who are the final decision-makers 
and the expert advisors who represent the different societal networks and who do not 
have the authority to make final decisions. Relationships among different levels of 
government and their agencies, industry organizations, scientific institutions and 
universities comprise knowledge-oriented strategy teams. These communities typically 
share a common belief system or “core beliefs” about goals but can differ in preferred 
collective strategy. 
Finally, the question of what is learned includes three elements: Core beliefs, policy 
goals, and means of implementing them (P. A. Hall, 1993). While the first may be the 
most difficult to change, it presents the most fundamental and powerful type of learning 
that underpins policy change. It also involves both the state and society. Decision-makers 
who believe that channeling more R&D funding towards collaboration projects with 
industry will yield higher rates of technological innovation as well as more and better 
paying jobs will be difficult to sway in support of basic research with little short or 
medium-term impact on economic development goals. These beliefs underpin both policy 
goals and ways of implementing them. Ideas about what the goals should be and how 
they should be achieved become central to what is learned. At the most general level, 
government, industry and universities differ in what they learn. These learning objectives 
typically range from lessons learned from previous policies about what worked and what 
did not, new business models to take advantage of biotechnology opportunities and to 
minimize risk, and how to successfully patent and license new discoveries and 
technologies. For purposes of this dissertation, I focus more on how these various 
learning objectives are expressed and supported in bioscience policy, strategies and 
institutions. Below I outline some objectives related to each ideal-type group within the 
“triple helix” of technological innovation: government agencies, industry and 
universities. 
Related government agencies like Ministries of industry, natural resources and health 








either bioscience strategies and institutions, or, strategies targeted at developing other 
industries, often knowledge-based like ICT. Some also engage in “lesson drawing” 
whereby lessons from both previous experience and those taken from other similar 
jurisdictions are combined to fit local needs. 
However, what these organizations specifically learn varies. Ministries of industry 
typically are weak in their knowledge of the science and the industrial structure 
underpinning biotechnology. Ministries of natural resources often do not understand how 
to address industrial growth, or, politically oppose it based on their core belief that 
environmental concerns take priority. And Ministries of health as well as hospitals are 
primarily concerned with the quality and affordability of therapies and healthcare 
services for patients, not necessarily economic development goals. The missions and 
specific interests of each dictate what they learn. 
In industry, large pharmaceutical firms, dedicated biotech companies, and risk 
finance organizations are primarily interested in commercializing new discoveries in 
order to capture a significant return on investment. What they learn is the scientific 
knowledge, how to develop the drug or manufacture the device, regulatory issues 
impacting their operations, how to commercialize their technologies, what government-
funded R&D programs exist and how they operate, and how to manage the drug 
discovery, development and distribution process. We can even examine each industry 
group separately and find that what they learn can be defined at a more fine-grained level 
and differences emerge. 
University scientists are primarily interested in engaging in basic and/or applied 
research in related bioscience disciplines like biology, chemistry, physics, engineering, 
and computer science. What they learn relates more to basic understandings of disease 
pathways and development of patentable discoveries beneficial to human and animal 
health, food security and the environment. Licensing opportunities have been promoted 
now for several years and are encouraged through university technology transfer offices. 
In each area, the type of social learning mechanism ranges. Governments and industry 
associations have led in the facilitation of open-source innovation in the form of public-
private partnerships. In industry, we see an increasing number of alliances between large 








and resource-sharing. At universities, R&D collaboration projects with industry partners 
have increased, leading to potentially new licensed products and services.  
But these same actors bring vested, competing interests that may prevent the learning 
process leading to new commitment strategies. The iterative bargaining process, 
therefore, plays a major role in determining these outcomes. Finally, the creation of a 
KOST, typically driven by enlightened individuals with experience in some or all three 
communities – government, industry and university – can aggregate and channel these 
interests toward consensus around a commitment to build and sustain a bioscience 
industry.  
In an increasingly competitive and uncertain global economic environment, the 
capacity of individual economies to create new or change existing rules and norms to 
sustain competitiveness is critical. But learning about how to create the most effective 
commitment strategies is difficult for the same reasons. The process of social learning 
can help solve the problem. A strong KOST that engages in disruptive social learning and 
coordinated bargaining processes among its members can build high level, more holistic 
commitment strategies. 
Scholars also argue that social learning as a force for policy change and therefore 
change in commitment strategies can generally take place within three different contexts. 
These include the state, society or among organizations that straddle these two. For 
example, some states develop industrial policy at arms-length from industry and 
university researchers. On the other hand, societal actors like industry associations within 
countries may take the lead in designing and implementing industrial strategies and 
policies, separate from government involvement. 
The third type involves both public and private sector organizations – from 
governmental economic development agencies to industry associations to firms and 
research organizations – with specific roles who are trying to create or transform 
institutions to keep pace with technological change.
24
 This process can take place more 
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For the purposes of this paper, I define institutions as formal rules and informal norms. Organizational 
institutions are the organizations created by institutions to implement established rules and programs. 








frequently in highly technical industries like bioscience where large information and 
knowledge asymmetries exist making room for different types of industrial governance.  
 
Barriers to Learning and How to Overcome Them 
 
It is more difficult to determine when economies are not learning. Changes in 
overarching goals along with specific settings and techniques may occur as a result of 
conflicting negotiations without learning. A new government often sets its own agenda 
driven by a different political paradigm. I argue that even within different power 
arrangements and political paradigms, opposing sides may still diffuse information and 
knowledge and may even come to a mutual understanding quite different from previous 
strategies and policies.  
In some cases, though, the actors may decide to forget and start from scratch rather 
than combine new information with existing knowledge and experiences. This forgetting 
may be as important as learning particularly in regions like Ontario where common 
values and practices relevant to an older industrial economy are not as effective in the 
“new” economy driven by knowledge-based industries (Gertler et al., 2002). 
Scholars have elaborated several phases of the learning economy. Storper describes 
how to construct frameworks of action to devise effective policies and institutions that 
involve four steps: Strategic assessment; Baseline assessment of the economy’s capacity 
including actors and resources in the target industry; Implementation of specific 
economic policies resulting from talk and technical assessments that build confidence and 
new roles; and, formal institution-building (Gertler et al., 2002; Storper, 1996). This last 
step should occur only after previous ones. This process describes a mix of public and 
private roles rather than an ideal Weberian state where each organization encompasses 
functionally discrete, hierarchical roles and responsibilities. 
Critical to the process is talk or “communicative interaction”(Storper, 2002, p. 140). 
Here, not only do participants share information and preferences but they reach a mutual 
                                                                                                                                                 
 









understanding. But while previous research claims that this type of communication is 
most effective at building trust when conducted within public institutions, evidence from 
cases like Quebec and PEI weakens this claim (Gertler et al., 2002; Storper, 1996). 
Sometimes public-private institutions are more effective. For example, publicly 
funded and privately managed industry associations can generate consensus around new 
goals despite competing economic development, industry and individual firms interests. 
However, an effective mix of incentives must be in place to encourage participation. 
Various authors have coined social learning terms. These range from “politics as 
learning” and “Institutional Learning, or, Institutional Forgetting?” to “learning by 
monitoring” and “reflexive learning” (P. Cooke, 1997; P. Cooke & Morgan, 1998; 
Nielsen & Johnson, 1998; Sabel, 1993). While social learning may help explain different 
types of commitment strategies, it is very difficult to separate social learning from 
iterative bargaining and explanations of power alone. Each is embedded in each other’s 
processes.  
Participants may reach mutual understandings but this may only be possible when 
sharing a similar political paradigm. Social learning may occur only after a new group 
reaches a dominant power position that influences how the problem is framed as well as 
negotiation agenda items. Therefore, a functionalist argument is not as powerful in 
explaining institutional change and development of commitment strategies. Rather, the 
idea of “collective puzzlement” and puzzling and powering through captures more 
accurately the reality of most political processes related to science-based industry 
construction (Heclo, 1974, p. 305). I examine the process of powering through by 
analyzing the iterative bargaining process in the next section. 
An important concept in Bennett and Howlett’s (Bennett & Howlett, 1992) words and 
based on Hall’s idea is the “knowledge-oriented policy community.” I substitute 
“strategy” for “policy” and “team” for “community” in order to capture processes 












I argue that social learning is a mechanism linking external ideas and institutions with 
existing principles and practices. The type of social learning - whether incremental 
(information-sharing) or disruptive (competence-building) - combined with the political 
process of choosing among and fighting for alternatives helps explain different types of 
commitment strategies. It ultimately offers implications for industrial change. 
This approach towards understanding the political process runs counter to traditional 
conceptions that involve conflict as the central characteristic. I argue that many processes 
also involve social learning among participants. The process can lead to shared 
understandings of the problem and way forward.  
 
2.2.2.3.1 Indicators: Disruptive or Incremental. The social learning process is disruptive 
when the KOST and its participants improve competencies in light of new opportunities 
and challenges. Competencies have improved or changed when: The KOST sustains itself 
over time by “learning to learn” through coordination channels, regular evaluations of 
goals and approaches, and when this process becomes routine; when organizations 
engage in collaborations; and when new firms establish themselves in line with the new 
KOST strategy. The disruptive nature of the process also implies that previous ways of 
doing things – research, business development, project management, exporting, FDI 
promotion – change relatively quickly. The net effect is a high commitment to developing 
the bioscience industry even though the process can create winners and losers. An 
incremental social learning process involves a weak KOST accessing, disseminating and 
processing information without significant changes in competencies. 
 
Iterative Bargaining 
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Gertler emphasizes the importance of national institutions: “effective social learning is underpinned by a 
shared set of rules, expectations, norms and practices that arise from a common macro–regulatory 
framework. Although firms may wish to collaborate, if their individual evolution has not been shaped by a 
similar set of national institutions, the likelihood of success in achieving effective inter-firm learning will 









I define iterative bargaining as a process whereby two or more groups of actors 
engage in repeated negotiations over time, informed by their own changing goals, 
resources and constraints (Grosse, 2005). The bargaining situation involves policy 
conflicts among interdependent actors who have both conflicting and complementary 
interests (Quirk, 1989; Schelling, 1980). Furthermore, each actor’s power is determined 
by his or her access to alternatives. This situation provides the opportunity for 
cooperation and coordination (Schelling, 1980).  
I argue that iterative bargaining as a particular aspect of the overall political process is 
a necessary, though not sufficient, explanation for changes in commitment strategies. But 
coupled with social learning, the two provide us with a more robust understanding of how 
and why different bioscience commitment strategies exist. I avoid static analyses of cases 
that predominate in the literature by highlighting the iterative nature of the process.  
To understand the negotiating positions of actors, I first segment them by categories: 
Government, industry and university. I examine the state using a two-tier model: national 
and subnational. This distinction is important in federalist countries where significant 
authority to shape industrial policy is devolved to provinces like Quebec and Ontario. But 
these jurisdictions still engage with federal government agencies in negotiations and 
consultations around institutions like patent regulation and R&D financing. Regions also 
engage globally with FDI and markets (Eden et al., 2005).  
I divide the industry into subcategories: MNCs, small biotech firms, service providers 
and financial entities. For example, understanding the structure of Quebec’s industry and 
the actors within it can help explain the nature of the negotiation process itself – what is 
negotiated, when, how and why. Historically Quebec’s industry has been divided into 
two groups. One involves large, foreign-owned pharmaceutical firms and their relations 
with local clinical research organizations, universities and provincial government. The 
other includes small biotech firms and their relations with the same organizations (Niosi 
& Tomas, 2003).  
Large pharmaceutical firms engaged in FDI activities and established a presence 
decades ago in the province to both manufacture and supply drugs to the provincial 








Not until the early 2000s and then later after the financial crisis of 2008 did these firms 
begin to ally with local biotech start-ups through R&D project collaborations. Small 
biotech firms, through local associations in Montreal and Quebec City, voiced their 
interests for R&D tax credits and policies supporting access to skilled labor. The two 
distinct groups shared general interests in these areas, but diverged when it came to big 
pharmaceutical firms’ power in dictating R&D alliance terms. 
I argue that these categorizations help simplify analysis of interests, social learning 
and negotiating processes even though the overall negotiation process is complex 
involving different actors at different times. This is particularly the case in areas of 
finance, skill development and corporate governance rules. The approach also helps to 
understand how the power of actors can shift over time and in reaction to external shocks. 
For example, prior to the 2008 financial crisis dedicated biotech firms were gaining 
leverage over big pharmaceutical companies. These smaller firms were the discoverers 
and innovators of new chemical entities and therapies turning them into valuable assets. 
After the financial crisis big pharmaceutical firms merged with, acquired or engaged in 
an increasing number of R&D alliances with small biotech firm to improve their own 
valuations.  
The rising costs of conducting R&D in-house and competition for a smaller number 
of NCEs repositioned core biotech firms with valuable assets. These firms enjoyed a 
stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis pharmaceutical MNCs whose “make or buy” 
decision shifted towards “buy” as a result of this global shock. This shift created greater 
leverage for smaller biotech firms over big pharmaceutical MNCs. 
 
2.2.2.3.2 Indicators: Fragmented or Coordinated. I employ a two-type bargaining model 
– fragmented or coordinated – in dimensions of finance, skill development and corporate 
governance. I define fragmented when only a limited number of actors engage in 
negotiations that affect the entire industry. This process can be intentional or 
unintentional.  
For example, the state and its lead agency, typically a ministry of science and 
technology, may provide for open calls for information on topics like R&D policies and 








but it may be politically expedient to limit actual negotiations to those organizations 
whose interests are more closely aligned with the state’s. 
Ontario’s bioscience industry is fragmented despite the large number of firms and 
research organizations. Not only do small biotech firms engage less with large 
pharmaceuticals MNCs via R&D and other types of alliances, the provincial agencies and 
industry associations do not share common understandings of the industry’s strategic 
direction. In fact, two industry associations have formed since the financial crisis. One 
reorganized from previous incarnations to represent an array of stakeholders from 
students to scientists to large pharmaceutical firms. The other is a new organization 
representing smaller and medium-sized firms. Since the financial crisis the government 
has decided not to engage fully with either organization until they agree on a “common 
voice” for industry. This means merging the two organizations. 
A fragmented bargaining process may be the unintentional result of traditional 
divides among key groups. In New Brunswick, Canada no bioscience industry 
association existed until 1997. Instead, provincial government agencies and two local 
anchor firms, the J.D. Irving Ltd. Company and McCain Foods, led the bargaining and 
decision-making process in niche areas of forestry and plant science, one of the 
province’s core capabilities. While the anchor firm is seen locally as a steward of the 
province’s forests, smaller firms have served Irving and McCain’s interests more than 
they have their own.
26
 
A coordinated bargaining approach involves engaging diverse bioscience interest 
groups to effectively design strategies and institutions meeting their needs. This approach 
is particularly challenging within an industry like bioscience. Several factors affect the 
governance process: the diversity and number of actors, competing interests, whether or 
not what is being bargained for is clear, scientific complexity, and the financial and skill 
requirements necessary to manage the process all impact the capability of actors to 
negotiate effectively. 
A coordinated bargaining approach is not without its share of conflicting interests and 
ideas about the way forward. But the process evolves, participants exchange information 
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and ideas, build knowledge and competencies, and can develop a shared understanding of 
both the challenge and solutions to it. The end result is consensus around choice of 
commitment strategy. Prince Edward Island, Canada is a representative case. 
 
2.2.2.4 Interaction Effects 
 
Social learning and iterative bargaining tend to interact and form part of the overall 
political process. Even though regular negotiations are often conflictual, they can involve 
evaluations of previous policies in light of new information related to science and 
industry trends, opportunities and challenges. Consensus can form around goals and 
strategies through a deliberative and flexible process. This process produces learning 
spillovers among KOST members and between KOST and non-KOST participants that 
improve competencies and the likelihood of engaging in high levels of commitment. I 
clarify as much as possible definitions and indicators while still capturing the nuances of 
such a process. Theories of conflict and negotiation alone do not explain outcomes. 
Social learning and iterative bargaining combined provide a more robust explanation. 
 
2.2.2.5 Causal Mechanisms: Puzzling and Powering Through 
 
Why does a strong KOST lead to a high/holistic commitment strategy?  
 
A strong KOST is inclusive, flexible, deliberative and engages in disruptive social 
learning and coordinated bargaining processes that build competencies. It accesses the 
latest information and knowledge about bioscience as well as best practices through 
KOST learning structures. These include: members’ global networks and those developed 
through the KOST where knowledge spillovers occur;  subject matter committees tasked 
with conducting strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats analysis; regular formal 
interactions to design and implement work plans in line with industry goals; and regular 
monitoring and evaluations of progress. These structures and processes affect ways of 
thinking about challenges and opportunities in light of new information and occur prior to 








This knowledge is diverse covering new ways of providing risk financing, creating 
training and immigration policies, and changing corporate structures in response to global 
shocks. Given key characteristics of a strong KOST - particularly its inclusive structure, 
deliberative processes over time, clear roles and responsibilities, formal strategies and 
work plans with timelines and agreed-upon tasks - participants are more likely to provide 
insights and represent interests that span critical areas of bioscience industry 
development. This dynamic increases the number of possible solutions to bioscience 
industry challenges and builds competencies. The approach is strategic and frames the 
challenge to include all three areas of finance, skill development and corporate 
governance, not just low hanging fruit like increased R&D spending or construction of a 
new technology incubator. This process causes a paradigm shift as core beliefs change 
reflecting new understandings of the opportunities and challenges.  
The social learning process is disruptive as the KOST continually monitors, collects, 
disseminates, deliberates and acts on new information and ideas about the industry and 
reflects on the effectiveness of its commitment strategy. Its own competencies change, 
displacing old ways of thinking and approaching problems that have spillover effects 
among its members who also design their own organizational strategies. With this 
intentional approach toward accessing the latest information and ideas about the industry 
and how to sustain it, the process results in a holistic, high level commitment strategy. It 
also helps to strengthens and expand industry networks. 
 
Why does a weak KOST lead to a mixed commitment strategy?  
 
A weak KOST is more likely to lead to a mixed commitment strategy. A weak KOST 
relies more on evaluations of previous policies than on gathering best practices globally. 
The approach limits the number of potential solutions to capturing bioscience 
opportunities.  
The roles and responsibilities of the KOST participants are less clear, the deliberative 
process is irregular, and information-sharing rather than competency-building dominates. 








relatively coordinated. This learning and negotiation combination yields a mixed 
commitment strategy.  
For example, a province might increase R&D spending tied to collaborations instead 
of dispersing grants to single firms. This change in programs also represents a paradigm 
change in the way government views its and the private sector’s role in sustaining 
industry growth. But the same region might not align skills development with industry 
needs or combine both FDI-led and local industry-led bioscience growth. This mixed 
approach can stem from limited access to or use of lessons learned from other 
jurisdictions and unclear understandings of the role of each KOST participant especially 
in light of a global shock like the 2008 financial crisis. As participants scramble to figure 
out what to do next they are more likely to rely on past settings, techniques and 
paradigms since the deliberative process is irregular. This process can also limit the 
KOST’s ability to develop its own competencies. 
 
Why does the absence of a KOST lead to low levels of commitment? 
 
When no KOST exists learning spillovers decrease and organizations benefit less. 
Organizations have less access to the latest industry information and struggle to build 
knowledge and competencies. Even though individual firm strategies underpin the 
industry, no organization can solve problems and capture opportunities on its own given 
the high cost of doing so.  
Few organizations can commit to industry growth without significant learning 
spillovers from participant interaction within and outside a KOST. Industry cannot 
generate consensus around goals and a strategy for reaching them without understanding 
how to proceed. The process requires regular evaluations of goals as well as creating, 
gathering and sharing lessons learned, technical information on markets and science, and 
firm experiences. It is more likely that at best only changes in settings like the level of 
R&D funding will occur in response to global shocks. These changes are relatively easy 
to implement but easy to reverse. 
Other forms of policy networks can and often do exist within a single region or 








reach them. Disruptive or incremental social learning can take place but within individual 
firms and policy communities as they build their own competencies. Iterative bargaining 
can occur within each community but not across communities through a KOST. 
The two-by-two in the next section loosely captures characteristics of these dynamics. 
However, these categories are not hard and fast into which each case neatly fits. They are 
“ideal-types.” Some regional cases shifted into other categories during the pre- and post- 
2008 global financial crisis time period. Furthermore, the pre-2008 period is generalized 
to capture changes in governance structures and resulting commitment levels on average 
since the early 1980s. I analyze this period leading up to the few years prior to the global 
financial crisis of 2008 for each case. This approach helps to create the context within 
which new commitments, if any, were made. 
 
 
2.2.3 Additional Explanations 
 
The presence and strength of a KOST does not fully explain why regions develop 
different commitment strategies. Varying factor endowments including natural and 
human resources impact the extent to which regions commit to developing their 
bioscience industry. Size can matter. Prince Edward Island is a small highly committed 
province while Ontario is a large industrialized province with signs of mixed 
commitment levels. Existing industries can either compete with science-based industries 
for resources, or, create knowledge spillovers to spur new industries like bioscience. 
Regions within countries help shape and implement national institutions but they do so 
differently. Both countries and regions within them respond differently to global shocks. 
Finally, path dependence helps to explain why Ontario has struggled to design holistic 
bioscience strategies while Quebec maintains its high level of commitment. I develop a 
research design that builds on some of these explanations while controlling for others to 
examine the impact of a KOST on commitment strategies.  
 
2.2.3.1.1 Factor Endowments. Provinces contain a different mix of factor endowments 








levels of commitment to bioscience. For example, decision-makers in a jurisdiction with 
scarce skilled labor will likely choose not to invest in a bioscience industry. We should 
expect resources to be diverted towards more promising alternatives. This argument 
builds on the traditional theory of comparative advantage as well as on how factor 
endowments affect the creation of institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005; 
R. E. Hall & Jones, 1999; Ricardo, 1817). I control for these factors by comparing similar 
“catch-up” provinces in Atlantic Canada and separately comparing the two larger 
industrialized provinces of Quebec and Ontario. While factor endowments do impact the 
choice of R&D investments in particular knowledge areas such as bioinformatics versus 
agricultural biotech, they do not fully explain why we see different levels of commitment 
to bioscience even within provinces with similar endowments.   
 
2.2.3.1.2 Size. A jurisdiction’s size can affect its level of commitment to bioscience. It 
may be easier for smaller jurisdictions to commit since they can more easily identify 
stakeholders, generate consensus given the smaller number of competing interests, and 
dedicate resources in support of industry goals. Larger provinces have more difficulty in 
facilitating high levels of commitment to bioscience for the opposite reasons. However, 
small size can work in the reverse direction in that vested interests may more easily hold 
back much needed changes to existing institutions or creation of new ones. Larger 
provinces with their higher numbers of industry stakeholders have access to more ideas 
and ways of solving problems than smaller provinces, which can lead to higher 
commitment levels. I control for size by comparing the small rural Atlantic Provinces 
separately from the large industrialized provinces of Ontario and Quebec. 
 
2.2.3.1.3 Rival Industries. Rival industries could have negative or positive effects on the 
commitment toward developing knowledge-based industries. Provinces with strong 
traditional industries such as automotive and agriculture compete for limited public and 
private sector resources. Capturing these weakens support for “industries of the future” 
like bioscience. Those actors who designed existing institutions to help facilitate goals of 
traditional industries can dominate the industrial policy agenda even after a global 








developing knowledge-based industries potentially offering long-term benefits. On the 
other hand, it is reasonable to expect that successful industrialized provinces such as 
Ontario and its automotive and plastics industries should be able to commit highly to new 
growth industries like bioscience. Knowledge spillovers from traditional to science-based 
industries or spillovers from a province’s economic governance experiences in one sector 
to another could occur but they often do not (Stiglitz & Greenwald, 2014). The same 
governance structures that worked in one industry may not in another since not all 
industries follow the same logic. Biotechnology and biopharmaceuticals must overcome 
initial market failures given high risks and uncertainties related to the drug development 
process. 
 
2.2.3.1.2 National Institutions. I use national institutions like R&D funding and IPR as a 
control variable in order to compare Canadian provinces operating within the same 
country and to demonstrate the importance of provincial commitment strategies. I also 
include this variable to demonstrate that not all provinces design strategies that interpret 
or implement national institutions in the same way (Gertler et al., 2002). Nor do 
provinces influence the design of national institutions equally. For example, Atlantic 
Canadian provinces gain access to federal R&D funding through the Atlantic Canadian 
Opportunities Agency (ACOA). PEI is the smallest province but has secured more 
funding than Nova Scotia, the largest province.
27
 Quebec is more strategic and has 
influenced national R&D funding areas like genomics and strengthened its own patent 
legislation using national IPR as a benchmark. Ontario has had weak strategic approaches 
towards influencing national bioscience institutions as part of its own commitment 
strategy. The presence and strength of a KOST at the provincial level helps to explain 
some of this variation. 
 
2.2.3.1.3 Global Shock. I treat the 2008 financial crisis as an external shock. Finance is 
critical to sustaining a bioscience industry given its market failures and long product 
development cycles. It is reasonable to expect that the financial crisis similarly affects 
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aspiring bioscience provinces like those in Atlantic Canada. The sudden scarcity of risk 
finance should equally impact the industrialized provinces of Ontario and Quebec. In 
theory all countries and regions within them with some level of commitment to growing a 
bioscience industry should be affected. While a financial crisis can cause a change in 
commitment from a high to low level, it does not necessarily cause change in the opposite 
direction from low or mixed, to high levels, or, no change. It is possible that Atlantic 
Canadian provinces were never part of the global financial network that includes VCs 
and other risk capital funding. It follows that we should not expect a change in 
commitment strategies in those regions. The evidence contradicts this claim. The theory 
does not fully explain why bioscience clusters like PEI’s continue to commit and grow 
while others like Nova Scotia’s stagnate. Furthermore, Quebec appears to be more 
strategic in responding to the crisis by creating new learning structures to help regain 
strength even though the financial crisis negatively affected both Ontario and Quebec. 
Ontario is still fragmented with no real strategic response. 
 
2.2.3.1.4 Path Dependence. Theories of path dependence explain why certain provinces 
have difficulty changing their commitment strategy. Previous industrial policy decisions, 
events and related formal and informal institutions tend to resist change (Mahoney & 
Thelen, 2009; Thelen, 1999). This reaction is primarily due to vested interests and to the 
difficulty of changing social norms around acceptable ways of operating within a 
particular industry. Changing cognitive and organizational frames to value the long-term 
benefits of knowledge-based industrial development can take generations, making these 
investments politically unacceptable given the preference for short-term, measurable 
returns on investment. Path dependence offers a partial explanation as to why some 
provinces resist adapting institutions to new opportunities. Those provinces that 
established institutional complementarity in finance, skill development and corporate 
governance rules prior to an external shock like the 2008 financial crisis are more likely 
to withstand it even though changing existing commitment strategies may be difficult. 
Path dependence theorists agree that the major cause of institutional change is an 
external shock. The shock creates a “critical juncture” where actors reassess interests and 








could not on their own. This process creates a new equilibrium. However, some 
provinces changed their commitment strategies after the 2008 global financial crisis 
while others did not. The two-by-two below illustrates these different processes, 
governance modes and commitment strategies at the sub-national level.  
 
 





This chapter presented a theoretical framework with which to understand varying 








argue that those regions with a strong KOST in place prior to the 2008 global financial 
crisis, or, create one in reaction to it are more likely to generate a high commitment 
strategy. The next chapter places Canada in global context as it attempts to develop a 
globally competitive “bioeconomy”. Case chapters follow while the concluding chapter 
highlights empirical findings, theoretical and policy implications, and future research 
directions. 
The following chapters evaluate in detail the empirical evidence from country and 
regional case studies. They evaluate the roles of a KOST and policy communities 
combined with other explanations including natural resources, national institutions, rival 
industries and size for the changing nature and level of bioscience commitments. 
Chapter three compares Canada with the United States and Australia, two other 
industrialized, federalist countries, and their responses to the 2008 global financial crisis. 
While these countries converged around the concept of the “bioeconomy,” they diverged 
when it came to designing strategies in support of it. This divergence occurs not only at 
the national level, but sub-nationally.  
Chapter four evaluates the Quebec and Ontario cases representing large, 
industrialized provinces within Canada with significant bioscience assets. The chapter 
determines whether or not commitment levels changed and explores the role of a KOST 
and other variables throughout the process. It provides insights into how large, 
industrialized regions can either maintain high commitment levels through disruptive 
social learning and iterative bargaining processes after a global shock, as in the Quebec 
case, or mixed levels through fragmented policy communities such as in Ontario. 
Chapter five analyzes the small, rural yet aspiring bioscience provinces in the Atlantic 
Canada region. The chapter contrasts the least likely case of Prince Edward Island and its 
strong KOST leading to a high bioscience commitment strategy against the other three 











DESIGNING THE BIOECONOMY:  
 




3.1 The Role of the State in the New Bioeconomy 
 
The role of the state in economic restructuring is fundamentally different from the 
past in the way that it helps transition to a knowledge-based economy. The 
“Schumpeterian Competition State” and its supply-side interventions that spur economic 
competitiveness explain this transformation. Since the 2008 financial crisis states have 
increasingly called for greater integration and coordination among government agencies 
and directly with industry. Public-private partnerships, pre-competitive collaboration 
projects, filling finance gaps along bioscience value chains, and addressing the skills gap 
by linking university research to specific industry needs are now goals. Many countries 
have embraced the overarching concept of the bioeconomy as an answer to global 
economic competitiveness.  
Yet, beneath this convergence each country’s bioscience strategy in response to the 
financial crisis reveals distinct differences in commitment. I apply theories of institutional 
change including diffusion, functionalism and path dependence as lenses with which to 
understand these differences. Each country is converging around a new equilibrium but it 
is far from certain that the new institutions will sustain industrial competitiveness. 
The modern biotechnology industry has evolved globally but with much volatility 
since the late 1970s. All OECD and many developing countries created policies 
supporting either biotechnology’s use or its application across sectors from agriculture to 
human health to energy and the environment. The different business models of large 
pharmaceutical MNCs and small biotechnology start-up firms began to converge as early 
as 2000. Now both are considered drug development companies.  
The 2008 global financial crisis disrupted this evolution. It was widely recognized as 









While biotech’s past financing droughts were localized and industry-specific, the 
present downturn crosses national boundaries and impacts industries across the 
economy. It is, in a word, systemic. (E&Y, 2009, p. 3) 
 
The key question now is what is the role of the state in influencing new ways of 
organizing economic activity? In particular, how do states facilitate knowledge-based 
industries? Do traditional state-industry structures persist in a path-dependent manner, or, 
are new institutions created or changed and how? This chapter applies the concept of the 
“Schumpeterian Competition State” to help answer these questions (Cerny, 1990; Jessop, 
1994). The Competition State differs from previous conceptions such as the Post-Fordist 
State in several ways.  
First, the nature of state intervention has changed from demand-side to supply side 
structural reforms and an explicit emphasis on technological innovation. States do not 
just adjust to the global economy they promote and sustain an open global economy in 
order to capture benefits from it. Second, the state cedes power to other non-state actors 
such as industry in order to create flexibility and efficiencies. Third, industrial policies 
embrace technological innovation and are designed to support competition and markets. 
Fourth, states create flexible labor markets to facilitate innovation as a primary goal. 
This conception necessitates more and new modes of state interventions rather than a 
reduction in its involvement (Cerny, 1990; Jessop, 1994). This is particularly the case in 
biotechnology. The industry is new and highly complex increasing the need for state 
agencies and industry to learn about the most effective and efficient ways of achieving 
common goals. But states like Canada and Australia still engage in demand-side 
interventions. They create markets through procurement policies for these products.  
How do states know where to look for ideas regarding modes of intervening? What 
strategies and institutions should they create? What is the nature of the social learning 
and negotiation process? Who is involved? To answer these questions I first examine the 
industry’s challenges. 
Unlike traditional industries, flexibility and constant innovation characterize today’s 
knowledge-based industries like bioscience. Firms can choose to specialize in specific 








can more easily secure resources globally and expand into international markets. To do so 
requires frequent technological and process innovation given the rapid pace of scientific 
discovery and increased global competition to secure market share. 
Industry viewed the 2008 global financial crisis as systemic and unchanging. It 
articulated the challenges and trends that were shaping a new way of understanding how 
to sustain innovation and growth - the rise of high-quality generics, fundamental 
healthcare reform, personalized medicine and globalization (E&Y, 2009). These trends 
illustrate how industry attempts to overcome financial constraints, create value in new 
product development, and learn how to compete globally within changing healthcare 
structures and incentives. 
By 2010 the question became how to “do more with less” along with pressures to 
“prove it or lose it” from government regulators (E&Y, 2011). Severe financial 
constraints and health care systems demanding proof that new therapies are more 
effective and less costly than alternatives force big pharmaceutical firms and small 
biotech companies to develop new strategies that increase R&D efficiency. These 
pressures force firms to focus on core “assets” like new chemical entities. Industry and 
government demand highly compelling scientific data indicating a strong probability of 
success in commercializing these therapies. Industry began to engage in product and 
process innovation within a very different global context: 
 
In this capital-constrained environment, we can no longer afford inefficiency and 
duplication in drug R&D. The industry needs to remove duplication, encourage 
pre-competitive collaboration, pool data and let researchers learn in real time.  
(E&Y, 2012, p. 1) 
 
Ideas from industry about how to address this overarching challenge come from 
recognized leaders and industry researchers. For example, in the E&Y Beyond Borders 
2011 global biotech report, suggestions included revamping the United States Food and 
Drug Administration to quicken the drug approval process, focusing on the science and 
unmet medical needs rather than just the regulatory process, changing small biotech firm 








focus on adaptive trials and conditional approvals earlier, and small biotechnology firms 
either partnering early with big pharmaceutical companies or bringing niche therapies all 
the way through to approval on their own. Efficiency and effectiveness are now the goals 
yet both are difficult to reach given financial constraints and uncertainty involved in the 
drug development process. 
This chapter situates Canada’s bioscience industry within global context focusing on 
each country’s response to the 2008 global financial crisis. It compares Canada with the 
United States and Australia, two other industrialized, federalist countries. I do not 
examine various sub-national cases. Later chapters on Ontario, Quebec and Canada’s 
Atlantic provinces take on this task. 
 
3.2 Research Questions and Arguments 
 
How and under what conditions do public and private sector actors design institutions 
to solve the problem of expanding the bioscience industry’s opportunity structure while 
simultaneously de-risking investments in it? This question implies a changing role for the 
state in industrial policies. Are countries behaving more like a “Schumpeterian 
Competition State,” intervening in industries to enhance product, process and market 
innovations
28
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 Jessop develops the concept of the Schumpeterian workfare state whose objective is the “promotion of 
product, process, organizational, and market innovation; the enhancement of the structural 
competitiveness of open economies mainly through supply-side intervention; and the subordination of 
social policy to the demands of labour market flexibility and structural competitiveness.” (Jessop, 1994, p. 
9) 
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Benner and Lofgren see convergence of bioscience institutions generally among liberal and coordinated 
market economies in areas of increased R&D funding and investments in healthcare. However, their 
research identifies divergence in how the industry and market is regulated, supported and treats ethical 
boundaries. Their results contradict the VOC literature, which argues that national institutions tend to 
follow a path dependence process, creating lasting differences across countries, yet coherence within 
them. According to Benner and Lofgren, some coordinated economies like Sweden and Finland 
demonstrate fragmented policies and institutions while the US and Australia tend to be more coordinated 
in certain areas. So there is no clear dichotomy as in “liberal” vs. “coordinated” models of 








I make the following arguments. First, each country’s response to a global financial 
crisis should be understood within the context of previous economic and industrial 
development experiences. At different times each country made major changes to its 
commitment strategies in an attempt to create opportunities and manage risks associated 
with them. A broader policy community has developed in some cases and the state has 
come to play a more activist role in facilitating the production and spread of 
biotechnology. In this activist role institutions are converging. Actors search both 
internally and globally for new ways of solving the problems of mitigating risk while 
capturing opportunities associated with the new biotechnologies. 
By 2012 institutions began to converge. Many countries accepted that technological 
innovation and knowledge clusters are crucial to long-term economic development. In 
addition, rules governing IP and R&D funding are converging in response to WTO-
TRIPS negotiations and domestic pressures. The scientific community’s network of 
researchers in specific disease areas is also globalizing. VCs are increasingly searching 
for co-investors globally to share ideas, contacts, business models, financing and 
investments. 
These networks diffuse common practices in areas like drug discovery and 
commercialization. However, scratching the surface we find significant divergence. Each 
country’s economic histories, paradigms and experiences in crafting commitment 
strategies shaped these differences. 
Second, how we understand success and failure in bioscience industry development 
must move beyond measures like the number of blockbuster drugs produced or revenue 
generation. Given the long and expensive drug development period that typically takes 
10-12 years costing over $1.5 billion very few countries and regions within them are 
successful. Yet they continue to value and promote a “bioeconomy”. 
I argue that we must consider various types of learning and bargaining processes 
leading to different commitment strategies and ways of measuring success. Much can 
happen during the drug discovery, development and distribution process and each 
milestone along the way can be a separate measure of success. Even different 








product, technology and service time-lines, affecting overall time-to-market as well as 
costs. 
Furthermore, other short and medium-term measures can include goals like creating a 
diverse bioscience community, a steady increase in the number of organizations, or the 
creation of institutions facilitating credible commitments among government, industry 
and university. Achieving these interim goals can help reduce uncertainty and risk. The 
process can improve information-sharing, enable faster discovery and development 
periods and spread risk among industry stakeholders. Together they could improve 
countries’ probability of reaching long-term goals. Managing uncertainty then becomes 
the primary challenge underpinning commitment strategies. 
Third, each country confronts a choice, albeit narrow in some cases, of strategies and 
governance modes. The choice set includes whether or not to invest in specific areas of 
R&D, like genomics or stems cells; different application areas from marine or industrial 
biotech to human biopharmaceuticals; or, ways in which to plug into the global R&D and 
production networks.  
This latter option can be broken down into others. Countries face a choice between 
developing platform technologies used in a particular drug development phase, or, 
technologies applied to each phase from pre-competitive through stage three clinical 
trials. They can also choose to manufacture, sell and distribute drugs as a core 
competency. 
However, the choice set is constrained by several factors. These include the 
availability of scientists trained in the specific subfields and application areas; managers 
with experience commercializing new discoveries; government agencies with enough 
working knowledge of the underlying science and the industry itself to be able to design 
strategies with a better chance of success; a diversity of risk financing sources; 
infrastructure; population and market size; natural resources; and location. 
Evidence indicates that the state, industry and other bioscience stakeholders seek 
greater coordination to move to a “health outcomes-based system”(E&Y, 2011). Firms 
alone cannot make all the changes necessary to be both innovative and responsive to 
demand for more effective, less costly solutions. This “new normal” represents a change 








goal has also precipitated a change in the role of the state and the broader policy 
community in helping to reach it. 
 
3.3 Comparing R&D Spending 
 
An initial comparison among Canada, the United States and Australia reveals some 
intriguing similarities and differences. All three countries are industrialized and federalist 
with devolved powers of taxation and administration of certain federal programs to 
regional levels. More recently the political administrations of each have embraced 
bioscience as a key driver of future economic competitiveness. By 2009 the term 
“bioeconomy” began to permeate discussions and ideas – largely generated by the OECD 
and member countries - regarding not only the importance of biotechnology as a tool that 
cuts across many application areas – from human health to industrial biotechnology to the 
environment – but also how to design credible strategies and institutions that sustain 
these industries (OECD, 2009). 
Table 8 compares biomedical R&D indicators before, during and after the 2008 
global financial crisis. However, the data itself does not reveal a major change in policy 
per Hall’s definition, only a change in “settings” or levels of R&D expenditure. Later 
sections address whether and how countries changed their commitment strategies in all 
three areas of settings, techniques and overarching goals. 
Only Australia increased its federal R&D spending in medical research. This increase 
was due primarily to public investment while industry remained relatively steady until 
2010 when investment increased but flattened out at 1.4 billion during each of the 
remaining years. Both the United States and Canada’s biomedical R&D expenditures 
decreased. However, when we compare R&D spending as percentage of total business 
expenditures and government spending in higher education and research, Australia 











Table 6 Key Biotechnology Statistics Comparing Australia, Canada and the U.S. 
Biomedical R&D Expenditures (US$B) by Public Sector and Industry* 





United States 131.3 123.8 119.1 126.3 120.0 119.3 -1.9 
Public 48.0 46.9 47.9 51.4 50.6 48.9  
Industry 83.3 76.9 71.2 74.9 69.4 70.4  
Canada 6.0 6.1 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.3 -2.6 
Public 4.0 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.3  
Industry 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.0  
Australia 4.4 4.3 4.6 5.8 6.3 6.1 6.9 
Public 3.3 3.1 3.6 4.4 4.9 4.7  
Industry 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.4  
 
Source: Chakma, J., B.Sc, Sun, G. H., M.D., Steinberg, J. D., PhD., Sammut, Stephen M,M.A., M.B.A., &Jagsi, 
Reshma,M.D., D.Phil. (2014). Asia's ascent -- global trends in biomedical R&D expenditures. The New England 
Journal of Medicine, 370(1), 3-6. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1473894767?accountid=11107 
*U.S. dollars adjusted for inflation to 2012 using NIH Biomedical R&D Price Index according to mean exchange rate 




Interestingly, in the United States’ public expenditures have been erratic, with the 
highest level of spending occurring in 2010 and reaching $51.4 billion. But by 2012 the 
total amount shrank back to almost 2007 levels. This significant decrease can be partially 
explained by political conflict regarding the federal budget resulting in sequestration of 
federal expenditures. 
U.S. industry has invested less and less over the years, except for a noticeable 
increase from 2009 to 2010, at the same time that government spending significantly 
increased. This short time that both US public and industry investment rose, can plausibly 
be explained by the federal government’s announcement, informed by the OECD 2009 
bioeconomy policy agenda, of a new “bioeconomy” strategy, signaling a credible 
commitment to bioscience as a powerful tool cross-cutting many industries and a 
potential source of sustained U.S. economic competitiveness globally. 
This perspective is different from the 1980s. States viewed biotechnology as a 
promising technology that could solve immediate human health, food security and 
environmental issues domestically. It was not considered a source of global economic 








policy framework, it has not matched it with increased financing. Individual government 
agencies simply reprioritized their budgets. So the commitment in terms of financial 
“settings” appears to come from existing organizational institutions rather than the 
creation of new ones. 
Finally, Canada shows a relatively steady decline in public and private sector 
biomedical R&D expenditures. The financial crisis significantly reduced availability of 
risk financing especially for small biotech firms. Prime Minister Stephen Harper and his 
Conservative Party applied a new paradigm favoring commercialization of new products 
and technologies over “blue sky” discoveries. The perception is that basic research is too 
uncertain and risky given longer timelines and high costs.  
 
 
3.4 The 2008 Global Financial Crisis: Divergence beneath Convergence? 
 
3.4.1 Global Context – Bioscience 
 
2008 marked the beginning of the global financial crisis. This event negatively 
affected both financial markets and the economy. Specifically it precipitated a decline in 
much needed risk capital available to biotechnology firms resulting in industry 
contraction.  
By 2008 the bioscience industry had changed dramatically since the early 1980s. The 
number of dedicated biotech firms and those using biotechnology reached 3,492 in the 
United States (2007), 527 in Australia (2006) and 532 in Canada (2005) (OECD, 2010). 
The scientific community made great strides in new discoveries from rDNA techniques to 
mapping the human genome to progress in stem cell research. All carry potential for 
progress in human health, food security and the environment. 
At the same time, the pharmaceutical industry was both contracting and restructuring. 
Large MNCs were trying to manage shrinking drug development pipelines, expiring 
patents protecting high-revenue-generating drugs, and declining returns on large R&D 








clinical trials were particularly attractive as either acquisition targets or potential allies 
with these large pharmaceutical firms. 
Biotechnology firms had less and less cash in reserve, fewer VCs willing to invest in 
stage one or even pre-competitive stages and a weak initial public offering (IPO) 
environment, all of which is needed to support the long R&D and drug approval process 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2009). By 2009, to diversify their portfolio, big 
pharmaceutical firms were merging and acquiring smaller biotechnology firms with 
specific biologic drug products, rather than new chemical entities (NCEs). This trend 
coupled with the Obama administration’s healthcare reform, a renewed focus on the 
“bioeconomy” and basic research, as well as personalized medicine all was expected to 
support biotechnology. 
In response, new modes of industry governance now revolve around greater formal 
and informal coordination among actors to share information, knowledge and resources 
in an effort to reduce uncertainty, risk and costs. These range from open-source 
innovation models to government and VC financing along the entire drug development 
value chain. 
 
3.4.1.1 The Challenge and Strategy Choice 
 
During this time period, a new challenge arose: How to manage increasing scientific 
and industrial complexity under conditions of severe cuts in financial resources. Framing 
the problem, learning about what financial mechanisms, skills development and business 
models work and what ones do not, and negotiating a credible way forward all impact a 
country’s ability to capture opportunities while managing uncertainty and risk. In order to 
frame each country’s response to the 2008 financial crisis, I use this problem-focused 
approach.  
However, the problems posed during this timeframe are naturally different than 
those faced by each country in the 1980s when biotechnologies were beginning to be 
commercialized. By 2008, the industry had experienced normal business cycles of growth 
and decline, structural changes, new product development displacing incumbent products 








generally disappointed many, especially in the industry’s inability to quickly produce new 
drugs alleviating major diseases, scientific discoveries continued. Both the science and 
the industrial system had become more complex, slowing down the expectations of 










Table 7 Snapshot: Comparing Country Strategies and Institutions 
 
 Australia Canada United States 
    
Strategy 
 
Building capacity to 
innovate and attract FDI; 
No longer compete for 
low cost manufacturing; 
Link R&D to industry 




Niche areas of R&D – 
agriculture, industrial, 
environment, stem cells 
Shift from basic to 
commercializable 
research;  
New mechanisms to 
facilitate competition; 
Centralize Innovation 
(new S&T Ministry) 
 
Niche areas of R&D: 
human health 




resources across multiple 
application areas 
 
Broad-based approach to 
R&D but with attention 
to human health 
    
Role of State State-Industry 
Partnerships; address 




address market failures 
and facilitate innovation 
State-Industry 
Partnerships; address 
market failures and 
facilitate innovation 
    
Finance Government-led; start-
ups list early on ASX; 
low diversity of risk 
finance 
Shift to more risk finance, 
industry collaboration 
projects, less R&D funds 
directly to firms with weak 
prospects to 
commercialize; low 
diversity of finance  
Diversity of finance 
sources, firms, research 
organizations;  






designed to attract skilled 
workers; interdisciplinary 
Interdisciplinary 
    
Corporate 
Governance 
Small biotechs - weak 
knowledge of how to 
create a corporate 
structure that attracts risk 
finance; sees products 
through approval process 
Small biotech focus on 
core assets; alliances  













Table 8 Bioscience Finance, Skill Development and Corporate Governance (Post-2008 Financial Crisis) 
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Corporate governance relates to how firms develop competencies to compete. One way to achieve this is to develop or acquire either internal or external 
resources, or both. Additional sources of privately and some further publicly held data on corporate alliance, mergers and acquisition include: SDC, MERIT-CATI 
(NSF), CORE and BIOSCAN/Recap. Recap indicated that in 2013 there were 2,315 publicly announced global deals. The above table includes commonly 
referenced statistics reported through Ernst and Young and PriceWaterhouseCoopers through their annual biotechnology reports as well as individual country 
reports. 
 Finance Skill Development Corporate Governance30 
1st Order – 
Settings 
Biotech R&D spending (US$) Tax Credits – Scientists, Technical specialists Make or Buy Decision – Amount of R&D in-house  
Canada Gov’t, industry and VC spending decreased; 
firms increasingly seeking financing from 
strategic partners 
 
Target to increase # of masters and PhD students. R&D increasingly external for big pharma. Biotech 
firms focusing new funds on core products growth and 
less on R&D  
Australia Gov’t, industry spending increased Increase # PhDs, technicians; 
 
R&D increasingly external for big pharma; 93% of 
Revenues for whole sector generated by CSL (local 
biotech firm) 
United States Gov’t total spending decrease; but tax credits 
to biotech SMEs, industry increased R&D 
Bio tax credit of 2009 & 2010 for small biotechs 
in preclinical/clinical stage. 
From “year of the deal” in 2007 to little M&A change 
in 2013 except for increased small biotech M&As, 
major decrease in big pharma M&As.; R&D 
increasingly external through alliances. 
2nd Order – 
Techniques 
Diversification of finance sources Program Changes Diversity of R&D models 
Canada Restructuring SR&ED, new forms of financing 
(seed level and later stages) of BDC VC fund; 
Gov’t creating market by procuring 
drugs/technologies with innovative 
components; NRC restructured to be more 
industry-facing. 
Government funding R&D but with greater focus 
on university-industry collaboration projects; 
New MBA-biotechnology programs  
Internal + external with different types of relationships 
e.g. in-licensing/out-licensing, R&D collaboration 
projects, patent strategies, open-source innovation, 







Sources: Ernst and Young and PriceWaterhouseCoopers annual reports, 2008 - 2014; Country bioscience strategy reports. 
 





Company stakeholders are demanding more oversight and diligence by boards in a variety of areas. The US Sarbanes-Oxley Act has changed the governance 
landscape on a global basis -new rules and regulations for accounting and disclosure, internal controls and risk management. 
 
Australia New Innovation Australia institution with 
responsibilities to administer new government-
backed VC funds – that target along the value 
chain - and tax incentives to attract VCs 
New MBA-biotechnology programs; Change in 
focus from discipline-specific to interdisciplinary 
(molecular bio + engineering + bioinformatics 
etc.) degree programs 
Different types of corporate structures of early stage 
biotech firms; lack of transparency make it difficult to 
raise funds on ASX or to be acquired.31 
United States Highly diversified vis-à-vis other countries; 
 
-NCATS (newest NIH center) established in 
2011 to focus on translational research 
(development); 
-NIH shifting focus to cancer research (fierce 
biotech) 
Industry training straight from high school; 
University degree programs increase in 
interdisciplinarity; Industry demanding 
individuals who can work across domains and 
support more than one project 
Internal + external with different types of relationships 
e.g. in-licensing/out-licensing, R&D collaboration 
projects, patent strategies, open-source innovation, 
“virtual” project companies. (PWC) 





Core focus shifting (e.g. basic-commercial 
research, niche application areas, niche 
science areas, global partnerships) 
Core focus shifting  Core R&D strategy shifting 
Canada Shift from “protect” to “compete” – lessons 
learned from Australia, the US and Europe; 
Shift from basic research to comm.; Centralize 
Innovation: Re-creation of the Ministry of 
S&T; Biotech firms seek more “broad” R&D 
funding from Gov’t 
Shift from R&D as funding university research to 
university-industry collaboration projects to give 




Increased M&A, alliances, external R&D and VC 
spinouts/separate companies.  
 
Pharmaceutical firms are both vertically integrating 
core functions and increasing external alliances. 
Competences come from within and externally. 
Australia Shift to innovation as source of long-term 
economic compet. Linking R&D directly with 
industrial competitiveness; restructuring of 
existing institutions Office of Chief Scientist, 
CSIRO now within new Dept. of Industry 
(2013); sector plans developed  
Interdisciplinary  Increased M&A, alliances, R&D and VC (government-
backed and private) spinouts/separate companies. 
Competences come from within and externally. 
 
United States “Bioeconomy”; all-encompassing/integrative 
framework; individual agencies asked to 
prioritize biotechnology in annual budgets; 
 
Greater Interdisciplinarity Increased M&A, alliances as well as R&D and VC 








3.4.2 Canada: To Protect or Compete - A New Economic Order? 
 
“We are at the dislocation point between an old economic order and a new one that may 
last for decades, if not centuries…Innovation is the wealth creator in this new order” 
-Tom Jenkins, Chair, Innovation Canada: A Call to Action Expert Panel Report 
 
3.4.2.1 Introduction: Response to the Challenge 
 
By 2008, debates around the most effective R&D and innovation strategies centered 
on how best to translate basic research into commercializable products and technologies. 
This is a puzzle common to most countries. The Canadian government was comparing its 
disappointing innovation results with others like Germany, South Korea and the United 
State, concluding that a greater emphasis on downstream commercialization would help 
resolve its weakening position globally. This new approach represents a paradigm shift. 
Between 2007 and 2013 Canada undertook five explicit strategic and institutional 
changes related to its bioscience industry. First, the Canadian government, elected in 
2006, applied a new neoliberal economic paradigm shifting its focus from a country that 
“protects” its industries to one that enables them to “compete” (Jenkins, 2011a). 
Changing the Canadian mindset to embrace competition, entrepreneurship and innovation 
was the priority.  
Second, the same government restructured its bioscience strategy and related 
institutions. It emphasized a more centralized innovation system by resurrecting its 
Ministry of Science and Technology, which existed in the early 1990s but quickly 
disappeared only four years later. The NRC is being restructured to be more industry-
facing, coordinating research projects with industry and financial organization needs, 
while shifting away from its basic R&D and public policy mission (Jenkins, 2011a).  
Third, the government and industry decreased their biotechnology R&D spending. 
Government restructured its financial settings and mechanisms to favor more 
collaboration projects between research institutes/universities and industry and less on 
basic research. The state would also create a market for innovative products by procuring, 








Fourth, the government is also shifting its focus in the skill development area by 
setting a target to increase the number of graduate students in the related sciences, adding 
more MBA programs that focus on biotechnology, and more funding for university-
industry collaboration projects that help train scientists for industry needs. 
Fifth, pharmaceutical MNCs reduced their internal R&D budgets, increased the 
number and diversified the nature of external relationships especially with small biotech 
firms. These relationships take the form of in-licensing, out-licensing, co-development, 
patent strategies, mergers and acquisitions, and pre-competitive open source alliances. 
Small biotechnology firms are investing more in their core strengths and products, less in 
R&D(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2013). And small biotech firms are experimenting with 
new business models including “virtual companies” where the core asset is an NCE and 
inputs are secured globally so that investors can control transaction costs while financing 
high potential product development.  
 
The National Innovation System 
 
 Canada’s federal and provincial governments are responsible for the framework 
conditions that support science, technology and innovation. These range from tax 
systems, IPR and labor mobility to competition policies, FDI and trade.
33
 The country’s 
national innovation system involves several categories of organizational institutions and 
their relationships. These include The National Research Council and its distributed 
system of centers of excellence throughout the country, several research hospitals, 
biopharmaceutical firms including large pharmaceutical MNCs and small biotechnology 
companies, government agencies including the Ministry of Industry, Minister of State for 
Science and Technology, Ministry for International Trade supports innovation sciences 
and technology globally. In finance mostly government-backed VCs, some angel 
investors, and the Toronto Stock Exchange, particularly its Venture Exchange, fund 
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 Canada is a federation of ten provinces and three territories. Its constitution assigns different 
responsibilities to federal and provincial governments. Provinces are responsible for education, natural 








product commercialization and corporate growth. The government creates markets by 
setting prices on patented therapies via its Patented Medicine Prices Review Board 
(PMPRB) and procuring these drugs. 
 
The Strategy Debate: R&D Democracy versus R&D Meritocracy 
 
The strategy debate centered around three main tensions: equalization of R&D 
spending versus R&D investment in highest potential technologies; basic versus applied 
research; and the role of the state. The idea that all firms and university researchers 
should have equal access to government R&D funding stemmed from Canada’s wealth 
redistribution institutions elaborated in its Constitution as well as in social norms 
attaching greater value to this understanding. These traditions historically permeated how 
the country approached its role in facilitating technological innovation.  
But by 2008 debates about the effectiveness of these inherited principles and practices 
were being questioned within the context of how to improve Canada’s position in the 
global economy. The strategy debate crystallized around how to increase return on R&D 
investment and whether to continue to: 
 
Spread cash far and wide – across all regions, industries and institutions, 
companies large and small – in the faint hope that something good will come of 
it… or…favoring the few (with highest growth potential) at the expense of the 
many” (McKenna, 2011, p. 1). 
 
Up until 2012 the traditional federal mechanisms for financing R&D centered around 
three main programs: The Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP), Scientific 
Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) tax credits, and the Natural Sciences 
and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC). IRAP, managed by the National 
Research Council, provides financing and technology assistance to small and medium-
sized enterprises engaged in innovation. SR&ED is a tax credit for small start-up 








federal government also finances PROs, like Genome Quebec, and university centers, but 
more for basic and applied research. 
However, the fundamental debate regarding federal government financing centers 
around whether the strategy should continue to include significant funding for basic and 
applied research, or, for commercialization of new discoveries and technologies. 
Furthermore, how to implement such a strategy remains controversial as the debate 
among stakeholders reveals many choices. 
In 2008 and then in 2011 the choice was made.
34
 The Jenkins Report laid out its logic 
and was clear in its recommendation to improve Canada’s competiveness through 
innovation by dismantling the country’s sector strategies. Jenkins (Jenkins, 2011b) stated:  
 
Competition is the fundamental motivation for innovation in a rational organization. 
Canadian sector [six] regimes limit competition in large, critical segments of the 
economy...If there is one single economic lesson about the most effective way to 
create wealth from the past century, it is that open market competition is the most 
effective and efficient basis for the economy of a nation. We would be wise to 
remember this lesson…We can’t have it both ways. We either protect or we 
compete.” (p.1) 
 
In addition, the new strategy emphasized how to balance government “support” with 
intense competition to increase innovation levels. Support would be targeted in areas like 
government funding of R&D, more masters and PhD students, skilled investors, capable 
managers and bigger markets with better supply chains through international trade. 
Competition would come from investor demand for profitable growth and from intense 
competitors globally. The strategy assumes that both processes would positively impact 
innovation in Canada.  
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 Under Canada’s “Mobilizing Science and Technology to Canada’s Advantage” 2008 strategy the country 
developed four strategic priorities: environmental science and tech; natural resources and energy; health 
and life sciences; and ICT.  The Science, Technology and Innovation Council identified sub-priority areas 
for R&D in Life sciences: regenerative medicine, neuroscience, health in an aging population, biomedical 








This paradigm represents a fundamental shift from previous industrial policies that 
did not explicitly make this linkage. And while biotechnology was not a traditionally 
protected industry, the 2011 panel suggested that Canada refocus its resources on the 
commercialization phase of discoveries and inventions (Jenkins, 2011a). By 2012, the 
federal government outlined its new innovation strategy. 
It rapidly adopted many of the recommendations, emphasizing mostly structural 
changes and reallocation of funds from basic to applied research and commercialization. 
The SR&ED program was reworked and offered only labor-based tax credits, not other 
types. Savings from the SR&ED would be reinvested into direct support for business 
innovation programs like the IRAP. Primarily industry-university R&D partnerships 
would become eligible for funding, less on basic research. It also sought to increase the 
Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) VC funds in order to provide additional 
financing to firms at both the seed level and later stages. 
These fundamental institutional changes were controversial. For example, Canada’s 
largest trade and industry association, Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters (Lothian, 
2011) claimed that the expert panel failed to take a comprehensive look at all federal 
R&D programs, and singled out one, the SR&ED tax credit for start-ups, which restricts 
eligibility and reduces funding (CMC, 2011; Lothian, 2011). The CME believed that this 
program was critical for small firms still in the start-up phase and for FDI making 
decisions about R&D investments in Canada (CMC, 2011; Lothian, 2011). Universities 
also criticized the lack of understanding by the panel and largely the federal government 
now in power of the value of basic research especially as the basis for invention and 
innovation. Finally, the CME claimed that the federal government ignores the bigger 
issue of how to improve funding models for university and government research as other 
countries have. 
BIOTECanada, the country’s bioscience industry association generally supports the 
federal government’s new strategy to promote private sector innovation. However, 
industry prefers the new policies to address the eight specific bioscience sectors, 
specifically through a centralized planning between government and industry that 
supports a common strategy (Brenders, 2011). Industry agrees that the federal 








especially in areas where the provinces invest significant amounts of funding such as 
healthcare. In 2014 both levels of government are renegotiating the federal-provincial 
agreement on the transfer of payments for healthcare. The CME argues that this renewal 
offers an opportunity to identify common objectives and establish mechanisms to adopt 




The Canadian government significantly decreased investment in biotechnology R&D 
while industry levels remain relatively unchanged from 2007 to 2012. By 2013, industry 
decreased R&D spending by 13% and VC funding declined to their lowest point in 10 
years (E&Y, 2014). As the number of firms decreased, government and those firms that 
remained began fundamentally restructuring and diversifying institutions and 
mechanisms to reduce transaction costs, leverage resources and focus on 
commercialization of new products and technologies. While the number of mergers and 
acquisitions was steady, the number of reported strategic alliances declined significantly. 
However this is likely the result of fewer existing firms. 
The federal government provided the context for change by bringing with it a new 
paradigm for the country’s R&D strategy. A strategy shift from “protect” to “compete” 
also impacted the nature of new institutions. We see that the ideas for these new 
institutions like the creation of a Competition Agency separating enforcement from 
advocacy comes from researching and comparing existing institutions in Australia, the 
US and Europe and is also a reaction against existing Canadian rules that do not separate 
the two functions. 
Industry reacted to the sudden decrease in global risk finance for biotechnology R&D 
by increasing the number of mergers and acquisitions to secure new patents and related 
technologies. While the number of reported strategic alliances has decreased, the nature 
of these relationships is increasingly financial. Finally, industry increasingly encouraged 
government to make R&D financing more broad-based versus specific to functional or 








and industry actors were collectively trying to figure out how to remain competitive in 
such a severely constrained financial environment.  
 
3.4.2.3 Skill Development 
 
Despite a globally competitive university research base, the skills gap still exists in 
certain areas of bioscience and industry. These include: interdisciplinary 
science/engineering programs with a greater emphasis on commercialization; 
professional services in regulatory and commercialization processes; and government 
program managers with weak science or industry backgrounds. The role of the state and 
industry in building this capacity is changing as the challenge of commercializing new 
discoveries becomes even more urgent. 
Ensuring that relevant government agencies involved in bioscience strategy and 
policy development and implementation possess the requisite scientific and industry 
knowledge is difficult. For example, the private sector has indicated that staff 
administering the SR&ED tax credits are not necessarily qualified to conduct the due 
diligence necessary to ensure that applicants qualify for such financing (CMC, 2011; 
Lothian, 2011). The private sector also believes that BDC operates like a traditional bank. 
Staff is not necessarily trained in specific sciences and industries like bioscience, but 
rather generally through MBA programs which means they are not capable of evaluating 
the science behind the investment opportunity. The understanding is that scientists need 
to become better managers while managers need to better understand the underlying 
science behind firm’s products and processes. 
 
3.4.2.4 Corporate Governance 
 
Small biotechnology firms that could not survive the financial crisis closed down 
while others began changing their business model to focus on fewer NCEs and niche 
areas. In some cases, the corporate structure changed towards a “virtual” model to focus 
on the NCE, or asset, itself while importing human and financial resources from global 








change is to reduce overhead costs, build in flexibility to the corporate structure, ensure 
access to the most capable human resources, whether local or global. 
Large pharmaceutical firms closed their R&D facilities, in some cases reconfiguring 
them into investment organizations, and began allying with small biotechnology firms 
and government PROs. VCs began investing in shorter time-spans along the drug 
development value chain to capture highest revenue opportunities; and, national 




All of these changes reflect state-level and organization-level social learning. Canada 
was reacting to previous strategies and policies that, while successful in generating new 
discoveries through basic research, were less so in commercializing them. 
Simultaneously, government and industry searched externally for new ideas and ways of 
intervening to facilitate biotechnology growth. 
The state and industry’s goals were more aligned during this period and to a certain 
extent represent a consolidation of trends that began prior to 2008. On the other hand, the 
sudden and severe contraction in risk finance, especially important for such a highly 
uncertain and risky industry like biotechnology, has forced even greater policy 
innovation. The universities are shifting towards more collaboration with industry, some 
reluctantly as basic research is garnering less attention. 
The Schumpeterian Competition State concept captures the major shift in Canada’s 
approach towards growing knowledge-based industries. There are more mechanisms 
linking government and industry with a clear goal to facilitate commercialization of 
products and technologies, train scientists, engineers and managers in these processes, 
and incentivize firms to create new competencies and governance modes in order to 
compete globally. Furthermore, Canadian biotechnology firms are asking for stronger 











3.4.3 Australia: Building a “Modern” Economy 
 
“…We must be an anticipator nation and not a follower—a nation which gives as it 
receives; a nation engaged in a two way flow of know-how through which we learn as we 
contribute to the solutions we will all desperately need.”  
– The office of the Chief Scientist 
 
3.4.3.1 Introduction: Response to the Challenge 
 
Australia’s response to the 2008 financial crisis was explicit. It involved accessing 
ideas from external sources such as the OECD and the concept of the “bioeconomy” and 
reacting to previous bioscience policies stemming from its first strategy developed 
between 2000 and 2008 (AusBiotech, 2014a). New strategies were designed and a high 
rate of institutional change and creation, greater focus on knowledge-based industries 
including cutting edge biotechnology, and stronger interaction between the state and 
industry characterizes this period. 
However, while prioritizing Australia’s economic position globally, the Australian 
government’s strategy and institutional changes involve a more all-encompassing, 
integrative framework - basic and commercializable research, educating the public, 
negotiating with unions - compared with Canada’s which is clearly focused on industry 
collaboration projects and investing in the most promising technologies. The challenge 
for Australia is to shift from a more generic approach towards its interactions with 
industry and university to learning more about the specifics of biotechnology, what 
works, what does not in terms of how to effectively facilitate industry growth.   
Again, the challenge facing all industrialized countries during this time was how to 
manage increasing scientific and industrial complexity, uncertainty and risk while 
creating opportunities with scarce financial resources for R&D. By 2013, while 
Australian biotech firms’ revenues and income increased, they were spending less on 
R&D (E&Y, 2014). However, Canada’s situation was worse, biotech firms were also 








convergence of financial institutions when comparing with Canada, yet divergence in 
niche areas of R&D, skill development policies and corporate governance. 
 
3.4.3.2 The Innovation System 
 
Australia’s industrial biotechnology structure by this time included a large local 
anchor company, CSL, which accounted for 93% of the industry’s revenue by 2013 
(E&Y, 2014). The remaining 7% of revenues is generated by 470 small firms, 130 of 
which are core biotech, as well as foreign subsidiaries of big pharmaceutical firms. Some 
are profitable, selling products in areas of health, industrial processing, agriculture and 
the environment. Australian states have also designed their own strategies focusing on 
different R&D areas including tropical medicine, bio-discovery, regenerative medicine, 
bioremediation, agricultural/industrial biotech and medical devices. 
Most R&D in Australia takes place in both universities and hospitals and jointly with 
industry, particularly large MNCs with subsidiaries in Australia. In contrast to Canada’s 
recent restructuring of its national health research agency, the NRC to be more industry-
facing, Australia’s national health research institute, the National Health and Medical 
Research Council’s (NHMRC) core mission remains focused on supporting health and 
medical research and advice.
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 It is the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organization (CSIRO), with a budget of $1.6 billion in 2012/2013 that seeks to generate 
“innovative scientific and technology solutions to national challenges and opportunities 
to benefit industry, the environment and the community, through scientific research and 
capability development, services and advice”.
36
 However, in 2014 CSIRO signaled a 
change in goals more narrowly focused on supporting commercialization of R&D 
globally. It appointed Dr. Larry Marshal as its new Executive Director who is a scientist 
and entrepreneur with global experience managing both VC and start-up biotechnology 
firms. CSIRO emphasized the social learning role it plays in ensuring “that it continues to 
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provide advice of the highest quality to Government as well as provide best practice 
collaboration with the private sector” (AusBiotech, 2014c). 
 
3.4.3.3 The Strategy Debate 
 
In 2009 the Australian federal government produced a new strategy, “Powering Ideas 
- An innovation agenda for the 21st century,” along with a Strategic Roadmap for 
Australian Research following the country’s first biotechnology strategy that spanned 
2000-2008. The timing of strategy indicates that the country was also reacting to the 
global financial and economic crisis forcing them to search for new ways of remaining 
globally competitive. The approach explicitly included biotechnology as one of four key 
technologies. Decision-makers claimed that Australia was one of only six countries 
capable of benefiting from 16 future applications arising from biotechnology, 
nanotechnology, materials science and information technology. The other five were 
Canada, Germany, Israel, Japan, Korea and the United States.  
The Minister for Innovation at the time, Kim Carr, clearly indicated that the new 
strategy was in direct response to the global financial and economic crisis: 
 
Investing in innovation is also one of the most effective ways we can cushion 
Australia against the effects of the global downturn and accelerate recovery. It 
will simultaneously keep people in work today and generate jobs for the future. 
(Australia, 2009d, p. 1) 
 
In addition, he clearly linked Australia’s long-term economic competitiveness 
prospects with new strategies and institutions that build capacity and support for 
knowledge-based industries indicating that: 
 
Tough times demand creative solutions. “Powering Ideas” will help us find those 
solutions. It will help us transform challenges into opportunities, risks into 
rewards … This is a ten-year reform agenda to make Australia more productive 








new ways of doing business is the key to building a modern economy based on 
advanced skills and technologies. It is the key to success in this, the global 
century. (Australia, 2009d, p. 1) 
 
By 2014, the Office of the Chief Scientist, after consultations with industry and 
interactions with OECD policy researchers, developed a new Science, Technology, 
Engineering and Math (STEM) strategy to build Australia’s competitiveness, maximize 
research, improve education and internationalize science and technology efforts 
(AusBiotech, 2014b). 
The new approach recognized that Australia needed to create credible commitments 
in support of technological innovation. Government increased its science and technology 
investment by 25% to $8.58 billion from 2009 to 2010 and required annual assessments 
over the next 10 years (Carr, 2009). Part of this package included the Super Science 
Initiative (Australia, 2009b). 
This initiative addressed priorities identified in the 2008 Strategic Roadmap and 
allocated A$1.1 billion over five years to priority areas of Australian research: Space 
science and astronomy, marine and climate science, and future industries including 
biotechnology, nanotechnology and ICT. Biotechnology received A$500 million over 
this period. As part of the “future industries” component of the Super Science Initiative, 
the government in 2012 developed the more formal National Enabling Technologies 
Strategy, targeting “cutting edge” biotechnology (Australia, 2012). 
The local biotechnology industry was negatively affected by the 2008 global financial 
crisis. Firms typically pursue a business model based on regularly raising capital from 
external sources to pursue their drug development activities. In the case of Australia, in 
contrast to Canada and the United States, small firms typically seek early stage financing 
from the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) (E&Y, 2008). The collapse of global 
financial markets has weakened firms’ ability to raise funds, increasing their investment 
risk to lenders and making it harder to support ongoing R&D activities. From 1 January 
to 25 November 2008, the market capitalization of listed biotechnology companies 








$2.1 billion. But part of this weakened valuation comes from investor’s lack of 
understanding of the biotechnology industry (E&Y, 2008). 
Despite the fall in private sector risk capital, by 2014, the Australian biotechnology 
industry reached 470 companies, including 130 core biotech firms and start-ups as well as 
profitable firms selling products in areas of health, industrial processing, agriculture and 
the environment (Australia, 2014). While other factors certainly impacted the industry’s 
growth, we see a high correlation between this growth and government’s new industrial 
strategy and resources supporting it. Meanwhile, Canadian and United States 
governments were steadily decreasing biotechnology R&D spending despite embracing 
ideas diffused by the OECD about the promise of the new bioeconomy. 
To implement the new economic strategy, government created new organizational 
institutions. For example, in September 2013, the federal government created the 
Department of Industry and placed the Office of the Chief Scientist and other science 
agencies like the CSIRO, Australia’s national science agency and the Australian Institute 
for Marine Science (AIMS) within it. Despite other agencies with portfolios covering 
education, health, environment and agriculture, the Department of Industry encompasses 
several similar areas including industry, energy, resources, science, skills and business all 
to drive economic growth, productivity and competitiveness. 
This move clearly indicates Australia’s strategy to link R&D to economic 
competitiveness goals. However, it may diminish the role of science by subordinating 
scientific agencies to industry. In addition, other goals including affordable healthcare, 
preserving the environment and basic research pursued by other agencies are perceived to 
receive lower priority. 
3.4.3.4 Finance 
Other institutional innovations were taking place increasingly in response to the 
financial crisis. The federal government created Innovation Australia in September 2007, 
an independent statutory organization designed to administer the Australian 
Government's innovation and venture capital programs. These include R&D tax 
incentives and a range of venture capital funds targeting different stages of product 
development. The new organization is an amalgamation of the former Industry Research 








(formerly known as the Pooled Development Funds Registration Board). Innovation 
Australia assumed the roles, responsibilities and powers of the two former Boards. 
Finally, the organization is managed by a Board comprised of government, private sector 
and university representatives with expertise in areas of technological innovation 
(Australia, 2007). 
One of CSIRO’s four programs is the National Research Flagships designed to 
address complex challenges through information, knowledge and scientific solutions to 
increase economic, social and environmental wellbeing. The program identified several 
national challenges including water, food, health, energy, climate change, mining, and 
manufacturing representing over 40% of Australia’s GDP. Given the complexity of the 
challenge, we see that the federal government, rather than taking an arms-length 
approach, advocated greater collaboration through partnerships with universities, PROs, 
the private sector and international organizations. Furthermore, the government 
advocated “continued interaction and engagement with these bodies is crucial to ongoing 
success and delivery and adoption of research outputs to maximize benefits for Australia” 
(CSIRO, 2012, p. 297). 
As part of the social learning process, the Flagship program is guided by a 
governance system that identifies new opportunities while scaling down others. For 
example, while focus remains on nine flagships from Food Futures and Preventative 
Health to Future Manufacturing, in 2011 the Light Metals Flagship was terminated after a 
review process, with key activities either wound down or moved to other programs. By 
2012, two potential new Flagships were being developed in the areas of Biosecurity and 
Productivity. Each Flagship operates within an approved business plan that guides the 
path to impact (Australia, 2007). 
Industry was also taking steps to build strength especially by integrating and focusing 
existing institutions. By 2006, just prior to the financial crisis, industry established the 
Pharmaceuticals Industry Council (PIC), the main industry association representing the 
innovative, generic and biotechnology industries to provide a “whole-of-sector approach” 
to addressing opportunities and threats to investment in the sector. The new association 
integrated three previous associations – AusBiotech, Medicines Australia and the GMiA 








AusBiotech provides expertise as industry advocates and committee members on all 
biotech steering committees participates in policy review panels at both government and 
corporate levels. These mechanisms facilitate learning, but also a way to influence policy 
agendas and institutions. 
In certain areas of bioscience, like pharmaceutical manufacturing, Australia retains 
some of its traditional mechanisms that coordinate interests among government, industry 
and unions, while establishing new ones. In traditional manufacturing industries, which in 
the past had high functioning unions, all three interest groups would negotiate wage rates 
and other interests. Beginning in the late 2000s, interests began to be coordinated around 
increasing investments in pharmaceutical R&D, clinical trials and manufacturing. To do 
so, the Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, Kim Carr, created a high 
level industry-union taskforce, the Pharmaceuticals Industry Strategy Group, which 
developed a 10-year plan.
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Based on the above analysis, we see the state taking the lead in framing the 
challenges, bringing together disparate interests, facilitating deliberation and sharing of 
knowledge among groups and creating consensus around strategy goals and tactics. The 
state is building on previous principles and practices, rather than completely throwing 
them away, and adjusting them towards new goals within the Schumpeterian competition 
state framework. Here, the state explicitly links its strategies with improving productivity, 
driven by technological innovation, via stronger state-industry ties. This is a key 
difference when compared to the country’s history of organizing its economy first 
through protective measures then through a major paradigm shift embracing a free trade, 
open market system. 
 
3.4.3.4 Skill Development 
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Pharmaceutical manufacturing has traditionally been strong in Australia. Between 1998 – 2007. Business 
Expenditure on R&D (BERD) for the pharmaceuticals industry reached $860 million, accounting for 7.5% of 









To learn about, understand and capture the benefits of the complexity of the science 
underpinning the industry, Australia recently recognized the need to change its focus 
from discipline-specific to interdisciplinary approaches. For example, combining 
molecular biology, engineering and bioinformatics concepts and methods to solve 
specific problems is now more widely viewed as an answer to scientific and innovation 
challenges. However, there are few clear examples of this approach. 
 
3.4.3.5 Corporate Governance 
 
During this period, Australian biotechnology firms were raising less capital but at the 
same time generating deeper drug pipelines, which made them attractive take-over 
targets. Pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers as well as CROs were 
struggling to find their competitive advantage in the face of rising competition from Asia.  
Small biotechnology firms along with big pharma, VCs and PROs all began to 
reconfigure their relationships and restructure their organizations. Companies like Pfizer 
Australia, AstraZeneca Australia, BoehringerIngelheim all began operations in Australia 
decades ago. First, they established sales offices to sell therapies and medical devices to 
Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), the government-created 
pharmaceuticals market. Then, MNCs began to expand and diversify by purchasing local 
farms supplying critical raw materials, increasing the number of manufacturing 
operations and investing more and more in R&D eventually in collaboration with PROs. 
For example, AstraZeneca Australia now spends about $250 million in R&D in Australia 
mostly in human health.
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 Pfizer is developing new business models that help the firm 




However, the global pharmaceuticals business model was changing in response to 
falling revenues from patent expirations, rising drug costs, competition from generics and 
the emergence of biologics (larger, more complicated molecules offering promising 













therapeutics). Firms began to merge with or acquire each other and outsource early stage 
R&D in order to manage costs. In response, the Industry Strategy Group acknowledged 
that: 
 
Australia will only remain competitive as a destination for manufacturing exports 
(in pharmaceuticals) if it is able to leverage its knowledge base to undertake the 
high value added activity that other locations find difficult to replicate. Competing 
on cost is not a viable or desirable option. (Australia, 2009a, p. 34) 
 
The real risk lies in Phase II and III clinical research. Because most industry R&D is 
spent by MNCs in these areas, Australia is vulnerable to global competition. These 
segments of the value chain are the most cost sensitive. Because the R&D at these points 
relies less on early researchers and the quality of R&D is increasing in emerging markets, 
MNCs can secure the large patient populations and lower cost base in other countries. So 
even maintaining the existing workforce in Australia is in question. 
Small Australian biotechnology start-ups are also experimenting with new corporate 
structures and business models. These firms are forming alliances among each other and 
increasingly with big, overseas pharmaceutical firms (Herpin, Karuso, & Foley, 2005). 
However, the challenge is in the weak skill level of managers in these small firms to 
engage in complex multi-actor projects. In addition, creating a clear recognizable 
corporate structure – with a CEO in charge of strategy and separate Board to ensure that 
transparency and fairness to all stakeholders is enforced – is often not a priority. This 
weakness makes some small biotech firms less attractive to VCs even if the firm is able 




The Australian case supports the Competition State theory and the state’s role in 
influencing technological innovation. Closer, more explicit state-industry relations are 
intended to produce future policies and institutions designed to create a more predictable 








Again, the strategy fits with Australia’s, Canada’s and the United’s thinking that 
investing in knowledge-based industries will create competitive advantages globally. 
Australia has a comparative advantage in agriculture and mining and to remain 
competitive it can use biotechnologies in these sectors. While Australia does not have a 
comparative advantage in pharma, health and environmental industries, biotech could 
help improve the country’s competitive advantage in these areas. Like Canada, Australia 
is weak in firms with financial depth, commercialization and management expertise. Also 
similar to Canada, most intellectual property is licensed to overseas firms leaving both 
countries with the challenge of appropriating value from their investments for both 
commercial and economic development benefits. 
 
 
3.4.4 United States: Toward a Coordinated and Integrated Bioeconomy 
 
 “The world is shifting to an innovation economy  
and nobody does innovation better than America” 
—President Obama, December 6, 2011 
 
3.4.4.1 Introduction: Response to the Challenge 
 
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the United States developed its first more 
explicit and comprehensive bioscience policy that includes a range of goals related to 
regulatory strengthening, finance, capacity building in areas of skill development, 
partnerships with industry, and greater coordination and integration of resources and 
governance models. This 2012 strategy, the National Bioeconomy Blueprint, differs 
considerably from the country’s policies beginning in 1986. These focused on creating an 
“economic ecology,” not a direct interventionist approach of regulations like patent 
legislation, safety requirements, and rules governing R&D finance eventually leading to a 
knowledge regime encouraging commercialization (Giesecke, 2000; Vallas, Kleinman, & 
Biscotti, 2011). 
Like Canada and Australia, the new strategy, I argue, acknowledges the United 








ideas – advocated by international organizations such as the OECD and WTO - about the 
role of technological and institutional innovation as platforms for this growth (OECD, 
2009). And the government, particularly the White House, appears to be taking the lead 
in developing this strategy. 
The United States’ government role in facilitating these goals is transforming through 
more public-private partnerships and pre-competitive consortia with industry. These 
mechanisms allow for social learning among the participants about commercialization 
prospects for new discoveries, effective financing mechanisms and regulatory 
requirements. But the potential for higher transaction costs may prevent such close 
collaboration and coordination especially if individual firms can eventually pursue 
similar opportunities on their own. I argue that balancing the two models depending upon 
the level of uncertainty, risk and opportunities will be necessary. 
 
3.4.4.2 The National Innovation System and the “Bioeconomy” 
 
Unlike Australia and Canada, the United States’ national innovation system involves 
a high density, diversity and level of sophistication of bioscience organizations in terms 
of their industry, regulatory and financial knowledge. But while the number of firms and 
amount of revenue increased from 2007 to 2013, both public and private sector R&D 
spending along with the number of employees decreased. These changes were driven by 
firms leveraging resources through mergers, acquisitions and alliances to reduce costs 
and target niche, highly promising therapies. While Australia and Canada both have 
highly developed, globally competitive educational systems and scientific infrastructure, 
one of their weaknesses is in the lack of understanding and experience on the part of 
investors and managers of both the industry and specifically how to value and bring 
products to market. 
In the United States, the role of the state changed during this process from a 
regulatory one, and one that clearly demarcated itself from the market, to a state that 
embeds itself more with industry, embracing technological innovation as a driver of 








conception of “relational embeddedness” in that the federal government is guiding this 
integration” (P. Cooke, 2004).  
Furthermore, the United States was the only country in the world with free 
prescription drug pricing. As a result, it has steadily expanded to represent over 50% of 
global sales (Benner & Löfgren, 2007). This combined with its relatively high (though 
decreasing) R&D spending makes it the global leader in research, drug development and 
distribution. 
In the “Bioeconomy Blueprint,” we find an explicit, broad strategy incorporating both 
economic growth goals as well as social and security goals. But while it was produced, 
with input from various government agencies and stakeholders as well as by the White 
House, the strategy is driven by existing government agencies. However, one new 
organizational institution was created to help implement the strategy, the National Center 
for Advancing Translational Sciences, a new Center at the National Institutes of Health, 
established in December 2011 so “that new treatments and cures for disease can be 
delivered to patients faster” (NIH, 2011, p. 1). While these changes demonstrate a 
heightened awareness of the need for more mechanisms that translate research into 
technologies and products and the broad based potential to the bioeconomy, government 
did not significantly increase budgets. 
 
3.4.4.3 The Strategy Debate 
 
Rather than a narrow focus on specific areas of basic, applied and translational 
research, the term “bioeconomy” now defines the emerging biotechnology industry of the 
1980s more broadly. It includes many areas of R&D and their applications to a range of 
industries. Furthermore, the term refers to a more coordinated and integrated approach 
both upstream, for example in areas of stem cell research, and downstream in terms of 
applied R&D, technological innovation and industrial growth.  










Economic activity that is fueled by research and innovation in the biological 
sciences, the “bioeconomy,” is a large and rapidly growing segment of the world 
economy that provides substantial public benefit. The bioeconomy has emerged 
as an Obama Administration priority because of its tremendous potential for 
growth as well as the many other societal benefits it offers. It can allow 
Americans to live longer, healthier lives, reduce our dependence on oil, address 
key environmental challenges, transform manufacturing processes, and increase 
the productivity and scope of the agricultural sector while growing new jobs and 
industries. (House, 2012, p. 1) 
 
With this understanding, the federal government asked each relevant agency to 
“prioritize” the bioeconomy in their budget requests (House, 2012).The National 
Bioeconomy Blueprint was modeled after the Administration’s 2011 Blueprint for a 
Secure Energy Future. It has two main objectives. First, it is designed to help realize the 
full potential of the U.S. bioeconomy. Second, the policy will highlight early 
achievements toward those objectives (House, 2012). 
It is important to note that the political environment at the time was highly 
contentious. President Obama was elected in 2008, reelected in 2012 and subsequently 
passed healthcare legislation that fundamentally changed Americans’ access to and costs 
of healthcare. While this dissertation does not delve deeply into the healthcare legislation, 
understanding the political context helps to explain the more comprehensive approach the 
government is taking to develop a bioeconomy that is more expansive and inclusive 
while leveraging existing resources.  
To manage the increasing scientific and industrial complexity, uncertainty and risk 
while creating opportunities, the United States is creating a more explicit industrial policy 
calling for closer state-industry-university collaboration in key bottleneck areas. These 
include how to ensure continuous financing from diverse sources over the product cycle, 
fill the skills gap and commercialize new technologies getting them to market faster, and 
manage uncertainty and risk. 
Leading interest groups produced a series of technical reports, statements and 








Research Council recognized the need to reassess the science and its multiple 
applications to health, food, and the environment in its report, “A New Biology for the 
21
st
 Century” (NRC, 2009). The agency’s findings influenced the White House’s new 
strategy, “National Bioeconomy Blueprint,” citing bioscience and its potential for 
improving human health, security and productivity. It stressed that: 
 
Biological research (offers) the potential to improve health outcomes for all 
Americans, feed growing populations, with higher-yield crops of improved nutritional 
value, and decrease American dependence on petroleum-based products while 
increasing domestic biomanufacturing of fuels and chemicals…the United States 
should capitalize on recent technological and scientific advances that have allowed 
biologists to integrate biological research findings, collect and interpret vastly 
increased amounts of data, and predict the behavior of complex biological systems. 
(House, 2012, p. 7). 
 
Both the NRC study and White House strategy emphasized the benefit of coordinated 
federal efforts to integrate biology with other sciences like physics, chemistry, and 
computer sciences along with math and engineering to address a range of social 
challenges in health, energy, environment, and agriculture (House, 2012; NRC, 2009). 
Following this report, two years later in June 2011, BIO, the U.S. Biotechnology industry 
association, came up with its own recommendations for federal policy reform. These 
steps included: greater investment in innovation, restructuring of FDA and support for 
human health and agricultural applications (BIO, 2011). 
The resulting “National Bioeconomy Blueprint” targets five strategic objectives for a 
bioeconomy with the potential to generate economic growth and address societal needs: 
Increase investment in R&D; quicken commercialization of discoveries through 
translational and regulatory sciences; develop regulations to reduce barriers, increase the 
speed and predictability of regulatory processes, and reduce costs while protecting human 
and environmental health; enhance training programs and align incentives at universities 
to meet industry workforce needs; identify and support public-private partnerships and 








To reach each of these objectives, the federal government emphasizes coordination, 
integration of approaches and improved mechanisms for finance, skill development and 
governance. Since budget growth is constrained, leveraging and coordinating approaches 
can help to address common challenges and generate novel approaches through 
information-sharing and consensus-building around a core focus. The strategy also 
emphasizes that funding mechanisms should be created or changed to support creative, 
high risk/high reward research. Furthermore, agencies should share lessons learned and 
explore the possibility of creating mechanism that cut across agencies. 
To improve commercialization, the strategy seeks to accelerate the cradle-to-market 
process, enhance entrepreneurship at universities, and use federal procurement authority 
to create markets. To fill the skills gap, the government is supporting employer-educator 
partnerships and incentivizing universities to reengineer training programs. Lastly, 
government indicates that federal agencies should provide incentives for public-private 
partnerships and precompetitive collaborations to benefit the bioeconomy broadly. 
The above description provides evidence of social learning around how to facilitate a 
bioeconomy given the changes in settings like decreased R&D, new techniques such as 
reengineering of training programs and changes in overarching goals towards catalyzing 
a more broad-based, inclusive bioeconomy designed to reduce the income gap across 
industries. The governance mechanisms have changed as well from a decentralized 
system of individual agency missions and goals to a more crosscutting, integrated and 




The United States is the industry leader in terms of number, diversity and sheer size 
of the financial industry supporting biotechnology. Compared to Canada and Australia, 
while these countries have stock exchanges on which starts-ups list, some VCs, angel 
investor groups and banks managing VC funds, they do not come close to the breadth and 
depth of the United States. Australian and Canadian biotech firms and government 








While both government and industry R&D spending decreased between 2007 and 
2012, by 2013 industry spending increased by 20% as investors responded to increased 
revenue generated through sales of new drugs. The stock market also responded 
positively by increasing the market capitalization of publically traded biotechnology 
firms. However, in 2013 U.S. venture capitalists invested less than in 2007 just before the 
financial crisis, 12.7% and 18% respectively (E&Y, 2014). 
Almost all of the global industry’s 2013 revenue growth and profit came from the 17 
US-based commercial leaders (E&Y, 2014). Furthermore, 2013 was the second-best year 
for biotech financing from public equity markets and VCs since 2003 (E&Y, 2014). This 
rebound demonstrates the resilience of the U.S. industry due partly to its diversity of 
finance sources. 
US government spending via the NIH (whose budget is over $30 billion) shifted to 
focus on cancer research and translational medicine, or on the development of drugs for 
the market by establishing a new organizational institution, the NCATS. And as part of 
the new healthcare reform bill, the US Congress set aside $1 billion tax credit to small 
and medium-sized biotechnology firms in 2009 and 2010 for pre-clinical and clinical 
R&D. So while overall funding has decreased, existing funds where shifted to focus on 
small firm R&D, translational over basic research, and a greater focus on a specific 
disease area, cancer. 
 
3.4.4.5 Skill Development 
 
By 2010, the US life sciences industry employed 1.61 million. The key difference in 
2013 over 2007 is a broad recognition of the need for interdisciplinary training at 
universities to address the increasing complexity of the science and ways in which 
devices and therapies are scaled up in production to serve the market. Traditionally, 
primarily senior scientist positions filled by chemists and biologists with highly 
specialized skills served the biotechnology industry. Now, industry is demanding 
employees with academic training who can support more than one project team and work 
across multiple areas. Organizations demand strong communications skills where 








academic mind-set, identifying and solving real world problems, big data management, 
creativity and thinking outside the box (Goodno, 2013; Nugent & Kulkarni, 2013). 
Producing not only a greater number of scientists, engineers and managers but also 
those with specific skills demanded by new industries and organizations is one of the 
challenges cited not only by the United States, but Australia and Canada as well. 
However, relatively speaking, the United States produces more managers with experience 
in taking devices and therapies to market than either of the other two countries.  
 
3.4.4.6 Corporate Governance 
 
Firms are now more pressured by market demand to become transparent and efficient 
within the context of scarce resources. At the same time they must demonstrate through 
evidence the value of their research and potential products. In the past, these processes 
were more opaque and requirements were less stringent. Investors and payers 
(governments and private organizations) now demand greater transparency at each 
clinical trial stage so that they can more accurately value the asset, meaning the drug or 
medical device, being developed (E&Y, 2014). Precision medicine, adaptive clinical 
trials and precompetitive consortia are all mechanisms designed for this purpose (E&Y, 
2014). 
For example, the Accelerating Medicines Partnership is a precompetitive consortia 
led by the NIH to address Alzheimer’s disease, Type 2 diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis and 
lupus. There are 10 partners including non-profits and big pharmaceutical firms. 
Specifically, the American Diabetes Association, the Alzheimer’s Association, Johnson 
& Johnson, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Merck & Co., Pfizer, Sanofi, GlaxoSmithKline, 
Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Biogen Idec, Eli Lilly, are all engaged in mapping molecular 
pathways and identifying new drug possibilities. Their goal is to increase the number of 
new diagnostics and therapies while reducing the time and cost of developing them (NIH, 
2014). 
In addition, firm’s response to these challenges involved both mergers and 
acquisitions as well as formal and informal strategic alliances. We see that between 2007 








This is because the nature of mergers and acquisitions changed to include many more 
small biotechnology firms merging with or acquiring each other, in contrast to big 
pharmaceutical firms merging as in immediate, previous years (E&Y, 2014). And many 
strategic alliances are notoriously difficult to measure since so many are informal and go 
unreported (Audretsch & Feldman, 2003).
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In addition to leveraging external partnerships, internally firms must address their 
organizational structure and its capability to achieve the above goals. However, many 
small firms do not have the capabilities to establish and manage corporate structures 
valued by investors. These elements include a strong scientific advisory board and for 
public companies a governing board with clear separation of responsibilities for 
managerial and stakeholder interests. Finally, the 2008 financial crisis created new rules 
and regulations, including the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act that influenced similar legislation 
in other countries, for accounting and disclosure, internal controls and risk management 
by firms. Based on these developments, we see an increase in the number and nature of 




Several trends characterize the United States’ strategic response to the 2008 financial 
crisis. First, a new strategy stemming from the White House called for a more 
coordinated and integrated “bioeconomy” to drive future economic growth and sustain 
the United States’ strong economic position globally. The strategy demands greater 
government-industry coordinating mechanisms. This approach is different from previous 
policies targeting regulatory changes and R&D financing in specific disease areas. The 
United States also established the NIH’s 27
th
 center, National Center for Advancing 
Translational Sciences (NCATS) to help translate research and discoveries into 
commercializable products.  
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 Data sources such as Bioscan, Recap and NSF databases do attempt to capture them. In this dissertation 
I rely on the E&Y report since they consistently track the same data points annually and the data is free 








Second, both government and industry R&D spending decreased from 2007 – 2012, 
but industry spending began to increase in 2013 based on new drugs coming to market. 
Third, there is a greater acceptance both within government and industry that the rising 
complexity of the science and costs of developing new devices and therapies requires an 
interdisciplinary approach both within university programs and within biotechnology 
firms. Fourth, mergers and acquisitions remained steady while strategic alliances 
decreased as firms leveraged external resources or collapsed. Fifth, the public and private 
sectors are embracing new approaches to creating value in products including adaptive 
clinical trials, precision medicine and precompetitive open source models. 
 
3.5 Conclusion: Industrial Restructuring and the “Competition State” 
 
After the 2008 global financial crisis the bioscience industry restructured, the state’s 
role changed, and the rate of institutional change increased. Many firms in weak financial 
condition or with few complementary assets ceased to exist. Those that remained 
leveraged external resources, outsourced non-core functions or were acquired. This 
rationalization enabled companies to focus on products and technologies with strongest 
commercialization potential.  
While competition for finance, labor and markets increased as expected, so did 
collaboration among competitors and non-competitors. This tension is common in 
science-based industries like biotechnology where no single firm can pursue R&D and 
commercialization on their own. The complexity of the science and the difficult, costly 
process of bringing products to market through stringent regulatory requirements are 
obstacles. This condition draws the state in to solve market failures of information 
asymmetry, uncertainty and scarce finance. The Schumpeterian Competition State helps 
to understand these new roles. 
Australia, Canada and the United States shifted strategies towards high risk/high 
reward research and away from “R&D Democracy.” These countries created formal 
mechanisms that facilitate information and knowledge-sharing and leverage resources 
among state agencies, public research organizations and firms. Industry in partnership 








knowledge development. These new institutions were designed to reduce uncertainty, risk 
and improve valuations of discoveries with market potential. All three countries 
recognized a need for talent that brings interdisciplinary knowledge and skills to solve 
real world problems. And each country explicitly linked support for biotechnology with a 
stronger global economic position. But a closer examination reveals diverging tactics and 
institutions among countries.  
Countries differed in their financial mechanisms, industry growth through local firms 
or FDI, and niche versus broad based bioscience approaches. Both Canada and Australia 
lack the density and diversity of financial sources needed to sustain the industry’s growth. 
After the financial crisis both states reinforced their government-backed, privately 
managed VC model to compensate. At the same time, the United States leads with 
privately owned and managed VCs.  
Canada’s and Australia’s strategy combines funding for university R&D and spinout 
firms, public research organizations (PRO)-industry collaboration projects, and FDI 
attraction to bring financing and knowledge spillovers. The United States’ first mover 
advantage developed a local biotechnology industry first that later attracted MNCs. Since 
it is a free pricing prescription drug market it offers higher profit margins that are 
attractive to firms globally. US firms have weathered the crisis more successfully than 
those in Canada and Australia particularly because of the diversity of financing options. 
These include mergers and acquisitions, alliances, VCs, public R&D, the stock market 
and new drugs coming to market in 2013.  
Each country chose a different bioscience niche. Canada concentrates on human 
health, less on agricultural and environmental biotechnology. Australia’s choice involves 
two approaches. One requires investment in R&D related to value-added products and 
technologies derived from traditional industries of agriculture, mining and the 
environment. The other focuses on future industries tied to human health advances. The 
United States’ strategy embraces the broad concept of “bioeconomy” and its multiple 
industry applications from human health to industrial biotechnology. 
Canada is shifting from traditional support for university research and FDI tax 
incentives to one that embraces the Competition State’s pursuit of technological 








PRO-industry collaborations to commercialize new technologies while reducing basic 
research. However, the negotiation process was fragmented and arms-length even though 
input was sought from industry organizations like Biotech Canada and CME. Universities 
and the NRC bring a tradition of basic R&D and science policy work with a culture that 
often clashes with industry. These organizations were less involved in building 
consensus. Provinces were asked for input but the federal government admitted it needed 
to improve its coordination with them. Major qualitative changes in R&D and 
commercialization mechanisms as well as in overarching goals were made. But the 
fragmented bargaining process combined with a decrease in both public and private 
sector biotechnology financing may compromise industry sustainability.  
Australia announced just after the financial crisis in 2009 a 10-year reform agenda 
facilitating its transition to a knowledge economy. Of the three countries it was the only 
one to increase public R&D spending in biotechnology and medical sciences. Australia 
changed its national innovation system by consolidating financial institutions including 
its VCs and creating biotechnology Action Agendas. The government also subsumed The 
Office of the Chief Scientist and CSIRO under Australia’s Department of Industry. This 
organizational change signaled the federal government’s belief that science should serve 
industry in order to sustain Australia’s global economic competitiveness. As a result 
basic scientific research may suffer and jeopardize the country’s interest in becoming a 
country that leads through groundbreaking discoveries.  
The United States established a new paradigm. It sees biotechnology as a tool with 
which to create a broad-based “bioeconomy”. Biotechnologies applied across industries 
will sustain the country’s economic strength globally while reaching social goals under 
an increasingly government-funded healthcare system. This concept differs from previous 
understandings that narrowly focused on biotechnology and a free market drug pricing 
system. The new strategy calls for various government agencies to coordinate and 
collaborate among themselves and industry, leverage resources, and prioritize 
biotechnology in their budgets. But federal R&D spending has steadily decreased since 
the financial crisis despite new institutions like the National Center for Advancing 








by technological innovation and access to affordable healthcare will require different 
ways of organizing economic activity. It may prove unfeasible.  
The role of the state changed after the 2008 global financial crisis breaking with path 
dependent trajectories in Canada, Australia and the United States. The crisis left few 
alternatives from which to choose in order to survive and remain competitive. The three 
countries actively searched for and shared lessons learned globally through organizations 
such as the OECD and WTO as well as domestically from previous policies and sub-
national experiments. The different bargaining approaches stemmed from paradigm shifts 
toward the role of the state in facilitating knowledge-based industries.  
The next two case study chapters examine Canada’s established and aspiring 
bioscience provinces within this context. They explicitly test hypotheses related to the 
presence and strength of a KOST in influencing degrees of and changes in bioscience 
commitment strategies. Sub-national cases are better suited to these micro-level 










QUEBEC AND ONTARIO:  
 




Quebec and Ontario, the two oldest and largest industrial centers in Canada, 
maintained different commitment levels to bioscience through the 2008 global financial 
crisis (GFC). Quebec sustained a high commitment linking institutional changes across 
all three areas of finance, skill development and corporate governance. Ontario continued 
its mixed level of commitment with changes in finance and skill development but not 
corporate governance. This chapter examines the role of a knowledge-oriented strategy 
team (KOST) and policy communities in this dynamic process.  
Quebec’s traditional strategic approach to industry development provided the 
foundation for a coordinated response to the 2008 global financial crisis. A few strong 
KOSTS were present in Quebec before the crisis. These teams were located in Montreal, 
Quebec City and Sherbrooke where pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries were 
evolving. KOSTs began to develop ties among each other after the crisis with the help of 
BioQuebec and the Ministry of Economy, Innovation and Export creating a meta-
network. This coordinative process sustained Quebec’s holistic, high commitment to its 
bioscience industry.  
Change occurred despite a sudden decrease in industry size and financing. The KOST 
quickly regained consensus around new industry and economic development goals by 
deliberating regularly, creating incentives and sharing knowledge about how best to 
leverage existing resources. The process generated a new understanding of stakeholder 
interests and preferences as well as how to frame challenges and opportunities. It 
produced new goals focusing on personalized medicine and technology 








collaboration projects, interdisciplinary training, alliances among firms, and government 
and university R&D. 
Ontario suffers from old industrial structures framed within a “states versus markets” 
mindset applied to bioscience. A weak KOST existed prior to the 2008 global financial 
crisis led by the Toronto Biotechnology Initiative (TBI), the province’s industry 
association at the time as it adapted to capture opportunities offered by the new 
biotechnologies. After the crisis multiple strategy communities began to vie for influence 
and resources. In 2010 the incumbent industry association renamed itself Life Sciences 
Ontario (LSO) and reorganized to encompass a broader societal membership from 
students to large pharmaceutical firms. At the same time a new industry association, 
Ontario Biotechnology Industry Organization (OBIO), established itself speaking for a 
missing constituency - small and medium-sized biotechnology firms stuck without 
financing or much needed commercialization expertise. The two associations now 
compete instead of coordinate to represent industry through a single voice.  
While the competition has increased stakeholder representation and raised awareness 
of problems specific to small and medium-sized biotechnology firms, it weakened 
relations with the lead government ministries at the time. These included the Ministry of 
Economic Development, Trade and Employment and the Ministry of Research and 
Innovation. Government views this division as inhibiting the ability of Ontario to reach 
its potential. Not only does this fragmentation slow knowledge spillovers among 
bioscience firms within the province, but externally it sends mixed signals to potential 
FDI. The ministries are now incentivizing the industry associations to either coordinate or 
merge. These multiple policy communities have engaged in disruptive social learning as 
they strive to capture the benefits of biotechnology but the fragmented nature of the 
bargaining process maintains Ontario’s mixed level of commitment to the bioscience 
industry.  
Empirical results reveal that both provinces seek more collaboration projects, 
interdisciplinarity in R&D and university degree programs, diversity of financial 
resources, and global branding as biopharma hubs. Biotechnology firms and big 
pharmaceutical companies are creating more alliances and new forms of corporate 








industries and attract FDI, Ontario focuses more on creating and keeping local firms 
while Quebec emphasizes attracting and keeping FDI.  
In this chapter I briefly trace the evolution of bioscience strategy and institutional 
development in each province. I then delve more deeply into the 2007 – 2013 time period 
capturing strategic responses to the 2008 financial crisis. The evidence unveils 
differences even though both provinces are attempting to balance their traditional 
industries of agriculture, automotive and plastics with knowledge-based industries such 
as bioscience. This difference is to be expected as each inherited diverse principles and 
practices related to industrial policy. Quebec brings a tradition of state intervention and 
coordination through sector plans similar to European and specifically French 
approaches. Ontario applies neo-liberal market-led governance modes. Each method has 
been effective in some industries like plastics and automotive in Ontario and aerospace 
and bioscience in Quebec.  
Both provinces struggled over time to sustain early success in their bioscience 
industries. Quebec’s experience in balancing competition and coordination created rules 
and norms that enabled it to respond more quickly to the 2008 global financial crisis. It 
strengthened its KOST by tightening coordination among bioscience organizations 
distributed throughout Quebec especially in Montreal, Quebec City, Laval and 
Sherbrooke. The process has enabled the province to maintain its high level of 
commitment to the bioscience industry that is fraught with market failures.    
 
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics: Comparing Quebec and Ontario 
 
After several years of growth, Quebec’s and Ontario’s bioscience industry contracted 
in response to the 2008 global financial crisis.
41
 Ontario’s bioscience industry grew 
between 1999 and 2009 from 111 to 140 biotechnology firms including Biovail, 
Cangene, Hemosol, and Vasogen. The industry was sizable as its portion of the 
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 Finding comparable bioscience industry data is difficult since countries and regions tend to track 
different types of firms differently. The OECD has developed a common system for data gathering. I 








province’s GDP reached 35 billion dollars, one-third of which is derived from exports.
 42
 
The province also spends a considerable amount on science and technology R&D 
reaching 2.23 per cent of GDP in 2010. The industry is broadly comprised of 850 firms 
including those in biotechnology, big pharmaceutical companies like GlaxoSmithKline, 
Roche, Sanofi Pasteur, Johnson & Johnson, GE Medical Systems and Genzyme, and 670 
medical and assistive device companies all of which employed more than 40,000. Most if 
not all pharmaceutical companies are foreign-owned.  
Quebec’s bioscience industry was valued at $23 billion of total provincial GDP in 
2008. Its R&D investment in science and technology was significantly higher than 
Ontario’s reaching 2.49% of GDP. The number of biopharmaceutical firms in Quebec 
totaled 145 including Shire Biochem, Axcan, and Nexia and employed over 20,900 
workers (McNiven, 2001). The industry included 28 pharmaceutical firms, mostly MNCs 
and employing almost half the industry, 67 health-related biotechnology firms employing 
about 11% of the industry’s workforce, and 50 generic pharmaceutical and contract 
manufacturing firms (Québec, 2010).
43
 These data indicate a growing sector since in 
1999. But by 2008 Ontario and Quebec suffered immediate losses from the financial 
crisis. The number of firms decreased from 98 to 84 in Ontario and 87 to 78 in Quebec 
(E&Y, 2009). 
The structure of bioscience clusters reconfigured over time and more quickly after the 
crisis. Montreal and Toronto’s biotechnology clusters housed two different subsystems, 
one more recent than the other. The traditional system included large pharmaceutical 
MNCs and their research labs contracting out work to universities and research hospitals 
while CROs provided the MNCs with clinical services. The more recent network includes 
small biotechnology firms, VC companies and university researchers. Universities 
typically spinout these firms while VCs finance them at different stages of the product 
value chain. But in 2000 these two systems did not necessarily interact and rarely 
coordinated (Niosi & Tomas, 2003).  
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MNCs had developed R&D alliances with overseas biotechnology firms based on 
mutual interests and complementarities rather than with local firms (Niosi & Bas, 2001). 
At the same time, local small biotechnology companies engaged in alliances with 
foreign-based pharmaceutical MNCs for similar reasons. The international nature of the 
two subsystems were driven by functional proximity in areas like cancer research or 
medical devices versus geographic (Rallet & Torre, 1999). But a cluster was developing 
as firms were both competing for human and financial resources and collaborating on 
issues related to shared facilities, legal and other support services. By the mid-2000s 
these subsystems in Quebec began to connect and after the financial crisis those firms 
still surviving ended up restructuring to include more alliances. 
In addition to industry size and type the snapshot below situates select Canadian 
bioscience regions in relation to each other and helps make some further comparisons. It 
correlates the level of technology specialization with level of market diversification by 
region. However, the number of application areas and level of market diversification are 
estimates based on industry reports rather than discrete values. Ontario and Quebec’s 
place in the graph result from strategies favoring investments in technologies with 
application to many markets within human health and medical devices. Each represents 
an effort to minimize risk while capturing opportunities offered by the industry. The 











Figure 4 Bioscience Region: Technology Specialization & Market Diversification 







4.2 Background: 1980s Discovery of Recombinant DNA Techniques 
 
4.2.1 A Problem-Focused Approach: Capturing the Benefits of a New Technology 
 
In the 1980s Quebec’s and Ontario’s economies were driven by traditional industries 
like agriculture, automotive manufacturing and plastics while most R&D was taking 
place in the university system. Pharmaceutical MNCs were manufacturing and selling 
drugs to the provincial formularies. The federal government was negotiating CAFTA and 
subsequently NAFTA agreements with the United States to benefit from an open trading 
system primarily as a way to enhance its competitive position globally.  
Provincial governments were designing various strategies and policies as well. By 
1990 Ontario elected a new government, the New Democratic Party, which brought with 
it ideas to develop Sector Strategies linking the public sector with industry including 
biotechnology (Gertler et al., 2002; D. A. Wolfe & Gertler, 2001). However, the idea of a 
formal industrial policy with specific plans was contrary to Ontario’s norms supporting 
market-led competitive practices. Quebec on the other hand, had transitioned to more 
government interventionist approaches as early as the 1960s and aggressively so in the 
1980s in knowledge-based industries including bioscience and aerospace. The province’s 
early experience with the public sector strategically engaging with industry in specific 
industries prepared it for its response to the 2008 financial crisis. 
The problems Canada and its provinces faced in the early 1980s centered on how to 
capture the opportunities stemming from the discovery of recombinant DNA techniques. 
The country decided to focus first on agricultural and environmental applications with 
some attention to human health. Both provinces confronted this challenge with difficulty 
especially since they are large, older industrial economies. Vested interests in rival 
industries like agriculture, automotive, textiles and plastics had to be balanced with those 
of the newer industries like aerospace, biotechnology and ICT. The threat of path 
dependence relying on older industrial structures and logics was very real. This section 
traces how Quebec and Ontario responded to these challenges and how they learned from 
the process. It lays the groundwork for understanding each province’s reaction to the 









4.2.1.1 Quebec: The Unsustainable “Good Years” 
 
Unlike Ontario, Quebec distinguished itself early in the 1980s as an aggressive 
proponent of the new biotechnology.
44
 Both the provincial and federal governments 
reformed their patent legislation. Provincial agencies were quick to create tax credits and 
R&D financing to attract FDI in biopharmaceutical R&D and generic drug 
manufacturing. Eventually a triggering event occurred in 2001 that catapulted biotech in 
Quebec. The scientist-entrepreneur, Roberto Bellini spun-out a company from the Institut 
Armand-Frappier that developed the first HIV-AIDS drug known as 3TC. BioChem 
Pharma eventually sold the drug to Shire Pharmaceuticals of the United Kingdom. Funds 
from this sale were reinvested in Quebec’s biotechnology cluster that resulted in a 
handful of new firms and thousands of jobs (Québec, 2010).This sale demonstrated 
possibilities for success to the rest of the local biotechnology community. FDI and new 
local firms grew in number as a result. 
The province struggled to sustain these successes by the early-mid 2000s. At this time 
rules governing R&D financing lagged behind industry and university demands. The 
province still considered funding university R&D key. There was also an over-reliance 
on the initial success of BioChem Pharma that raised unrealistic expectations. A lack of 
second-generation entrepreneurs and skilled managers revealed gaps in competencies 
especially in how to attract risk capital and to commercialize new products.
45
 Initial 
heavy government intervention in financing basic and applied research combined with 
late-stage private sector investment in drug development left gaps in financing needed to 
bring drugs from “cradle-to-market.” External global shocks like the 2001 ICT industry 
crash increased uncertainty and risk. VCs who lost investments were reluctant to take on 
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 Quebec’s 1960s Quiet Revolution advocated new values of state intervention and planning (Bélanger, 
2000). These values informed the role of the state in spurring biotechnology in the 1980s especially as the 
province’s economy was struggling. Traditional manufacturing and agricultural industries were 
increasingly exposed to global competition and its rival, Ontario, began to attract more FDI. Elected 
officials from all levels of government and business leaders devised a strategy outlined in the Picard 
Report  to transition Montreal’s economy towards a knowledge-based one driven by aerospace, 
pharmaceuticals and ICT (Picard, 1986). 
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risk in an even more uncertain industry like biotechnology. Despite competing interests, 
social learning did occur as government-funded, privately managed VCs figured out how 
to restructure financing over time to gain greater return on investments and universities 
learned more about how to measure risk and reward.
46
  
Four factors drove Quebec’s cluster emergence. First, both national and provincial 
leaders shared the political will to improve Canada’s economic competitiveness by 
transitioning from a resource-based economy to a knowledge-based one. Second, Quebec 
exercised some influence on federal regulations governing IPR while simultaneously 
coordinating its own strategy to expand patent protections for its firms as well as R&D 
spending. Third, the provincial government implemented a deliberate strategy around a 
particular knowledge area, pharmaceutical development, building on the success of large, 
incumbent MNCs and local firms already operating in the province. Fourth, the existence 
of several universities with medical schools, hospitals and bioscience-related departments 
engaged in basic research provided a foundation for cluster emergence and a critical 
trigger through the sale of BioChem Pharma. The above processes resulted in two 
networks, one dominated by large pharmaceutical firms and their relationships with 
university researchers and Clinical Research Organizations (CROs), and the other led by 
SBFs and their collaborative relationships with universities and CROs (Niosi, 2000; Niosi 
& Tomas, 2003).  
Quebec pursued a high commitment strategy during the 1980 – 2007 time period 
despite challenges associated with learning about and capturing new opportunities. It 
coupled financing and skill development investments with industry’s efforts to improve 
its capacity to innovate. This disruptive social learning and coordinated bargaining 
process involved a policy community comprised primarily of provincial agencies, 
biopharmaceutical MNCs, and the Office of the Chief Scientist aligned with the goal of 
securing cheaper drugs and creating new therapies. The 2008 financial crisis tested 
existing learning structures and commitment strategies. 
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4.2.1.2 Ontario: The Province that “Does Not Change Well” 
 
In contrast to Quebec, Ontario made incremental policy changes rather than a change 
in overarching industrial development goals during the 1980s. There was no formal 
bioscience strategy except one produced in 1995 that was not fully developed. Ontario 
traditionally has led a fragmented political bargaining process. The province and industry 
had not established social norms or mechanisms for sharing lessons learned, jointly 
developing sector strategies and creating incentives for industry to engage. By 1990, 
however, with the election of the New Democratic Party (NDP), the province began an 
experiment. Ontario was experiencing an economic recession at the time and adjusting to 
the opportunities and challenges presented by NAFTA. With an open trading system 
came attempts at industrial restructuring in areas of automotive, agriculture and 
manufacturing especially in the face of competition from Asia and the United States.  
In 1992 the NDP and Parliament moved against tradition by approving an Industrial 
Policy Framework and a Sector Partnership Fund with a budget of $150 million over six 
years to support specific Sector Strategies jointly with industry. The strategy was 
intended to change the business culture within Ontario to embrace more collective 
responsibility and to engage in social learning processes that could become the basis for 
sustained competitiveness. The overarching goal was to create high wage, high value-
added jobs and strategic partnerships with industry. One way to do this was to increase 
productivity through continuous product and process improvements across networks of 
firms and industries within the province rather than reducing the costs of existing 
industry (Laughren, 1991; D. A. Wolfe, 2002)..  
The strategy generated mixed results and eventually was cancelled in 1995 with the 
election of a Conservative government. While firms within sectors learned more from 
each other and developed useful relationships, sector strategies were not implemented 
except in those areas that had begun a similar process much earlier than the 1992 












In 1989 various policy communities were forming and evaluating prospects for 
biotechnology prior to the 1992 Sector Strategies. Government produced its Green Paper: 
“Biotechnology in Ontario – Growing Safely,” which addressed biosafety and 
environmental issues (Labour, 1989). Industry formed its first association from very 
organic beginnings in the Toronto Biotech Initiative.
48
 The Ministry of Health and Long-
Term Care continued to administer health R&D funding as far back as the 1970s.  
Despite these gains, Ontario did not take a strategic approach towards growing the 
industry. There is little evidence of significant investment in finance, skill development 
and firm competencies. As one interviewee noted: 
 
Ontario did nothing until the late 1990s and then the government cut university 
funding to focus narrowly on health research through the Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research (CIHR). The universities then came later to government 
demanding more support for research generally so Ontario established the Science 
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 A critical change was an increased focus on the provincial government and its agencies strengthening its 
existing working relationships with specific sectors and creating new ones in growth industries like 
biotechnology (D. A. Wolfe, 2002). The Sector Partnership Fund was designed to draw in key sector actors 
including a formal industry association and broad-based stakeholders to develop and implement a strategy. 
The Cabinet Committee on Economic Development would then approve the strategy. Specific initiatives 
could be submitted to the Cabinet by the sector for funding. Ultimately small and medium-sized firms did 
not have the financial resources required to match government funding of initiatives and were reluctant to 
submit proposals given the complex bureaucratic process while large firms did not see significant benefit. 
In the end a lack of incentives and a reversion back to old ways of lobbying government for traditional tax 
incentives occurred (D. A. Wolfe, 2002).  
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 This organization began as an informal, grassroots initiative by both the city’s economic development 
agency and interested individuals from service providers like investors, banks, and law firms. These 
individuals met regularly every month and eventually expanded beyond Toronto offering mentoring 
opportunities to scientists spinning out companies from university. 
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Roger Martin was an influential agent within government during this process. He 
raised the profile of R&D and innovation as drivers of Ontario’s future growth by helping 
to create the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Prosperity. 
By the early 2000s Ontario had more diversification of firms and VCs but nowhere 
near the level expected.
50
 But similar to Quebec and the individual scientist-entrepreneur, 
Francesco Bellini of BioChem Pharma, Ontario had its success story. In 1999 David 
Young applied his science background to found ARIUS Research based on a proprietary 
technology platform that generated and selected therapeutic antibodies based on their 
activity. This platform is useful in treating cancer and other diseases. Over nine years the 
company raised $30 million from investors. It was on the verge of bankruptcy but 
survived. In 2008, Roche, a global pharmaceutical and diagnostics company 
headquartered in Switzerland, purchased ARIUS for C$191 million.  
This sequence of events was viewed initially as a success and a potential pathway for 
other Ontario start-ups. But it did not result in reinvestment of funds from the sale into 
the local biotechnology community as Biochem Pharma did in Quebec. The stated 
intention by Roche was to keep the Ontario location and continue to conduct R&D there. 
It eventually closed down leaving the impression that Roche really was just interested in 
purchasing the firm’s 400 compounds.
51
 This case is important in that it reveals the 
struggles that local economic developers confront when the goal is to keep existing, high-
paying, highly skilled positions and expand them. 
In the 1990s while Quebec was increasing its bioscience R&D funding, devising 
aggressive tax incentives and patent legislation to attract FDI, Ontario cut funding and 
narrowly focused on cancer research. Individual pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms 
designed strategies to sell to the provincial healthcare system and its formulary as well as 
to international markets, not to other domestic markets. Innovation typically took place in 
healthcare services and processes rather than through the commercialization of new 
products. While there were a significant number of firms, most had little cash and in the 
1990s only one local firm demonstrated the typical path to success.  
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 Author Interview, Toronto, Ontario, March 25, 2014 
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These trends combined with other social norms that constrained the provinces. In 
Ontario a “cultural preference” for university research in the hopes that individual 
scientists would spin out companies reduced government funding of industry 
collaboration projects. Reliance on the logic of older, traditional industries limited 
biotechnology’s growth. Medium-sized firms so necessary to attract FDI and to grow the 
industry did not develop though a significant number of small start-ups emerged.  
Similar to Quebec, Ontario had two different industrial structures. One was led by 
large pharmaceutical MNCs and their relationships with CROs and universities while the 
other was led by small startups and their relationships with VCs and universities. But 
differences even in these networks existed. In Quebec VCs were largely government-
funded and privately managed. In Ontario they were mostly privately financed and 
managed especially after a “bad experiment” in a labor-backed attempt to create tax-free 
VC funds. In Quebec the sale of BioChem Pharma had positive demonstration effects 
with the creation of some new firms, while in Ontario ARIUS’ sale did not necessarily 
lead to greater local investment. Quebec aggressively created favorable patent legislation 
and increased R&D funding while Ontario had no real strategy and decreased funding. 
During this time Ontario relied on its legacy of market-based institutions that were 
successful in supporting traditional industries but not so much in launching complex, 
science-based ones like bioscience where uncertainty is high and innovation occurs 
rapidly. By 2007 with few credible commitments aside from the MaRS facility 
established in 2005 and designed to help startup ventures with broad economic and 
societal impact, Ontario was following a fragmented path dependent trajectory, still 









4.3 The 2008 Global Financial Crisis:  
A Critical Juncture for Quebec and Ontario? 
 
The 2008 financial crisis created a critical juncture for both provinces in their efforts 
to facilitate bioscience industry development. Quebec reinforced its high commitment 
strategy with new ways of financing, developing necessary skills and corporate 
competencies. After the crisis it further mobilized and coordinated the smaller bioscience 
organizations that existed in Montreal, Quebec City, Laval and Sherbrooke. Ontario 
maintained its mixed commitment strategy where decoupling of institutions remained and 
fragmented negotiations continue despite new policy communities arising. 
Quebec strengthened its learning structures linking public and private sector 
organizations and leveraging their respective knowledge sources. Ontario’s social norms 
continued to reject industrial policies as interfering in rather than catalyzing some sectors. 
This mindset prevented coordination among policy communities. Social learning 
structures that existed prior to the 2008 financial crisis prepared Quebec to respond 
quickly with new overarching goals and complementary institutions. Ontario remained 
trapped in old ways of organizing its economy despite sporadic success. 
 
4.3.1 Context: Industrial Reorganization and Strategic Responses 
 
By 2007 the global biotechnology industry was reconfiguring itself to take advantage 
of the few drug development opportunities in the pipeline. Companies with drugs in stage 
three clinical trials were particularly attractive as either acquisition targets or potential 
allies with large pharmaceutical firms. While industry was restructuring, the 2008 
financial crisis further exacerbated the process, constricting risk financing and forcing 
small firms with little funding to closed down or seek government R&D funds while 
others sought different types of alliances to secure financing particularly with big 
pharmaceutical firms searching for high potential assets, or potential therapies. 
At the provincial government level, while both Quebec and Ontario suffered 
bioscience industrial decline, each responded differently to the financial crisis. Quebec 








tradition of coordination and created public-private partnerships to help refocus the 
industry and reduce transaction costs. But it is still too early to determine if they are 
restructuring effectively.  
While Ontario developed a written strategy during this period, the perception by 
industry is that the province had no strategy, opting instead to rebuild its infrastructure 
and let industry lead. While neither approach guarantees industry sustainability they 
reflect each provinces’ inherited principles and practices, learning and bargaining 
processes all of which have led to particular strategy choices and industrial change. I 
argue that Quebec’s institutions relative to Ontario’s represent a higher commitment. 
 
4.3.1.1 A Problem-Focused Approach: Understanding Opportunities, Leveraging Scarce 
Resources, and Creating Competencies 
 
By this time, the provinces were focusing on human health applications in areas of 
cancer, stem cell and other major diseases. The challenge was how to leverage very 
scarce financial resources globally to create capacity in different skill development areas 
and to share risk in order to capture opportunities within a highly competitive global 
environment. While the opportunities by 2007 were defined more by their commercial 
possibilities than by the production of new knowledge through basic research, scarce risk 
financing forced small biotechnology and big pharmaceutical firms to focus on core 
capabilities and high potential therapies. Key questions include: How to reconfigure 
industry governance and institutions to support R&D with highest prospects for success? 
How to grow the local industry base as opposed to selling intellectual property via 
licensing to FDI, thus avoiding the “growing them to leave” trap?  
At the same time, the provinces were trying to manage technological and economic 
uncertainty to create a stable industry. Both provinces pursued different path dependent 
strategies before and after the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC). Quebec maintained its 
high commitment to bioscience despite major changes while Ontario continued a mixed 
commitment.  
 









Quebec maintained its high commitment to bioscience and quickly made substantive 
changes in its strategy in response to the damaging effects of the GFC. A strong KOST 
expanded to include new stakeholders representing bioscience clusters in Montreal, 
Quebec City and Sherbrooke. This team negotiated not only their own strategies but a 
new provincial one led by the Ministry of Economic Development, Innovation and 
Exports (MDEIE) and the Office of the Chief Scientist.  
Revised overarching goals included “mobilization, innovation and prosper” (MDEIE, 
2010). The strategy was designed to strengthen institutional complementarity among 
finance, skills development and corporate governance. To do so it favors collaboration 
projects requiring financing along the value chain, scientific and technical skills directly 
linked to industry demands, and alliances among firms, PROs and universities. This 
approach coupled with individual firm strategies and a favorable business environment is 
designed to restart industry growth. 
Between 2005-2010 the number of human health-related biotechnology companies 
declined by about 21% and employment dropped by 48% (BioQuebec, 2008, 2012).
52
 
Between 2001 and 2008 the number of biotechnology firms decreased from 110 to 67 and 
employment fell from 3,000 to 2,300. Between 2006 and 2011 pharmaceutical and 
medical manufacturing jobs declined by 28% from 10,422 to 7,549. BioContact, the 
industry’s most important annual conference, reported that attendance declined from 
close to1,000 prior to the financial crisis to 300 in 2012.
53
 This downward trend signifies 
that Quebec firms merged and acquired each other, folded or restructured into other 
organizational types like VCs.  
Quebec’s strong KOST responded to the volatility by learning about the challenges 
and how to address them. Quebec sought greater coordination among regional actors in 
areas of knowledge development and finance. It chose a general application area, human 
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Its strategy also seeks to spur growth through stronger ties to other clusters within 
Canada especially Ontario and globally including California and Sweden. The nature of 
these ties includes FDI, joint R&D, co-investments and market access to skills and 
finance. In 2011, the province created its first Office of the Chief Scientist to manage the 
province’s three research funds including nature and technology as well as health while 
promoting and financially supporting research, knowledge dissemination and researcher 
training in Québec. Finally, in 2012 the Quebec government abolished its “15-Year Rule” 
since costs of procuring brand-named drugs were exceeding tax collections from FDI.
55
 
Four trends characterize this period: a severe financial crisis; small biotechnology 
firms closing down or changing their business model to focus on fewer NCEs and niche 
areas; MNCs closing their R&D facilities, in some cases reconfiguring them into 
investment organizations; VCs investing in shorter time-spans along the drug 
development value chain to capture highest revenue opportunities; and, national 
institutions reconfiguring towards commercialization efforts while provincial institutions 
expand and coordinate networks of partnerships among industry, university and 
government. 
I argue that Quebec’s response to the 2008 financial crisis involved disruptive social 
learning along with a relatively coordinated negotiation process. New institutions were 
created and others changed but conflicting interests underpinned the process. 
Three leading organizational institutions–the Office of the Chief Scientist, the 
MDEIE, and BioQuebec, the industry association - developed their own strategies, which 
ultimately appear quite similar. For example, in 2012 the Office of the Chief Scientist 
called for Quebec to differentiate its bioscience “ecosystem” internationally, increase 
financing for innovative technologies, create more partnerships among the various 
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bioscience stakeholders and promote on an international scale Quebec’s new business 
model to collaborate with stakeholders (Quirion, 2012). 
The province continued to develop its general three-year research and innovation 
strategy from 2007-2010 and 2010-2013, adding “mobilization” to its theme of 
innovation and prosperity (MDEIE, 2006, 2010). This change further indicates the 
province’s recognition that coordination and mobilizing resources are necessary during 
times of severe global competition and financing shortages. Its $122.7 million bioscience 
strategy established in 2009 complements the overall R&D strategy, emphasizing 
partnerships especially in pre-competitive and clinical research areas, retaining and 
attracting skilled labor, local – global collaborations among firms as well as between 
firms, university and government research organizations in order to both adapt to and 
compete within new global market conditions (Québec, 2010). 
Specifically, the strategy identifies five objectives: Encourage firm spin-offs from 
R&D; support both small biotech firms and big biopharmaceutical companies, mostly 
MNCs with subsidiaries in Quebec; ensure that the province produces and attracts enough 
skilled labor to support industry needs; emphasize and promote Quebec as a 
biopharmaceutical cluster globally (Québec, 2010). 
In addition to MDEIE, in 2007 the Ministère de la Santé et des Services sociaux 
(MSSS) developed a unique Quebec Drug policy that takes into account both society’s 
needs for access to low cost, high quality drugs and industry’s need to innovate and 
access markets. MDEIE, MSSS and industry formed a high level, permanent committee 
to discuss and implement the new policy and to “maintain an attractive, competitive 
business environment for the Québec economy and businesses in these sectors on the 
international scene” (Québec, 2010, p. 21). 
BioQuebec supports these goals. It joined with Montreal Invivo, the city-level non-
profit economic development organization that had been functioning since 2002 but 
formalized in 2007 just prior to the financial crisis, to advocate for personalized medicine 
as a common theme. Professor Howard Bergman of the Fonds de recherché du Quebec-








among stakeholders the province committed $21.1 million to finance the Personalized 
Medicine Partnership in Cancer (BioQuebec, 2012).
56
 The initiative also encourages 
more creative ways to support local biotech firms and their collaborations with foreign 
biopharmaceutical companies (BioQuebec, 2012). 
Region-industry strategic interaction became more coordinated through new 
organizational institutions like Montreal Invivo and around common themes like 
personalized medicine, though not without difficult negotiations aligning interests among 
the various groups. Government, Bio Quebec and individual firms acknowledged the 
need for more integrated networks of organizations and research, less silo mentality, as 
well as new business models that reduce risk and increase return on R&D investment 
through commercialization. 
The resulting institutional configuration continues to shift from a less coordinated, 
silo approach and one focused on R&D to a more coordinated approach centered on 
commercialization. However, universities claim that government does not understand the 
necessary link between basic and applied research leading to innovation. Without 
increases in funding for basic research to create a strong foundation for new knowledge, 
they argue, few innovations will materialize. 
At the provincial level, the PLQ remained in power from 2003 until 2012, when Jean 
Charest was defeated and Pauline Marois of the PQ became Premier. During the PLQ’s 
reign, industry stakeholders perceived that the private sector was left to finance more of 
the bioscience industry than government. However, with the election of Marois and the 
PQ, expectations are that the provincial government will begin to dedicate more financial 
resources. 
At the same time, the province continued to make advances in basic research. For 
example, Dr. Mick Bhatia’s work at McMaster University discovered how embryonic 
stem cells could become other cells. Stem cell research generally is considered by some 
to be as revolutionary in terms of technological innovation and benefits to society as the 
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discovery of recombinant DNA.
57
 Though others disagree emphasizing that big bets like 
these are highly uncertain (Wong, 2011). 
However, translating basic research investments into commercially viable therapies 
and technologies continues to be the ultimate puzzle. For example, though the federal 
government as well as Quebec invested hundreds of millions of CDN$ in Genome 
research over the past decade, results in terms of commercializable products did not 
materialize. This disappointing result was partially due to ineffective financing 
mechanisms and lack of skilled commercialization managers, as well as to unrealistic 
expectations related to the level of scientific progress in the basic research component. 
Despite mixed results in terms of translating basic research into new products and 
technologies, in 2008, Québec’s life-sciences sector was relatively strong and included 
400 businesses and 25,000 employees. In addition, 13,000 researchers in publicly funded 
institutions specialized in neurology, oncology, cardiology, immunology, and genomics.  
Recovering from the financial crisis proved to be a formidable challenge even though 
by 2012 Quebec was engaging in cutting edge basic research and contributing significant 
discoveries in higher profile bioscience areas from stem cells to bioinformatics. Partly in 
reaction to the ICT bubble bursting around 2001 and also because the human 
biopharmaceutical industry lacked success measured by fewer drugs and novel therapies, 
the PLQ decided to focus their limited financial and technical resources in other 
industries perceived as more promising.  
Large pharmaceutical firms began to outsource their R&D by forming alliances with 
small biotech firms and establishing their own VC firms that invest directly in NCEs, or, 
co-invest with other VC companies. These larger firms are also diversifying into product 
lines beyond pharmaceuticals to include medical devices and technologies. For example, 
by 2011, Quebec’s bioscience industry networks had begun to shift. Pharmaceutical 
MNCs like GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Pfizer closed their manufacturing facilities and 
instead established VC firms to focus on investing in Canadian DBFs offering promising 
therapeutics. However, though Pfizer has made four such investments, none have been in 
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Quebec, but rather in Ontario and British Columbia.
58
 Essentially, larger MNCs have 
downsized their operations and now are establishing more formal R&D relationships with 
DBFs whereas before, the larger MNC would internally undertake R&D. 
Small biotech firms, on the other hand, began to specialize in niche disease areas and 
in fewer assets or new chemical entities (NCEs) compared to previous strategies. DBFs 
were trying to distinguish themselves in order to compete for large pharmaceutical firm 
investment by focusing on core capabilities. These firms are beginning to more closely 
link their R&D to market opportunities, for example, in certain disease areas like 
Alzheimer’s or in the orphan drug market.
59
 The figure below illustrates these network 
shifts. 
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 Public Presentation at BioContact, Quebec City, October 2013. 
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Expanding the KOST  
 
Quebec’s history of creating learning structures involves public-private partnerships. 
These provided a foundation from which the province could quickly react to the harsh 
effects of the global financial crisis. The province broadened and deepened its strong 
KOST in response to the sudden scarcity of finance by mobilizing new organizations to 
form a meta-network around a common vision and commitment strategy.  
The ecosystem is comprised of organizations that fund, produce and transfer 
knowledge. At the provincial level, the Ministry of Economy, Innovation and Exports, 
Ministry of Research and Innovation, BioQuebec, CQDM, Fonds de recherché Sante 
under the Office of the Chief Scientist, and Genome Quebec among others play key roles. 
Federally the National Research Council is prominent. 
At the city level, Montreal is the largest bioscience cluster with close to 70 per cent of 
Quebec’s biotechnology firms. Quebec City, Sherbrooke and Laval are small but active. 
Each grew from policy communities that formalized into what knowledge cluster 
theorists and practitioners call “cluster facilitators” (Ketels & Memedovic, 2008). These 
are typically non-profit economic development organizations led by industry and with 
long term financial support from government at all levels and the private sector to 
catalyze industry growth.
60
 Montreal Invivo is an example.  
While each cluster developed its own strategic plan, they increasingly coordinated 
with the MEIE, MRI and the Office of the Chief Scientist around a common vision for 
Quebec. In other words, Quebec is evolving from small, strong KOSTS distributed 
throughout a few key cities to a dense ecosystem with strengthened ties among 
organizations that finance, produce and transfer bioscience knowledge. While the nature 
of the provincial strategy changed, Quebec maintained its high commitment by 
continuing to link finance, skill development and corporate governance. The next section 
evaluates institutional change in these areas after the crisis.   
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High Commitment Strategy: Linking Finance, Skill Development and Corporate 
Governance 
 
Table 12 details the nature of change in each institutional area. The data reveals that 
Quebec is shifting towards filling gaps, coordinating and leveraging resources within and 
among the three institutional areas to support a new phase of internationalization and 
focus on personalized medicine. This strategic focus is designed to brand Quebec as a 
global biopharmaceutical hub.  
The province is increasing investments in pre-competitive collaboration projects 
between industry and PROs, immigration programs to attract scientists in support of these 
projects, interdisciplinary research and education, and leveraging external resources 
through alliances. The next sections review the evolution of finance, skill development 
and corporate governance just before and after the 2008 financial crisis weaving in 










Table 9 Finance, Skill Development and Corporate Governance 
 Finance Skill Development Corporate Governance 
1st Order – Settings Biotech R&D spending (US$) Tax Credits – Scientists, Technical 
specialists 
Make or Buy Decision – Amount of 




2009 Biopharma Strategy - $122.7 m 
$1.2 B tax incentives 
Refundable R&D tax credits 





2nd Order – 
Techniques 




Continue to fund government-backed VCs like Teralys 
Capital 
-new pre-competitive collaboration 
mechanisms/institutions - CDQM 
-Retain and attract highly skilled workers 
locally and globally 
-Educate and encourage youth about 
science careers 
-Increase in pre-competitive, open 
innovation models 
-Big pharma investing more in 
university research in specific disease 
areas (cancer); creating own VCs to 
invest in Canadian (not just Quebec) 
assets; outsourcing more R&D to 
local biotechs;  
-local biotechs focusing more on 1-2 
NCEs, even in-licensing, orphan 
drugs 
3rd Order – 
Overarching Goals 
(Paradigm change) 
Core focus shifting (e.g. basic-commercial research, 
niche application areas, niche science areas) 





Greater Collaboration between firms and PROs;  
Mobilization/coordination of resources; 
Pre-competitive collaboration/open innovation; 
Focus on common theme – personalized medicine 
Continue to link directly to industry needs 
Greater Interdisciplinarity 
Greater collaboration between local 
biotechs& big pharma 








Did financial institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
Quebec changed existing financial institutions and created new ones after the GFC. 
The province invested more in government-backed, privately managed VCs and created 
new research organizations like CDQM to focus on precompetitive collaboration projects 
jointly funded with the private sector. The focus on public-private partnerships is a shift 
from separate public investments in university R&D and private VC funds. This shift 
represents government shoring up scarce financing to maintain its commitment.  
Finance is crucial to both R&D and product commercialization in biotechnology 
firms. Sources of finance come typically from government, VCs, private equity funds, 
angel investors, stock markets and mergers and acquisitions. VCs play a major role in 
more established biotechnology clusters like Quebec and Ontario. These organizations 
typically use exit strategies that enable the VC to sell its shares after a set period of time 
in the stock market, or, sell to a large pharmaceutical firm for commercialization and 
distribution. This exit enables the VC to capture profits from a high-risk investment.  
By 2007 the Canadian IPO market had been closed and VCs were reluctant to invest 
in Canadian firms because of weak exit options (E&Y, 2008). VCs instead invested in 
fewer numbers of firms and those with more promising therapies. This process reduced 
funding available for small start-ups and those in early clinical trials forcing these firms 
to partner at too early a stage with larger companies to secure financing. Sometimes the 
value of these investments was lower than what it should have been because of few 
financial alternatives to the small biotech firm. 
The Quebec Government recognized this weakness and on October 8, 2009 it 
launched a Biopharmaceutical Strategy. The province’s approach towards achieving its 
goals involved a selective focus on human health and personalized medicine as opposed 
to all bioscience application areas. It intends to expand financial support along the drug 
and technology development value chain while creating a market for innovative products 
through a coordinated health procurement program.  
The strategy specifically intends to extend its financial leadership by: restricting 









clinical research and put major funds into translational research in hospitals; and 




According to the perception at the time, the provincial government’s renewed interest 
in financing the bioscience industry represents a reversal from 2003-2012 when the Parti 
Libéral du Quebec (PLQ) left financing bioscience to the private sector. One interviewee 
capture the attitude: 
 
Now there is a shared understanding that it didn’t work. With the Partie Quebecois 





In Quebec key industry associations like BioQuebec develop industry strategy mostly 
through private sector members and committees with some government participation. 
City-level economic development organizations like Montreal Invivo negotiate with the 
Ministry of Economy, Innovation and Exports at provincial level, MRI at national level, 
city government and the private sector for funding. 
 However, it crafts industry strategy through mechanisms similar to BioQuebec and 
mainly with active members like DBFs, large pharmaceutical firms and VCs. The 
political process involves each stakeholder group negotiating their own interests and 
bringing different levels of resources to bear as industry identifies shared needs, goals 
and objectives. While the negotiation process was coordinated and learning occurred it 
was not without conflict particularly around its chosen theme. Eventually these 
stakeholders agreed on personalized medicine.
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Specific actions include: Encouraging creation of solid enterprises and well capitalized  developed from 
the “majors; Maintaining long-term investment and maximize value-creation in Quebec in collaboration 
with global partners; Completing a new fund of risk capital to be able to support projects end-to-end;  
-Seeding capital and start-up funds (e.g. Anges Capital Quebec) to support biotech and medical 
technologies; Coordinating risk capital funds with Ontario – Corridor Quebec-Ontario; Facilitating 
sufficient size, expertise and capacity to intervene in medical technologies; Securing participation of 
institutional investors in financing after startup. 
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In the area of finance, big pharmaceutical firms, VCs and government began to 
change their investment models to one of integrated finance. Increased coordination 
among these organizations was driven by their need to reduce uncertainty and risk while 
securing a return on investment. The best way to achieve this goal is to segment out the 
investment opportunities at each point along the R&D to commercialization chain. 
Government is trying to fill the funding gaps left by the private sector                          . 
During this period investors, DBFs and big pharmaceutical firms began to communicate 
among themselves at the beginning of a potential opportunity. They agreed on more 
specific investment roles assigned to each participant. This approach is wholly different 
from past fragmented models.
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For example, Amorchem, a publicly-funded, privately managed VC fund now invests 
smaller amounts in the early stages of an opportunity to maximize profit. It then sells its 
shares after two years. Now Amorchem discusses earlier in the process with institutional 
investors and big pharmaceutical firms to educate them on the opportunity and to secure 
early commitments for investments after the first stage. Funds like Amorchem now 
position themselves between university researchers, and, large pharmaceutical firms and 




The above example represents a process of social learning and institutional change. 
Amorchem used to invest in opportunities at the beginning and wait for its return after 10 
years by which time other VCs and institutional investors had invested and diluted 
Amorchem’s return. Amorchem took all the risk up front but was not rewarded fully for 
its long-term investment. Later investors minimized their upfront risk and maximized 
their return on a fairly large yet short-term investment. In response to these industry 
challenges as well as to the constraints of their internal organizational structure, 
Amorchem reconfigured its competitive position. It was content to make smaller returns 
earlier in the investment process. 
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In addition to risk finance, individual firms still directly benefited from SR&ED tax 
credits for R&D, NSERC university-industry collaboration and IRAP grants. Quebec’s 
PROs continued to receive R&D funds from the NRC as well as from Quebec’s Ministry 
of Finance and Economy. However big pharmaceutical firms cut staff and reoriented 
offices away from generics manufacturing toward R&D investments. Smaller firms were 
either acquired or failed. Industry interaction with the province is now characterized as 
more coordinated through the network of strong KOSTS and their projects. 
Quebec’s FDI promotion strategy led by Invest Quebec explicitly targets medium and 
large scale investors rather than small firms. It typically funds projects that involve 
foreign partners and seeks to grow Quebec firms both domestically and internationally.
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However, since small firms can be the source of innovation, lack of attention by the 
Quebec government to attracting smaller investors with the potential to grow could lead 
to lower levels of growth in the short term and cluster instability in the long-term. The 
province’s strategy continues to incorporate FDI as a driver of bioscience industry 
growth.  
 
4.3.1.2.1 Did skill development institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
 
Quebec reinforced its skill development strategy after the GFC to attract even more 
diverse, global talent while balancing this effort with investments in local sources. Firms, 
universities and PROs require the competencies of scientists and managers with 
experience in guiding complex projects. Quebec created a new tax holiday to help firms 
lure needed scientists and technical specialists globally. The province shifted from 
financing university degrees in traditional biology and medical programs to more 
interdisciplinary ones. Quebec designed its approach not only to directly meet industry 
needs but to increase the effectiveness of financial investments. But skills gaps still exist 
especially in biotechnology firms who lack technology commercialization experience. 
These changes demonstrate Quebec’s relative flexibility and capability to monitor 












industry change, learn quickly about new opportunities, and combine them with previous 
experience all through a strong meta-network of KOSTS.  
 
 
Did corporate governance institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
 
Firms that survived the GFC maintained their high level of commitment by changing 
the ways in which they improved their competencies. Companies shifted from internal 
capacity building to external relationships for this purpose. Quebec’s industry 
association, BioQuebec, advocated this change in its 2008 strategy and 2012 




Individual firms began to respond to scarce financial resources, rising costs of drug 
development and fewer blockbuster drug opportunities by searching for new business 
models that reduce transaction costs, increase access to valuable information, and create 
efficiencies. These models include project companies, disease teams, large 
pharmaceutical firm R&D spin-offs and alliances with DBFs. They are quite different 
from those that dominated the past such as vertically integrated large pharmaceutical 
firms and DBFs that carefully guarded results of their own R&D and clinical trials. While 
individual firm strategies still drive corporate behavior, they increasingly include 
participation in more coordinative institutions with competitors.  
For example, stakeholders are creating institutions around the concept of “open 
innovation” involving information and resource-sharing among industry participants 
particularly during the pre-competitive phase of product development. However, not all 
institutions effectively aggregate the interests of all participants. Clearly defining the 
economic benefits for each as well as intellectual property protections presents barriers.    
Industry’s reaction to the volatile years from 2007-2012 has been to seek new 
business models and ways of coordinating and collaborating on both R&D and 
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commercialization. For example, VCs, DBFs and university researchers are creating 
“project companies” in addition to vertical companies. Project companies secure 
resources globally, from finance and management to research partnerships and direct 
them to commercializing a single product or NCE discovered by a university or 
entrepreneur-scientist. This approach enables more flexibility to secure the best talent and 
financing to bring promising drugs and technologies to market. The project company is a 
form of process innovation in terms of commercialization. While transaction costs may or 
may not be higher vis-à-vis vertically integrated firms whose resources are maintained 
internally, the new institution could enable faster and more effective solutions to 
problems.  
Firms have also responded to increased competition amid scarce resources. For 
example, DBFs are narrowing their focus to single therapeutic areas or technology 
platforms with wide-ranging applications rather than trying to be “all things to all 
people.”
68
 Some advocate licensing non-core NCEs, key assets of most DBFs, in order to 
secure short-term revenue that in turn could support long-term development of core assets 
that will gain a higher return. Start-ups are establishing alliance networks – both upstream 
and downstream – at founding rather than later in their evolution and configure them to 
reduce costs, duplication and complexity (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000). Firms 
are beginning to ally with established rivals in order to learn, but ensure that partners in 
the network do not compete among each other (Baum et al., 2000). Some firms establish 
as “virtual companies” with headquarters in Montreal, researchers in Boston and 
suppliers in Asia. While others, like Bellus Health managed by Roberto Bellini, the son 
of Francesco Bellini founder of BioChemPharma, Quebec’s biggest success, no longer 
focus on R&D, but repurposed drugs and therapies that provide faster returns.  
VC strategies have also changed how they are organized, governed and invest. There 
are several types including privately held and managed, publicly financed but privately 
managed, big pharma-funded and managed VCs like GSK and Pfizer, and “fund of 
funds” like Teralys Capital. Teralys manages financing from other VCs, some public 
                                                 
 
68









others private, and invests in target sectors like clean technology, life sciences and 
information communications technology.  
However, VCs faced certain challenges during 2007-2012. It is now more difficult to 
syndicate opportunities among investors. The costs of producing drugs are increasing so 
there is a need for good quality management and assets like NCEs. The typical goal now 
for VCs is to focus on the lowest “spend,” about 3-5 year investments, in return for the 
highest growth, or “early investment, early returns.”
69
 For example, VCs like TVM invest 
in pre-indication through to phase II or pre-clinical to technical proof of concept in 
humans for new drugs. Afterwards, they sell to strategic partners, typically a large 
pharmaceutical firm. In the past, VCs would invest in either later stages of drug 
development, closer to commercialization, or along the entire value chain. VCs now are 
increasingly searching internationally for partners and investments whereas during the 
1980s and 1990s, they focused domestically.
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Government backed VC funds like those managed by the Business Development 
Bank of Canada (BDC) take on a holistic approach to investing in bioscience products 
and technologies. These VCs operate under a different set of objectives, namely 
economic development and better healthcare, including drugs, for Canadians. BDC 
invests longer term and in a wider range of firms. However, BDC is criticized by private 
sector VCs and biotechnology firms for not having the requisite skills and knowledge to 
conduct due diligence on investment opportunities particularly since BDC originated as a 
traditional commercial bank.  
Large pharmaceutical firms are also reorganizing to balance risk and return through 
both competition and cooperation. Many like Pfizer and GSK are outsourcing R&D 
through partnerships with DBFs yet they also continue research collaboration with 
universities. In addition, large pharmaceutical firms are simultaneously establishing their 
own VC funds and co-investing with competitors as a limited partner particularly since 
financing and good investment opportunities are increasingly difficult to find and vet 
alone. Furthermore, pharmaceutical firms are redesigning their VC fund strategies to 
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invest in “cures” versus “treatments.”
71
 Finally, pharmaceutical firms are diversifying 
their products by investing not just in biopharmaceuticals, but medical technologies. 
Changes have also occurred at the individual entrepreneur level. Individual successful 
entrepreneurs who have gained credibility within the industry are increasingly mobilizing 
industry in strategic ways whereas in the past they did not. For example, these 
entrepreneurs have formed working groups comprised of representatives of all bioscience 
application areas, niches and firm types on the basis that. One interviewee spoke for 
many: 
 
It is critical to get everyone on same page, then industry can attract government 
investment. Now, we must have more innovative leveraging from big pharma 
R&D budgets, government funds, and university research without which we 
would not have gotten more funding. This is a public goods argument. Pharma is 
not going to fund it alone, therefore industry needs government. We all need each 




In addition, the strategy should not involve picking winners, but focus on niches like 
personalized medicine. DBFs are beginning to focus their corporate strategies on 
developing one-two NCEs and dropping the rest. The thinking is, “Start with what you’ve 
got, and if not much, then you have to be laser-focused on your niche if you want to 
attract companies like Novartis. Then, you can interest government in it.”
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Regional bioscience stakeholders, sometimes led by government and sometimes by 
industry, began to establish new institutions based on public-private partnership (PPP) 
models. These are designed to create incentives for participants to share information and 
resources to save on rising costs of pursuing these tasks alone. In return, bioscience 
organizations would receive sufficient benefits including access to the research and 
technologies.  
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For example, in 2008 the federal and Quebec government and large pharmaceutical 
firms like Merck and Novartis invested C$4 million and C$1 million each, respectively, 
in a new research institution, the Québec Consortium for Drug Discovery (CQDM). This 
is a pre-competitive consortium designed to facilitate a faster drug development process 
in partnership with the pharmaceutical industry. In 2012 the Quebec government, 
AstraZeneca and Pfizer established a non-profit research institute called the Neomed 
Institute designed to bridge the gap between academic research and industry by funding 
collaborations with universities and biotechnology start-ups. Both are attempts to make 
up for large pharmaceutical firms closing down their R&D and manufacturing centers in 
Quebec over the last five years. 
Governance mechanisms include a board of directors comprised of industry, 
academia and government. This new collaboration model claims that it is a “network of 
exchange and cooperation” in research among universities, hospitals, biotech firms and 
the pharmaceutical industry. Public and private sector partners design collaborative 
projects and share in results rather than just responding to request for proposals (RFPs).
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This type of collaboration represents a level of embeddedness and coordination not 
achieved by markets alone. However, it is too early to determine its level of 
effectiveness.  
 
Institutional Configuration: Balancing Coordination and Competition 
 
While Quebec’s bioscience cluster contracted after years of growth, the strategy 
community created new and transformed existing institutions. The new institutions are 
designed to solve certain problems inherent in this science-based industry. These include, 
lack of information and knowledge-sharing, and, uncoordinated financing mechanisms 
needed to take discoveries from the lab to market. The key problem was how to reduce 
the costs of innovation and cluster development while securing higher return on R&D 
investments. 












Below I examine a representative sample of new and changed institutions as well as 
modes of coordination around finance, skills, product markets and knowledge. These 
include: the globally networked region; interregional alliances; reorganization of 
provincial government ministries; project-focused companies (PFCs); small 
biotechnology firm strategies designed to create focus, flexibility and coordination; large 
pharmaceutical companies outsourcing R&D to small biotechs and universities while 




Bioscience industry, university and government stakeholders increasingly attached 
importance to the role of global networks in research, finance and skill development. The 
region is forming R&D and financial networks that are becoming more disease-specific 
and therapy-focused, combining “global expertise with a local response.”
75
 For example, 
Quebec and the state of California each are contributing $60 million to a cancer research 
project focusing on stem cells.
76
 An individual entrepreneur in California, Robert Klein, 
led the effort to commit California’s legislature to issue state bonds for stem cell R&D, in 
direct opposition against U.S. national policy on stem cells. California’s strategy brings 
the role of global R&D and financial networks to the center of drug R&D. In turn, 
Quebec’s efforts to forge ties separately from Canada’s federal agencies provides 
evidence for the relative autonomy that Canada’s regions have in designing and 
implementing knowledge-based industrial strategies.  
Canadian provinces are coordinating among themselves in order to gain efficiencies 
particularly in translating R&D spending into higher product and technology 
commercialization rates. For example, In 2005 Ontario founded a public-private 
partnership, Medical and Related Sciences (MaRS) facility that would reduce knowledge 
silos, “nurture a culture of innovation … and help create global enterprises that would 
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contribute to Canada’s economic and social development.”
77
 Quebec now partners with 
MaRS in order to share information, contacts and resources since Ontario’s bioscience 
success has rested more on the private sector. MaRS acts as a bridging tie between the 
two networks, provinces and their bioscience communities.  
By 2012, Quebec’s new Premier combined the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Tourism and the Ministry of Economic Development, Innovation and Export Trade 
(MDEIE) to form a new institution, the Ministry of Finance and Economy. This change 
reflects a political interest in establishing new organizational forms conducive to 
implementing the new government’s economic and finance programs. The overall 
mission, however, remains the same: facilitating finance, economic growth and tourism. 
Separately, Quebec’s Ministry of International Relations of la Francophonie and 
International Trade will oversee the province’s export strategy that the former MDEIE 
used to manage, while the new Ministry of Higher Education, Research, Science and 
Technology is responsible for research and innovation.
78
 
The MDEIE’s and Office of the Chief Scientist’s mobilization of smaller, distributed 
knowledge-oriented strategy teams into a province-wide network strengthened Quebec’s 
high commitment to bioscience after the GFC. This team negotiated not only their own 
strategies but a new provincial one. Revised overarching goals included “mobilization, 
innovation and prosper” (MDEIE, 2010). This approach coupled with individual firm 
strategies and a favorable business environment is designed to restart industry growth. 
The major strategic change during this period was to emphasize equally wealth 
creation along with support for the healthcare system. To do so, stakeholders support 
government procurement of local innovations, multi-stakeholder partnerships particularly 
at pre-competitive stages of product development, more effective risk management by 
learning how to segment different types of risk along the drug development chain, and 
local-global collaborations. This focus on mobilization and coordination of resources and 















the goal of promoting Quebec as a global biopharmaceutical hub is largely in response to 
the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
4.3.1.3 Ontario: Fragmentation and Path Dependence? 
 
Ontario maintained a mixed commitment to bioscience after the GFC. The Ontario 
government designed an innovation policy to improve the business environment by 
increasing R&D financing, tax incentives for both research and training, building 
infrastructure, and creating government funded, privately managed VCs similar to 
Quebec. Biotechnology firms shed non-core assets and developed some alliances to 
remain viable. Industry associations addressed the financing gap by creating new seed 
funding mechanisms. Despite these incremental changes there was no overall strategy to 
strengthen and adapt linkages among finance, skill development and firm competencies 
to new circumstances.    
There is no evidence of a strong KOST and little indication that policy communities 
developed a shared mindset and coordinated around common goals. For example two 
industry associations, the incumbent Life Sciences Ontario and the newly established 
Ontario Bioscience Innovation Organization, fought for resources and relevance rather 
than “speaking with a common voice”. However, individual policy communities often 
represented by a formal organization like an industry association continued to learn. They 
evaluated industry goals and previous strategies, gathered lessons learned from similar 
jurisdictions, and created new individual strategies.  
 Ontario remained trapped in old ways of organizing its economy that are less 
conducive to science-based industry development despite learning gains. Multiple policy 
communities with competing interests, a lack of shared strategic goals, rival industries 
vying for resources and a history of market-led industrial development help explain this 
mixed strategy. 
The difference between Quebec and Ontario lies in just how far government embeds 
itself in strategy development and implementation. While both invest in PRO, university 
and hospital R&D, Quebec creates sector plans co-designed with and implemented by the 









2011 an Office of the Chief Scientist. Ontario, on the other hand, creates a favorable 
business environment in the hopes of growing local firms and attracting FDI but industry 
does not speak with one voice. Individual firm strategies collectively reflect industry 
development. 
By 2009 and for the first time in its history Ontario became a “have not” province. 
Ontario’s industrial decline particularly in its automotive and manufacturing industries 




In 2008 the province negotiated an Innovation Agenda with a local-global connection 
in order to address economic decline. It singles out the primary challenge of translating 
research into commercializable products and services. The strategy is designed to attract 
entrepreneurs, innovators and FDI from overseas; invest in, generate and attract a highly 
skilled workforce in science, engineering, creative arts, business and entrepreneurship; 
stimulate private sector investment in knowledge-based firms; improve productivity and 
promote a supportive business environment in Ontario abroad. In 2010 the province 
created a bioscience strategy in support of the new agenda (OMRI, 2010).  
Ontario’s bioscience industry contracted from 118 to 98 biotechnology firms between 
2006 and 2007 and continued to decrease after the financial crisis (E&Y, 2008).
80
 
However, the province promotes itself as the fourth largest biomedical research center in 
North America and a life sciences hub. On the surface the data supports this view. 20 
universities and 24 colleges developing curricula jointly with industry and graduating 
9,300 students in science and engineering fields annually; 60 public research 
organizations including the Ontario Institute for Cancer Research; several 
biopharmaceutical MNCs such as Sanofi Pasteur, Roche, and Johnson & Johnson along 
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with successful local firms Apotex and Biovail; 40,000 employees at 850 companies 
(representing all bioscience firms, not just biotechnology); and revenues of $15 billion. 
$5 billion dollars is derived from exports. The province promotes its expertise in 
genomics, neuroscience, oncology, cardiovascular disease and clinical trials (MRI, 2010). 
These impressive statistics do not represent the prevailing local attitude among 
industry that weaknesses persist. There are very few local start-ups, anchor companies 
and much needed medium-sized biotechnology firms to attract significant FDI. Those 
MNCs in Ontario are not investing in local industry nor are small and medium-sized 
firms receiving much support.
81
  
Industry and some in government agencies claim that the province has no strategy 
and still relies on a “cultural preference for university research” as opposed to public-
private partnerships to drive commercialization.
82
 Those firms that are selling products 
are selling them either to the provincial healthcare system or internationally. This 
structure that is tied to the healthcare system actually reduces incentives to invest in R&D 
to innovate and does not create a need for strategy. The disconnection between 
government and industry is underpinned by old institutions separating them in support of 
traditional industries like plastics and transportation.  
Four events characterize this period in Ontario. First, the province developed a new 
innovation strategy similar to the federal government embracing the role of technological 
innovation in sustaining Ontario’s economic competitiveness. Second, the MRI produced 
its life sciences strategy in support of the same goals outlined in the broader innovation 
agenda. But there are claims that no strategy exists leading to the possibility that it is not 
actually being implemented nor was it negotiated in a coordinated manner involving key 
stakeholders.
83
 Third, government created new financial institutions in the form of 
government-backed, privately managed VC funds. Ontario learned from Quebec about 
the benefits of these public-private partnerships despite the province’s failed attempts to 
outsource management of innovation projects in the 1990s and early 2000s. It breaks with 
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Ontario’s traditional preference for privately held and managed funds. Fourth, industry 
remains fragmented. Two associations compete to be the voice of industry despite 
formalization and coordination of industry segments within each organization.  
 
Provincial Government Commitment Strategy 
 
By 2010 the province began implementing changes in ministries reflecting new roles 
aligned with new overarching goals, but the changes created uncertainty around the 
priority level that the province assigns to research and innovation. For example, the 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MHLTC) changed its mission from actual 
delivery of health care to “stewardship” in planning and guiding resources to “bring value 
to the health system.”
84
 Historically this ministry financed R&D in health technologies as 
well as delivered healthcare to Canadians. But over time the Ministry of Research and 
Innovation (MRI) took on the R&D financing responsibility linking research to 
innovation. 
In 2011 the provincial government folded the MRI, founded in 2005 in support of 
research and commercialization of new technologies, into the Ministry of Economic 
Development, Employment and Infrastructure (MEDEI). This change more closely 
linked research and innovation with competitiveness and high wage, higher skilled jobs.
85
 
It also established mechanisms to connect local Ontario scientists with those in the 
strategic markets of China, India and Israel.
86
 
The approach is very different from experiments in the 1990s that favored public-
private partnerships, contracting out through a sole-source agreement management of the 
province’s research and innovation agenda and budget of $1.25 billion to a private 
corporation, the Innovation Institute of Ontario (IIO). It was discovered that IIO did not 
develop a clear strategy to meet the objectives of promoting innovation, economic 
growth, and job creation. By 2013, MRI became a separate ministry again with a budget 
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of $911 million. The new VCs funds and management partnerships analyzed below are 
financed by MRI and housed within this ministry. Getting it right when it comes to 
public-private partnerships is not guaranteed in the initial design. A purely functionalist 
explanation does not support this outcome as the implementation process produced 
unforeseen outcomes.  
Ontario’s MRI responded in 2010 to tight credit markets, increased competition from 
emerging markets and the province’s previous unsuccessful attempts to transition to a 
knowledge-based economy with a formal bioscience strategy, “Ontario’s Life Sciences 
Commercialization Strategy.” The strategy supports the province’s broader Ontario 
Innovation Agenda and Open Ontario, a five year plan to create jobs and growth in 
Ontario and to position the province as a prime location for knowledge workers. It also 
stresses a comprehensive approach to distinguish itself in a dense, globally competitive  
environment (MRI, 2010). 
Similar to Quebec and federal policies, the $161 million strategy sought to promote 
greater collaboration among government, academia and industry; attract more MNCs/FDI 
particularly advanced health technologies firms to buy or test new therapies in Ontario; 
and grow the local biotechnology industry to compete against US and global bioscience 
clusters. To do so the province seeks to fill the skills gap by attracting and producing 
leading scientists, facilitate greater collaboration, address the finance challenges and 
increase the Ontario brand globally (MRI, 2010). 
However, strategy implementation is as important as its initial design in creating high 
levels of commitment. For example, in Ontario the prevailing norm when it comes to 
searching for and attracting FDI to redress the decreasing manufacturing base is to 
continue to attract large manufacturing firms that can provide a significant number of 
jobs.
87
 This model is less effective in the bioscience industry, which is heavily reliant on 
small biotechnology start-ups with the potential to grow. This short-term thinking by 
government technocrats is incompatible with the long-term nature of the biotechnology 
industry.  
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The research community supports this focus on greater coordination and breaking 
down of silos to unleash new tacit and formal knowledge. But certain institutes ground 
the approach to a particular scientific area like genomics. Dr. Mark Pznansky, President 
and CEO of Ontario Genomics Institute states that: 
 
We lack not the capacity, but the ability to connect new knowledge to the needs of 
industry and financial resources…Genomics is the foundation of what we’re 
calling the future bio-economy in Canada, which involves all of this nation’s 
economic activity that results from the life sciences. (MediaPlanet, 2013, p. 2) 
 
Furthermore, he becomes more specific when elaborating the nature of the 
coordinative approach indicating that the province needs: 
 
A holistic finance system where government (through proof-of-concept grants), 
industry (through true academia/industry partnerships) and venture capital all 
participate to support the passage of a product through the development pipeline; 
strong regulatory and public policy as well as an efficient tax system that provides 
incentives for companies to thrive in Ontario, and procurement policies where, in 
a reasonable way, a “Buy Ontario” culture is promoted. (MediaPlanet, 2013, p. 2) 
 
This approach emphasizes coordination to generate new knowledge and gain value 
from investments as well as globalizing the province through FDI and knowledge worker 
attraction strategies.  
Industry was learning at the same time when provincial ministries and public research 
organizations were shaping a new bioscience strategy. Industry created new and changed 
existing institutional organizations. But while the social learning process was disruptive, 
it took place when political bargaining was highly fragmented.  
 










Unlike Quebec, Ontario contains two very different bioscience associations, the Life 
Sciences Ontario (LSO) and the Ontario Biotechnology Industry Organization (OBIO), 
each claiming to represent industry. The LSO is the incumbent industry association 
founded in 1989 but renamed the Toronto Biotechnology Initiative in 2010 reflecting a 
geographically expanding membership. 150 organizations from medical technologies and 
agri-food to biochemicals, service providers and universities are now members. The 
organization’s main goal is to promote commercialization throughout the diverse life 
sciences sector.
88
 To establish its legitimacy and role vis-a-vis industry and all levels of 
government LSO claims “Diversity of Members, Unity of Voice.”
89
  
This diversity of membership is coupled with the association’s goal to break silos and 
improve learning: 
 
Everything at LSO involves incorporating different sectors of life science. LSO is 
trying to create a learning opportunity for the different sectors to allow them to 
learn from each other. Maybe the human health sector can learn from the 
agricultural sector in terms of entrepreneurship. LSO is trying to create cross-
fertilization. The association determined that process of integrating across the life 
sciences at an early stage. The vision is there, and we see how the technology can 




In 2013 LSO collaborated with Quebec’s industry association, Biopolis Quebec, to 
produce two joint position papers for the federal government. Like OBIO, this industry 
association also educates policymakers on Ontario’s life sciences industry and its 
economic and social impacts (LSO, 2013). 
This positioning contrasts with OBIO. OBIO was founded in 2008 immediately after 
the global financial crisis when small and medium-sized (SME) biotech firms began to 
search for government financing as they struggled to survive. OBIO established itself in 
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response to TBI at the time, which was perceived to be an “older institution that did not 
keep up” with industry needs especially SMEs.
91
 While LSO’s mission is to be a 
community organization and all-encompassing in terms of membership and bioscience 
areas, OBIO is sharply focused on health technologies and SME growth. But it does rely 
on the membership of large pharmaceutical firms and government agencies.  
Furthermore, each association frames the challenge differently, has developed its own 
strategies, governance structures and working groups, taking lessons learned in the case 
of OBIO from jurisdictions as far as Victoria, Australia and Israel to see which 
institutions may translate effectively to the Ontario context (OBEST, 2011). OBIO’s 
overall goal is to help build Ontario’s bioscience cluster into one that is producing 
innovative products and services and selling them globally, rather than just to the local 
Ontario market through its formulary. Another goal is to create industry stability and to 
reverse the trend of Ontario bioscience firms developing IP in Ontario, selling it overseas 
only to purchase final products at a higher cost. The Executive Director of OBIO captures 
this process: 
 
Ontarians do not reap the benefits of an innovation economy due to the 
underdevelopment of the biosciences industry sector. Our investments in research, 
novel commercial technologies, highly-qualified individuals, and smaller start-up 
corporations are, for the most part, lost to foreign markets. The commercial 
products and services developed from our innovations are then bought back by 
Ontarians (in the form of novel therapeutics, diagnostics, and devices) at 
considerable mark-up. The increased costs are not only a growing burden for tax 
payers, but more importantly, we as Ontarians have not benefited from the 
economic prosperity (jobs and wealth creation) that would result from a strong 
and sustainable domestic biosciences sector. (OBEST, 2011, p. 3) 
 
Furthermore, OBIO defines the problem in two ways. First, it is one of managing 
healthcare costs by enacting fundamental policy reforms to support innovation and 
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growth. Second, the association is reacting to previous policies and experiences. It argues 
the need to rely less on commodities and extraction industries to finance and sustain the 
healthcare system and to make a higher commitment to a knowledge economy. The way 
forward lies in social learning and a more collaborative process, “in identifying and 
correcting past mistakes, adjusting conventional wisdom that has led us astray, learning 
from international best practices and adopting a collaborative approach to create made in 
Ontario solutions” (OBIO, 2012, p. 3). 
 
In 2011 OBIO created the Ontario Bioscience Economic Strategy Team (OBEST) to 
design and implement its plan. It was comprised of  “…all stakeholders in the Ontario 
bioscience community who want to create the conditions for sustainable growth of 
Ontario’s bioscience industry” (OBEST, 2011, p. 2). The six month planning process 
involved the creation of subcommittees with specific roles and tasks including the 
creation nine work plans in support of defined goals.  
Industry led the creation of five plans and was specifically charged with defining the 
industry’s priorities, raising awareness of its potential, creating SME networks, and 
building and attracting “patient” capital. Government-industry partnerships address the 
other four including: identifying and investing in Ontario’s health priorities; clearly 
showing integrity of process; using the province’s procurement process to create and 
drive markets; and changing government incentives in favor of industry. Implicit in 
government’s responsibilities is the assumption that its policy-making fails to include 
industry input in a fair and transparent fashion. This particular strategy reveals that two 
implementation tactics: industry-led and government-partnered implementation. 
Both associations are reacting not only to external forces but also to previous 
industrial policies and institutions that have not kept up with the pace of change. Yet, the 
politics of incumbent versus new institutions fragment the process and force the two 









Table 10 Finance, Skill Development and Corporate Governance 
 Finance Skill Development Corporate Governance 
1st Order – 
Settings 
Biotech R&D spending (US$); R&D tax credit changes Tax Credits – Scientists, Technical 
specialists 
Make or Buy Decision – Amount of 




After 2007 – Companies can acquire the rights to IP 
developed at PROs (similar to Bayh-Dole). 
2010 –Province invests - $500 million annually in basic& 
translational life sciences R&D. 
2014 –$14.6B R&D spending total among all LS groups  - 
biz, gov, hospitals etc. 
2010, no more capital tax on Ontario businesses  
2011 – OBIO proposal to modify gov’t funding programs 
to enable rapid access to and deployment of gov’t funding. 
2008 – 72.8% firms provide training to 
staff but by 2013, only 64.7% of firms did.  
2004 - Apprenticeship Training Tax Credit 
enhanced by 2009 – amount of claim 
doubled ($5k – 10k), training time 
increased from 3 to 4 years, program went 
from temporary to permanent. 
Increasingly external 
Mirrors national changes 
After 2007 
-Ontario Tax Exemption for 
Commercialization (OTEC) – new 
companies. 
2nd Order – 
Techniques 




New gov’t VC & research funds: OVCF, NVCF and 
OETF; fewer private VCs and institutional investors; no 
IPO market; more gov’t VC funds to BDC 
--OBIO – Capital Access Advisory Program (building 
SME capacity) 
-Focus on developing and recruiting 
entrepreneurs, experienced managers 
-Build infrastructure to attract scientists: 
Ontario Research Fund; $114 million 
Global Leadership Round 
in Genomic & Life Sciences 
-Foster scientific talent at the earliest stage 
– youth mentoring opportunities 
 








Core focus shifting (e.g. basic-commercial research, 
niche application areas, niche science areas 




Genomics/health focus competing with broad-based agri-
food tech, environmental; little change in overarching 
goals by government, but industry taken the lead. 
-Greater collaboration 
-Internationalization of networks 
-Greater Interdisciplinarity 
-Coordination; Integration 
-VCs like TVM investing more in 
individual molecules rather than 
companies. 










Did finance institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
  
Different policy communities made incremental changes to both levels and types of 
bioscience finance one year after the GFC. The changes represent a mixed level of 
commitment. Even though government has stepped in to fill some financing gaps left by 
private sector sources leaving, these are not strategic responses with overarching goals 
attached.  
The province increased support for health biotechnology with an emphasis on 
genomics that competed with rival industries in agri-food and environmental 
technologies. Many private VCs and other sources of funds folded at the time. The 
province began to fill this gap by establishing two VC funds, the $205 million Ontario 
Venture Capital Fund LP (OVCF) and the Northleaf Venture Catalyst Fund LG (NVCF) 
jointly with the federal agency, Industry Canada.  
The OVCF invests mostly in “Ontario-based and Ontario-focused venture capital and 
growth equity funds that support innovative, high growth companies.”
92
 This rule 
contrasts with Quebec’s whose funds traditionally have been tied to investment in 
Quebec firms only. But industry prefers untied funding. Quebec is crafting a similar 
argument now especially when there are fewer opportunities yet intense competitive for 
profitable investments globally. The Ontario Capital Growth Corporation (OCGC) was 
established in February 27, 2009 in order to manage the limited partner interests of the 
government in the two VC funds. To ensure well-informed investment decisions OCGS 
contracted two private sector specialists, Covington Capital Corporation and Ernst & 
Young to evaluate applications, administer and monitor co-investments.
93
  
In 2009 the province created the $250 million co-investment fund, Ontario Emerging 
Technologies Fund (OETF), to be managed and operated also by OCGS. This fund, 
similar to the VC funds in Quebec formed earlier in the decade, target three knowledge-
based industries: clean technology; life sciences and health technologies; and digital 
media and ICT. It invests directly in Ontario-based firms in these sectors needing to raise 
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VC and other risk capital. The fund is designed to achieve both government goals of 
investing in sectors of strategic importance to the province and in catalyzing private 
sector capital as well as investor goals of profitably investing in knowledge-based growth 
companies. 
The province is attempting to apply both public and private sector capabilities 
towards financial vehicles designed to reach both firm-level corporate growth goals as 
well as provincial economic development goals. The mechanism also offers an 
opportunity for social learning. These changes represent a shift in paradigm concerning 
the role of the province in leveraging and investing in new technologies and firms. 
Previously, primarily private sector VCs invested in high growth firms and there were a 
number of these VCs operating in Ontario in the early 2000s. However, during the 2008-
2013 period the number of purely private life sciences VC firms has decreased to about 
three or four with Lumira and Genesis Capital as leaders.
94
 Searching for alternatives, 
Ontario began much later than Quebec in establishing public-private VCs. 
In addition to the VC funds, the province established the Ontario Research Fund 
Advisory Board (ORFAB) to review, assess and make recommendations to the Minister 
to fund promising basic research applications and the Early Researcher Award. The board 
is comprised of nine advisors eight of which come from universities representing mostly 
natural sciences and engineering with one social scientist. The board meets six to eight 
times per year to speed project approvals. There are no industry representatives except 
one who straddled both the public and private sectors.
95
 
The configuration of the board indicates that industry has little input, at least through 
these mechanisms, into shaping research agendas, which reflects Ontario’s as well as 
Quebec’s culture of R&D as university R&D not necessarily industry-led. The board 
provides strategic advice to the Minister on the research agenda in support of Ontario’s 
competitiveness goals. The new VC funds are designed to catalyze industry through 
direct firm investments while the research funds are directed towards the universities. 
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In addition to the above changes to conventional sources of funding, government and 
industry are designing completely new types in order to give small start-ups a 
competitive advantage and to prevent them from moving to the U.S. where there are more 
diverse sources of financing. For example, equity-based crowdfunding is of growing 
interest in both Ontario and Quebec. But with new governments come changes. Premier 
McGinty tried to pass legislation creating an angel investor tax credit similar to the highly 
successful rules in British Columbia but the legislation failed after losing the election. 
The ultimate goal from industry’s perspective is to support a growing diversity of capital 
to facilitate bioscience firms at all stages of the value chain. 
 
Did skill development institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
 
Enhancements were made to provincial tax credit programs in response to data 
indicating that firms were investing less in staff training programs during this time. 
Changes to programs were made to attract overseas scientists and to build infrastructure. 
These included the Ontario Research Fund and the $114 million Global Leadership 
Round in Genomics and Life Sciences. To cultivate local scientific talent at earlier stages, 
the government established youth mentoring programs, which paired young students with 
established scientists. 
The nature of skills required for bioscience during the period shifted from a demand 
for senior scientists to a need for technicians, business developers and experienced 
managers. BioTalent Canada reported that the top three critical skills demanded by all 
types and sizes of firms were interpersonal skills, business development and 
management/leadership skills. While the size of the skills gap in 2008 did not change 
substantially by 2013 with the percentage of firms reporting a skills shortage reaching 
33.2 and 34.4, respectively, the nature of skills required did.
96
 But firms were not able to 
offer as much training to employees largely because of scarce financing. 
The data indicates strong institutional complementarity between skill development 
and finance. To solve this problem, Ontario’s provincial strategy involves improving the 
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institutional environment to attract non-local scientists and provide training programs and 
incentives for local talent. Third order changes in overarching goals have been made in 
focusing on greater collaboration, internationalization and interdisciplinarity. Previous 
efforts focused primarily on university R&D and individual firm programs as skill 
development mechanisms. Here the shifting roles of the public and private sectors are 
evident in that government increased support for skills development in new areas while 
the private sector decreased support. 
 
Did corporate governance institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
 
Competing policy communities led to mixed levels of commitment to building 
corporate competencies after the GFC. Government agencies encouraged Ontario firms to 
co-partner on R&D projects with local firms and MNCs to generate knowledge spillovers 
with the hopes of growing the industry locally. Big pharmaceutical firms were 
demanding that small biotechnology companies develop core capabilities in one or two 
areas rather than several. This strategy would prepare them for a merger or acquisition 
and increase the probably of relocation.  
The sale of local start-up, ARIUS, to Roche Pharmaceuticals in 2008 should have 
signaled opportunity for other small biotechnology firms and the province as a whole. 
However, as the financial crisis worsened other small firms found it difficult to secure 
enough private sector financing to continue R&D. As in many other jurisdictions, these 
firms began to look to government for risk finance. Yet in Ontario up until this time little 
existed as most R&D funding was distributed to university. 
Building competence and confronting the “make or buy” decision, in Ontario those 
firms that had at least survived the 2008 financial crisis were searching not only for 
government risk financing, but also co-development partnerships with larger 
pharmaceutical firms and other small biotechnology companies. Increasingly, merging 
with or being acquired by another firm is seen as a form of success. 
This strategy, however, competes with the industry association’s goal as well as the 
provincial government’s whose interests lie in keeping local firms and growing them to 









the challenge. There does appear to be a growing acceptance that some local firms will 
develop assets and sell as an exit strategy but that the province also needs large firms that 
stay.
97
 One interviewee referred to Nortel as an example of a large firm that created a 
number of smaller suppliers and partners. While Nortel was bankrupted in 2013, it is 
argued that it was better to have this global firm in Ontario than not.
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In addition to biotechnology firms, the VCs such as TVM are investing more now in 
small molecules rather than companies themselves. This approach reduces costs and 
focuses investments on the specific asset and gives the VC flexibility in managing the 
process especially in securing resources and meeting deadlines. However, this “project-
focused company,” similar to what we observe in Quebec, may increase transaction costs 




Ontario maintained its mixed commitments to bioscience after the 2008 global 
financial crisis. New policy communities represented conflicting interests that have yet to 
be resolved. Government-industry relations in Ontario are based on traditional norms that 
largely separate and confine roles and responsibilities.  
Governments typically react to industry needs only when industry approaches them. 
While previous experiments with Sector Strategies in the 1990s and more recently with 
the Life Sciences Strategy represent attempts at learning how to learn, and a recognition 
that new modes of public-private sector relations can be valuable, the province has little 
experience sustaining such approaches. Furthermore, the perception from industry is that 
there is a “zero-sum” attitude still among government, industry and universities rather 
than positive-sum relationships needed for industries such as biotechnology. Unlike most 
industries, bioscience firms in Ontario are demanding a stronger government role in 
helping to fill the financing and skills gap as well as creating a supportive business 
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environment. But actors are still trying to figure out who takes on what roles and 
responsibilities. 
Understanding the complexity and changing nature of roles and relationships among 
the triple helix of industry, government and universities is a challenge faced by each 
stakeholder group. For example, despite the many institutional changes in the area of 
provincial risk finance and in some tax credit schemes, the perception is that government 
lacks the knowledge and political will to support industry as it relies on old norms that 
defined R&D investment as investing solely university R&D, not industry. One 
interviewee highlighted the difference between Ontario and a leading biotechnology 
cluster, Boston, MA. In Massachusetts, the state’s economic development agency 
manages a $1 billion life sciences fund while the Governor clearly states that it is the role 
of the state to help start-ups evolve and de-risk so that they attract investment (MBT, 
2009).
99
 In Ontario, it is not clear that the province makes such a commitment. This is 
partly an issue of how the life sciences industry is viewed, more as a cost to the 
healthcare system rather than an investment in technological innovation as a driver of 
economic development and ultimately economic contributor.
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During this period industry structure was fragmented along both functional lines and 
diverging interests. Further exacerbating the problem is the competition between two 
industry voices, LSO and OBIO, with neither institutional organization able to coordinate 
these interests and negotiate with government. Industry understands that no single change 
in rules will successfully alter Ontario’s path dependent trajectory towards fragmentation. 
While there is talk of coordinating stakeholder interests around shared goals such as 
generating and attracting continuous risk finance, skilled workers in specific science and 
engineering disciplines as well as service areas, and more medium-sized bioscience firms 
strong enough to attract potential FDI as anchors, the approaches are fragmented.  
One interviewee noted that Ontario does have an industrial success story from which 
it can learn.
101
 Sixty years ago the province identified natural resources as a source of 
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economic potential. It was underfunded but represented high risk similar to 
biotechnology. After a period of providing R&D tax credits the province paved the way 
for firms to list on the Toronto Stock Exchange, which is currently the largest exchange 
in the world for natural resources. This lesson learned is used as part of an argument for 
creatively designing similar structures for today’s high-risk industries like biotechnology. 
Despite the impressive number of firms, employees and discoveries as well as globally 
recognized bioscience research infrastructure and institutional changes during this period, 
government, industry and universities have not yet combined disruptive social learning 
with coordinated bargaining processes. Having said this, through regular briefings and 
annual public conferences, industry is taking the lead and beginning to educate both 
elected officials and technocrats on the nature of the bioscience industry and its potential 




4.4.1 Empirical Findings 
 
Traditional industries underpin Quebec’s and Ontario’s economies as they struggle to 
reinvent themselves towards knowledge-based economies. Even though both contain 
large biomedical research facilities, invest significant amounts in R&D and are home to 
biotech and pharmaceutical organizations, they maintain different commitment levels 
toward bioscience.  
Quebec built social learning structures including a strong KOST prior to the financial 
crisis that helped the province adjust and maintain its high commitment. Ontario’s legacy 
of neoliberal economic approaches, while successful in other industries, is less suited to 
the needs of biotechnology within the context of rapid innovation, increased scientific 
complexity, scarce financial and human resources. The province maintained a mixed 
commitment to bioscience as multiple policy communities fought for resources and 
legitimacy.  
Quebec and Ontario share several themes. First, they struggled to fill the skills and 









between private firms and between firms and public research organizations through joint 
projects. Both argue that governance mechanisms must embrace coordination to manage 
the increased complexity of science and industry. The commitment requires greater 
industry - government social learning about problems, potential solutions, industry trends 
and processes. It also requires greater integration of organizations and approaches. But in 
Ontario it is difficult to overcome cultural norms against public-private sector 
coordination. In Quebec the approach fits well with cultural traditions even though 
coordinated negotiations can still involve conflicting interests. 
In finance both acknowledge the need for more diversified sources to fill gaps along 
the entire product development value chain. Instead of just government grants and some 
VC funding, the provinces advocate expanding angel and big pharmaceutical firm 
investments as well as and a stronger stock exchange. Quebec invested first in 
government-backed, privately managed VC firms. Ontario did so only recently and just 
after the global financial crisis whereas in the past the province relied solely on privately 
funded and managed VCs. 
In skill development both provinces support an interdisciplinary approach toward 
R&D projects and university degree programs to solve the most complex yet potential 
high reward problems. Both provinces also cite the need for entrepreneurs, skilled 
managers and business development staff. 
Corporate governance in both provinces has changed whereby small biotechnology 
firms are just beginning to form more alliances with big pharmaceutical companies to 
secure the much needed financing for drug and device development. Big pharmaceutical 
firms and VCs are also acquiring the small biotechnology companies and increasingly 
invest in the NCE itself, preferring to build project-focused companies especially in 
Quebec. 
The governments of Quebec and Ontario established the Quebec-Ontario Life 
Sciences Corridor to leverage resources and compete globally. This corridor is a physical 
space that connects both provinces and is comprised of the majority of the province’s 
bioscience assets - financing, talent and infrastructure. 
 










I evaluated the Quebec and Ontario cases while testing the three hypotheses. The Quebec 
case supports Hypothesis 1: A strong KOST in place prior to a global financial crisis is 
likely to maintain a high commitment strategy afterwards.. The Ontario case supports 
Hypothesis 2: A weak KOST in place prior to a global financial crisis is likely to 
maintain a mixed commitment strategy afterwards. Neither case supported Hypothesis 3: 
When no KOST is present prior to a global financial crisis a low commitment strategy is 
likely to persist afterwards. 
Quebec took a strategic approach towards developing its bioscience industry both 
prior to and after the 2008 global financial crisis. Before the crisis a few strong KOSTS 
were present in three bioscience clusters including Montreal, Quebec City and 
Sherbrooke. After the crisis BioQuebec and the Ministry of Economy, Innovation and 
Export helped to facilitate a meta-network of KOSTS. Organizations within the network 
contributed to the province’s new bioscience strategy while continuing to design and 
implement their individual strategies. 
Quebec engaged in a coordinative process in response to a sudden decrease in 
industry size and financing. The KOST regained consensus around industry and 
economic development goals by deliberating regularly. The learning and negotiation 
process generated a new understanding of stakeholder interests and preferences as well as 
how to frame challenges and opportunities. It produced new goals focusing on 
personalized medicine and technology commercialization. The results are changed but 
complementary institutions facilitating collaboration projects, interdisciplinary training, 
alliances among firms, and government and university R&D. Quebec’s tradition of 
public-private sector coordination around shared industrial development goals created 
learning structures that enabled the province to quickly respond to the financial crisis. It 
adapted to new institutions while maintaining institutional complementarity.  
Ontario suffers from old industrial structures framed within a “states versus markets” 
mindset applied to bioscience. A weak KOST existed prior to the 2008 global financial 
crisis led by the Toronto Biotechnology Initiative, the province’s industry association at 
the time, as it adapted to capture opportunities offered by the new biotechnology. After 









incumbent industry association reorganized to encompass a broader societal membership 
from students to large pharmaceutical firms. At the same time a new industry association 
established itself speaking for a missing constituency, small and medium-sized 
biotechnology firms stuck without financing or much needed commercialization 
expertise. The two associations now compete instead of coordinate to represent industry 
through a single voice.  
While the competition has increased stakeholder representation and raised awareness 
of problems specific to small and medium-sized biotechnology firms, it weakened 
relations with the lead government ministries at the time. These included the Ministry of 
Economic Development, Trade and Employment and the Ministry of Research and 
Innovation. Government views this fragmentation as inhibiting the ability of Ontario to 
reach its potential. Not only does this fragmentation slow knowledge spillovers among 
bioscience firms internally, but externally it sends mixed signals to potential FDI. The 
ministries are now incentivizing the industry associations to either coordinate or merge. 
These multiple policy communities have engaged in disruptive social learning as they 
strive to capture the benefits of biotechnology but the fragmented nature of the 
bargaining process continues to steer the province along a mixed level of commitment to 
the bioscience industry.  
In addition to the strength of a KOST and multiple policy communities, other 
variables help explain different levels of and changes in commitment strategies. These 
include factor endowments, size, rival industries, national institutions, and previous 
decisions and events (path dependence). Quebec and Ontario each produce leading 
scientists through their respective university systems, PROs and hospitals. This abundant 
factor endowment has led the provinces to continue to invest in university science and 
technology degrees and R&D up until the global financial crisis. But skills gaps in 
commercialization, engineering and translational research have slowed progress in each 
province as they learn how to address these weaknesses.  
Quebec and Ontario are large, industrialized provinces. Rival industries like 
automotive, plastics, aerospace, wood products, textiles and others compete with the 
growth industries of bioscience and information communications technologies for 









R&D and in science and technology industries like aerospace, bioscience and ICT.  The 
province and the federal government are embracing the “bioeconomy” concept where 
bioscience cuts across several industries creating a multiplier effect on the economy. It 
can not only create highly skilled jobs but produce less expensive, more effective 
therapies and technologies. Ontario refrains from formal industrial policies preferring to 
let industry lead. But industry is fragmented and has created different strategies  based on 
competing interests leading to mixed levels of commitment. 
National institutions in finance and skill development are distributed throughout the 
provinces. These range from R&D financing to tax credits for skills training within firms 
to Centers of Excellence in research. This distributed system is coordinated with 
provinces and city-level bioscience clusters. However, Quebec has been more strategic 
than Ontario in leveraging federal IPR and financial resources. 
The global financial crisis of 2008 negatively affected the bioscience industry in both 
provinces. Since finance is crucial to R&D and innovation in biotechnology we would 
expect firms tied to finance to fail, be acquired, merge with large pharmaceutical firms, 
or develop alliances to secure needed financing. Evidence from these two cases supports 
this claim. We can also infer that Ontario maintained its mixed commitment partially 
because of the crisis. But it does not explain why Quebec remains highly committed to 
the industry. 
Previous decisions and events impacted the paths that each province took to establish 
a bioscience industry. They help to explain why Quebec created a strong KOST and 
maintained its high commitment and why Ontario maintains its mixed commitment.  The 
next chapter compares the four Atlantic Provinces and their efforts to create 




















ATLANTIC CANADA:  
 




Small, aspiring bioscience regions face distinct economic challenges. Scarce human 
and financial resources, isolation from markets, weak capacity to engage in R&D and 
commercialize discoveries all constrain the Atlantic Canadian provinces’ ability to 
establish and sustain a bioscience industry. Despite these weaknesses, New Brunswick 
(NB), Newfoundland (NL), Nova Scotia (NS) and Prince Edward Island (PEI) are 
restructuring their economies to compete globally by balancing traditional industries with 
knowledge-based ones.  
In these provinces many of the traditional industries upon which their economies have 
depended for decades including agriculture and fisheries form the basis for new product 
and technological development as they progress along the value-chain. They also 
underpin bioscience creating a collection of resource-based R&D and product 
development activities in functional foods, nutraceuticals, agricultural biotechnology, 
marine biotechnology, pharmaceuticals as well as medical devices and contract research 
organizations (CROs).    
While the Atlantic Canadian provinces share common histories, institutions and 
infrastructures, at the micro level they commit differently to the bioscience industry. I 
argue that even the smallest of provinces like PEI can begin to chart a path towards a 
sustainable bioscience industry. Its strong knowledge-oriented strategy team (KOST) has 
created and implemented a holistic, high commitment strategy. And it is not always the 
case that the largest province, Nova Scotia, with more resources will easily sustain high 
commitments. The province has struggled to maintain its industry’s early growth spurred 
by individual firm strategies and selective government interventions. A weak KOST 
helps to explain Nova Scotia’s mixed commitment strategy. 
Overcoming path-dependent strategies that lead to industrial and economic decline is 









iterative bargaining help explain variation in commitment strategies. These different 
commitment levels and changes in them offer implications for industry development. 
 The four Atlantic provinces are less developed regions within Canada. We should 
therefore expect no significant commitment to the bioscience industry or changes in it 
after the 2008 global financial crisis given the regions’ scarce resources, small size and 
income levels below the national average. The evidence contradicts expectations. The 
presence and strength of a KOST, competing policy communities, different natural 
resources, rival industries and national institutions explain varying levels of and changes 
in commitments to bioscience.  
PEI represents a least likely case. Its small size and limited resources have historically 
been liabilities. Individual decision-makers with experience in government, the 
bioscience industry and university research led the creation of a strong KOST and a niche 
strategy prior to the 2008 global financial crisis. High, holistic commitment levels 
continue today. The disruptive nature of social learning combined with a coordinated 
negotiation process underpins the industry’s success. 
Individual firm strategies in Nova Scotia have coordinated economic activity in 
bioscience despite early attempts to develop an industry-led strategy. The industry 
association facilitates information, best practices and networking rather than designs and 
mobilizes sustained support for a strategy perceived to be “picking winners”. By 2014 
Nova Scotia began to change its approach calling for a fundamentally different way of 
governing its bioscience industry. It calls for a collaborative approach across levels of 
government and sectors that requires changing attitudes and investing in necessary skills. 
This new strategy places a higher value on coordination and social learning among public 
and private sector organizations compared with past policies. But it is too early to 
determine its effectiveness. A weak KOST maintains a mixed commitment strategy.  
Newfoundland’s history of “catching up” to other provinces in terms of economic and 
social development combined with its discovery of offshore oil and gas has detracted 
from significant investment in R&D and knowledge-based industries. While policy 
communities developed over time, the political process was fragmented and pulled in 
different directions by competing industrial, economic and health interests. The result is a 









Fragmented, government-led policy communities prevented high level commitments 
to bioscience in New Brunswick. The province increased investment, created new finance 
vehicles, began to balance innovation and support for value-added industries, and called 
for internationalization of the province. But the province has not developed “learning-by-
learning” structures that aggregate interests among bioscience stakeholders, facilitate 
regular deliberations that change strategy in light of new information and create 
competencies along the way. Most institutional changes are the result of reviewing past 
policies and making incremental changes to them. With government leading, there is little 
consensus from industry around goals and implementation of them. The province moved 
from low to mixed levels of commitment to bioscience before and after the 2008 global 
financial crisis similar to Newfoundland. The rest of this chapter evaluates each case in 
detail. 
 
5.2 Research Questions, Design and Method 
 
The questions posed in this chapter address more the reaction to the 2008 financial 
crisis than the technological discoveries of the 1980s. Rather than assuming that 
provinces developed explicit responses, I ask did they change or create specific economic 
strategies, policies and institutions to shore up knowledge-based industries? Since the 
provinces are small and few have mature bioscience industries, were these affected at all 
by the sudden scarcity of financial resources globally? If the provinces were affected, 
how and under what conditions did public and private sector actors design institutions to 
solve the problem of expanding the bioscience industry’s opportunity structure while 
simultaneously de-risking investments in it? Why do these regions develop and change 
levels of commitment to bioscience despite operating within the same national political 
economy and sharing similar histories? 
Using a most similar systems approach, this chapter compares four Atlantic Canadian 
provinces – Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Prince 
Edward Island – and their attempts to develop and implement bioscience industry 









rural bioscience regions that are generalizable to similar regions in other countries. It also 
provides a more complete picture of Canada’s changing bioscience industry. 
The research continues the structured, focused approach to compare case studies over 
time and asks the same questions of each. Data was collected from semi-structured 
interviews, scholarly papers, policy reports, government statistics and other public 
documents. CEOs, researchers, industry association leaders and managers as well as 
policymakers within both provincial and national government support organizations were 
interviewed. The study also draws on the author’s many years of international trade, 
foreign direct investment and firm-level strategy work in these provinces. 
Section three compares industry innovation and growth among the provinces as 
background from 1997 – 2007 using descriptive statistics. Bioscience industry statistics 
are notoriously difficult to measure and compare. Each jurisdiction selects data that 
portrays their industry positively in order to compete for FDI and resources. For example, 
while some provinces attempt to distinguish between core biotechnology firms and those 
that use biotechnology, others do not and even include firm and employee counts in 
healthcare services. The difference can be hundreds of employees versus thousands. This 
research separates out measures of core biotech firms, number of employees and other 
indicators from the broader healthcare industry. This section also helps facilitate 
controlled comparisons of provincial strategies and institutions by highlighting shared 
federal institutions.  
Section four briefly evaluates the innovation systems and evolution of strategies and 
institutions in each province up to 2007. This part necessarily lays the groundwork for 
understanding whether path dependence or the diffusion of ideas and institutions 
eventually permeated individual provincial responses to the 2008 financial crisis. Section 
five then examines in more detail the role of policy communities and KOSTs as they 
learn and bargain for each province’s choice of commitment strategies in reaction to the 
2008 financial crisis. Section six concludes. 
 










As indicated in Table 1, since the 1980s, the bioscience industry in the Atlantic 
Canadian provinces has grown in terms of the number of companies, revenue, R&D 
spending, number of employees and new product development. By investing in the 
necessary infrastructure and providing critical institutional support, the number of firms 
has increased, for example, in Nova Scotia from 28 to 50 during 2002-2009, in New 
Brunswick from six to 25 during 1997- 2007 and in Prince Edward Island from 15 to 29 
during 2005 - 2009.  
But sustaining growth has proven more difficult. While there are several arguments as 
to why, from the lack of diversified sources of risk finance to a scarcity of human 
resources with requisite skills and experience commercializing technologies, I argue that 
the causes are deeper. A lack of understanding of the industry by government, 
fragmented industrial structures, few institutions that facilitate social learning among a 
broader range of industry stakeholders and often conflictual bargaining processes pitting 
competing interests between traditional and knowledge-based industries all precede other 
specific challenges.  
 
5.3.1 Structure and Nature of the Industry and Markets 
 
The bioscience industry in the Atlantic Canadian provinces is comprised of a 
relatively small number of diverse firms including privately owned start-ups, a handful of 
anchor companies, industry associations, provincial and federal research organizations, 
hospitals, technology incubators and economic development agencies. Government 
finances R&D in most provinces. However, in Nova Scotia the region’s largest cluster, 
the private sector finances most R&D. The majority of its products are exported as 
functional foods, nutraceuticals and pharmaceuticals. Those firms that have moved 
beyond the R&D stage to commercializing technologies export most products given the 
small regional market.  
One or two large firms such as Novartis, Biovectra, Genzyme, Acadian Seaplants 
Limited, Abbott, Pfizer Canada, and Cooke Aquaculture anchor each bioscience cluster. 









CRO services to in-licensing and out-licensing of new technologies. The diversity of 
relationships represents a variety of growth strategies. 
Below are bioscience industry statistics up to 2007 for each of the four Atlantic 
Canadian provinces. Each province developed significant yet different bioscience assets 
and each grew during this period. These resources coupled with federal and provincial 
support for infrastructure and R&D funding bolstered capabilities. Private sector 
investment drives R&D intensity in Nova Scotia, which is much lower in the remaining 
provinces.  
Despite these relatively positive statistics an underlying skepticism and concern for 
the lack of bioscience industry sustainability exists in each province except PEI.
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 NS, 
NB and NL claimed that they had not yet created a true bioscience cluster, which reveals 
that all four provinces seek this goal. It also signifies that cluster theory is permeating 
many federal and provincial bioscience strategies. 
The next section briefly analyzes the evolution of bioscience commitment strategies 
in Atlantic Canada up to the 2008 global financial crisis. These provinces started much 
later than Quebec and Ontario in capturing the benefits of new biotechnologies so the 
focus is more on changes in the business environment and policy communities. The 
approach provides useful background for a deeper examination of responses to the 2008 
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 Conculsions based on interviews with industry stakeholders and analysis of official government and 









Table 11 Atlantic Canadian Provinces Bioscience Statistics (2005/7) 
Province New Brunswick Newfoundland & Labrador Nova Scotia Prince Edward Island 
Population 754,914 526,977 942,688 146,283 
     
Core Research/Industry 
Areas 
Plant science, forestry, 




digital health, CROs, medical 
technology 
Bioactives with applications to 
human, marine, animal health 
     
# Patent 122 N/A 307 (222 Industry; 85 Research 
Institutions) 
N/A 
# Bioscience firms 6 to 25 from 1997- 2007 20 28 to 50 from 2002-2009 15 to 30 from 2005 – 2009 
Corporate Annual Sales 
  (US$ million) 
110 million in bioscience 
 




16 million (medical devices; omega 
3 oils) 
181 million 61 million 
Industry Employment 120 Full time 
415 Seasonal 
(2,000 direct + indirect in 2009) 
533 1,100 750 (Industry 500; Research 
Institutions 250) 
# Products (1997-2007) 210 (plus 102 in pipeline) N/A 480 (plus 306 in pipeline) N/A 
# Universities with 
Bioscience Degrees 
 
3 1 8 2 
Research Institutes (Fed + 
Private) 
10 1 20 18 
Research Employees 788 840 2,365 250 
R&D - Value of research 
projects 
N/A 192 million (137 industry; 55 
Research Institutes) 
163 million (53 Industry; 110 
Research Institutes) 
134 million (38 Industry; 96 
Research Institutes) 
Source: Collected by the author from Statistics Canada, asset maps and overviews developed by the bioscience industry associations in New Brunswick, Newfoundland & 










5.4 Bioscience Industry and Strategy Evolution: 1980 – 2007 
 
5.4.1 Industry Evolution 
 
Technological changes during the 1980s – 2007 affected the four Atlantic Canadian 
provinces, historically the poorest, smallest and most remote of Canadian regions, differently 
compared to the wealthier, industrialized provinces of Quebec and Ontario. Atlantic Canada 
relied more on traditional agriculture, marine and food related industries for economic growth. 
Each province benefits from the same federal economic institutions such as the Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency (ACOA) that delivers programs and funding designed to help them “catch 
up” to the rest of Canada. Despite these similarities, each province pursued a different path 
towards transitioning to a knowledge economy. These paths were influenced by each province’s 
previous policies as much as their efforts to access lessons learned from other jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, while benefiting from these formal federal and provincial programs, other 
stakeholder groups including industry associations, individual firms and the universities 
developed their own strategies.  
The key challenge during the 1980s and 1990s for Atlantic Canada was, given constraints on 
natural and human resources, how to create the capacity to learn both within and among 
government agencies, firms and the university. Alongside investing in physical assets like new 
research labs and technology incubators as well as providing R&D financing, creating the assets 
and the mechanisms that facilitate how and what to learn about the economic benefits of science-
based industries and how to translate scientific discoveries into marketable products leading to 
highly skilled jobs and wealth creation was also necessary. But entrenched, traditional interests 
in agriculture and the fisheries combined with weak understanding of the bioscience industry 
challenged fundamental economic restructuring.  
To sustain economic development, the Atlantic Canadian region during this period relied 
heavily on a combination of federal government transfer payments through ACOA, improved 
productivity in traditional industries and R&D and infrastructure investment in knowledge-based 









lower rather than higher commitment to knowledge-based industries as a source of technological 
innovation and economic development. 
It was not until around the time of the 2008 financial crisis that some provinces began to 
make higher-level commitments toward the bioscience industry and to knowledge-based 
industries generally. The financial crisis created a sense of urgency to do something in the face 
of increasingly scarce resources and global competition across the economy. I argue that while 
Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia established bioscience strategies prior to 2008, these 
formed part of a larger knowledge-based industrial growth plan targeting multiple industries. 
Furthermore, only Prince Edward Island established, implemented and regularly monitored and 
evaluated a formal bioscience strategy beyond the crisis. The overviews below describe and 
analyze each province’s bioscience assets and industrial structure. 
 
5.4.1.1 New Brunswick 
 
New Brunswick’s bioscience industry grew between 1997 and 2007. Bioscience in the 
province stems from its traditional industries including marine, agriculture and forestry. Areas of 
innovation within these niches include plant science, potato development, native berries, and 
aquaculture including the introduction of “green” fish therapies, fish brood stock, new fish 
species, and crop-specific biofuel technologies. The majority of biotechnology firms in New 
Brunswick are small. Some are innovative while most conduct R&D through government grants. 
Acknowledging the critical role that anchor firms play in New Brunswick’s innovation system, 




McCain Foods and the Irving Company anchor the bioscience industry. McCain Foods is a 
multi-billion dollar company with core competencies in agriculture and notably is a global 
supplier of French fries. The firm leads New Brunswick’s potato innovation cluster. Over 75 
companies and research organizations engage in research and commercialization projects. The 
Irving Company owns 75 per cent of New Brunswick’s forests and is viewed as a major steward 
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of the province’s natural resources. Despite these resources the industry remains fragmented with 
little social learning occurring. No bioscience industry association existed during the period to 
aggregate interests, create consensus around goals, tasks and responsibilities and collaborate with 
government on strategy and resources.  
 
5.4.1.2 Newfoundland and Labrador 
 
 An island jurisdiction located in the eastern most point of North America, the 
Newfoundland and Labrador bioscience industry comprised 20 firms. Activities included niche 
areas of genomics, marine biotechnology, aquaculture, and health information technology. These 
three application areas build on the province’s long reliance on the sea for economic growth 
opportunities. In addition, its founder population 98 percent of which is traced back to 
immigrants originating from England and Ireland during the 1700s provides a competitive 
advantage in the area of human genomics. This population carries genes associated with common 
diseases like diabetes. Since the island jurisdiction is “genetically isolated,” it is easier to identify 
these genes that can be useful in developing therapies (Rahman et al., 2003, p. 167). University 
researchers at Memorial University continue to lead this research and collaborate with similar 
jurisdictions like Iceland.  
 Commercializing discoveries and attracting FDI were enormous hurdles during this time 
despite these strengths. Federal and provincial governments primarily financed university 
research even though disbursements through the Atlantic Innovation Fund to individual firms 
continued. No bioscience industry association or anchor firm existed during this time. Competing 
industries including offshore oil and gas shifted attention away from knowledge-based industry 
development. 
 
5.4.1.3 Nova Scotia 
 
Nova Scotia specializes in disease diagnosis, treatment and prevention, marine biotech, 
bioproducts, functional food and nutraceuticals, and medical technology. R&D is conducted both 
within firms as well as in research institutes from the National Research Council Institute for 









in 1983 by a scientist turned entrepreneur, which produces diagnostic coagulated reagents and 
controls to test blood samples; Acadian Seaplants; and, Ocean Nutrition Canada as well as many 
smaller firms in either product-ready or R&D stages. Overall, the province’s bioscience industry 
serves the global market given local market scale limitations. The industry produces and exports 
over US$80 million in functional foods and nutraceuticals, US$55 million in pharmaceuticals, 
$25 million in agricultural bio products, and US$20 million in medical diagnostics. Medical 
device manufacturers, clinical research organizations and bioinformatics/software product 
exports are minimal (BioNova, 2007). 
Nova Scotia developed industry partnerships in the early 1990s to capture the opportunity to 
create a bioscience industry. From the beginning it was industry, not government agencies that 
mobilized itself up until 2005 when asset maps were completed but no strategy was developed. 
 
5.4.1.4 Prince Edward Island 
 
Prince Edward Island’s bioscience cluster includes bioactives-based research, product 
development and commercialization for human, animal and fish health and nutrition. Its 2005 
strategy outlined specific areas of focus and goals that were developed through participatory 
governance led by the government and transferred to the PEI BioAlliance industry association. 
Explicit goals included increased private sector employees and revenue by 2010. By 2009 70% 
of bioscience revenue was still derived from government grants through specialized R&D 
financing programs (S. Casper, Krause J., MacNevin A., 2010).  
In response, government has acted as a platform for which mostly small firms conduct both 
basic and applied research. Larger firms like Biovectra, Genzyme, Chemaphor and Stirling 
Products demonstrated differing levels of local and global network connectedness based on how 
reliant their products were on local strengths including natural health products and some 
pharmaceuticals for animals and humans. This condition is due primarily to the historical R&D 
strength of PEI’s Veterinary College, local agricultural and marine resources as well as 
subsequent interest from foreign investors for which these companies depend.  
The above overviews indicate that each province developed significant bioscience assets and 









choices in terms of what areas of bioscience to invest, develop skills and how to growth the 
industry either through local firm and FDI support or both. 
 
5.4.2 Strategy Evolution 
 
It was not until the middle to late 1990s that provinces like Prince Edward Island and Nova 
Scotia along with industry associations and their universities began to coordinate and develop 
strategies to transition towards a knowledge-based economy. And it was not until the mid-2000s 
that only one province, Prince Edward Island, began to design and implement a transformative 
bioscience cluster development strategy. The table below chronicles key strategies, governance 
organizations, individuals and triggers during this period. 
Prince Edward Island’s Premier, Robert Ghiz supported the new focus on strategies favoring 
knowledge-based industries: 
 
As a single community, working together on big goals and new ideas, Prince Edward 
Island is poised to begin a new and innovative chapter…The status quo is unacceptable 
because yesterday’s path neglects our province’s advantages, strengths and possibilities. 
(Mayne, 2005, p. 3) 
 
As a result, the number of firms, new skills and institutions grew significantly as well as a 
more responsive labor market associated with new university degree programs in microbiology. 
Previous bioscience growth in PEI was very incremental though initial success in the 1980s was 
led by Dr. Regis Duffy who left the University of PEI to found BioVectra, now PEI’s leading 
bioscience firm.  
Nova Scotia’s growth up until 2007 was largely led by individual firms, networking 
assistance from the industry association, BioNova, and finance from its VC organization, 
Innovacorp, while provincial and national government partners largely maintained established 
R&D grant, tax and market access programs. And even though a provincial asset map was 









with suspicion, not wanting them to “pick winners.”
104
 While Nova Scotia overall sells more new 
products, its bioscience growth was driven by existing firm expansion through sales to export 
markets rather than through the establishment of new firms (BioNova, 2007). Nova Scotia 
established institutions and governance organizations over time beginning in the early 1990s up 
to 2007, but individual firms sustain growth through their own strategies, alliances and access to 
labor, finance and markets.   
During this period, the bioscience industry in New Brunswick was fragmented and involved 
no real province or industry-led bioscience strategy. Despite no formal strategy, application-
specific bioscience clusters have established themselves in different regions of the province, 
from marine bioscience in the Acadian Peninsula to plant bioscience in the Fredericton-River 
Valley, over time. Large, “home-grown” anchor firms in forestry such as the Irving Company 
and in agriculture including McCains have led this growth. In addition, federal programs 
including IRAP R&D grants and a single provincial initiative, the New Brunswick Innovation 
Fund, have contributed to more effective financial institutions. And the industry association, 
BioAtlantech, now known as Bio New Brunswick (BioNB) is showing signs of mobilizing 
resources to support research and commercialization particularly of products derived from the 
province’s natural resources. However, there has been little social learning up until now other 
than through an informal network of bioscience specialists in both the public and private sectors 
who meet and communicate infrequently.
105
 
Newfoundland’s bioscience industry was also fragmented and comprised primarily of 
university research with just a few small bioscience firms. Social learning can be characterized 
as incremental and the political process of choosing among alternative economic development 
strategies was fragmented. While the province has developed general economic development 
strategies, touching on bioscience among other industries, during this period a more formal 
bioscience policy community did not exist nor did the province produce a specific strategy in 
coordination with industry. The province’s capitol, St. John’s, includes the only university, 
Memorial University along with most firms and the important Newfoundland Center for Health 
Information. While the province established BioEast, its bioscience industry association in the 
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early 2000s, this institution was largely unsuccessful and later folded into the Newfoundland 
Association of Technology Industries (NATI), a more broad-based high technology industry 
association. Newfoundland’s commitment to developing bioscience was low during this period. 
Finally, the majority of firms derived revenue from federal and provincial R&D grants from 
the NRC, ACOA and the province’s economic development agency, the Department of 
Innovation, Business and Rural Development (IBRD). During this time, Newfoundland did not 
create or change many bioscience institutions related to finance skill development or corporate 









Table 12 Governance Organization, Policy and Key Individuals by Province (Pre-2008) 
Province Governance Organizations Policy Key Individuals 
Prince Edward Island 2005 – PEI BioAlliance established as 
catalyst mobilizing other national, 
provincial and private sector entities 
2005 - Island Prosperity Program 
1990s – First coordination effort: 
“Belvedere life sciences group” – 
Public/private partnership 
1999 – Knowledge Economy strategy 
2005 - Strategy for PEI Bioscience 'Cluster Development'; 
Funding for scale-ups; Building of biocommons facility –
research, production; Bioscience Human Resource Strategy; 
Dr. David Mayne, former Deputy Minister, Innovation 
and Advanced Learning, former Lead Scientist at PEI’s 
NRC - INH 
Wade Mclauchlan, current PEI Premier, former 
University of PEI President. Supporter Island Prosperity 
strategy 
Dr. Regis Duffy – former UPEI Professor – Founder, 
BioVectra – first successful bioscience firm in province 
Rory Francis – former Deputy Minister in several PEI 
gov’t departments; Executive Director PEI BioAlliance 
non-profit network of bioscience organizations 
New Brunswick BioAtlantech (federally and provincially 
financed) 
Business New Brunswick, Industry Canada, 
Department of Fisheries, Agriculture 
Largely top-down/federal strategy 





IBRD – Gov’t Econ Dev. Agency 
NATI – Technology Industry Assoc. 
(absorbs BioEast industry assoc. founded in 
early 2000s) 
2008 - First coordination effort: “Ramada 
group” breaking silos in health IT. 
1996 - NL Centre for Health Information 
No written strategy, but do have goals 
 
Health information network - 1996 
 
Craig Dobbin (Craig L. Dobbin Genetics Research 
Centre, MUM) 
Nova Scotia Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency 
InNOVAcorp, the National Research 
Council, Institute for Marine Biosciences, 
Nova Scotia Business Inc. and the Nova 
Scotia Office of Economic Development 
2005 – Back to individual organizations 
facilitating growth 
2000 – Life Sciences Development Assoc. 
1997 – Life Sciences Industry Partnership 
1993 – First coordination effort: BioNova 
Biotech Working Group 
2005 - Mission accomplished. LSDA to close. New asset 
map completed.  No new province-level strategy/policy. 
Firm-led growth with BioNova and InNOVAcorp facilitating 
finance, technical assistance, access to markets and networks 
2000 – accelerate growth with new development plan & 
federal/provincial funding 
1997 - link scientists, business partners, universities, and 
government agencies in the biotech industry 
1993 - Initial establishment of industry vision & stakeholders 
N/A 











The above analysis uncovers the evolution of different bioscience industries, governance 
structures and strategies among the Atlantic Canadian provinces between the 1980s and 2007. 
Despite these differences they all contain anchor organizations such as federal or provincial 
government agencies, university medical schools and science departments, industry associations, 
FDI or individual homegrown firms and relied significantly on government R&D grants.  
Prince Edward Island created and maintained a bioscience strategy driven by a strengthening 
KOST. Industry led Nova Scotia’s early success as it mobilized stakeholders and created a 
bioscience strategy. But by 2005 individual firm strategies guided industry with the mindset that 
government should not “pick winners”. In both provinces enlightened individuals with science, 
government and industry experience led strategy. New Brunswick and Newfoundland struggled 
and maintained low commitment levels despite investments in infrastructure, R&D and pockets 
of success from plant science to marine biotechnology. Competing policy communities 
prevented holistic and even mixed levels of commitment to bioscience. 
 
5.5 The 2008 Global Financial Crisis: A Change in Commitment Strategies? 
 
 After the 2008 global financial crisis, PEI maintained a high commitment to its 
bioscience industry while Nova Scotia maintained its mixed commitment. New Brunswick and 
Newfoundland both made changes to finance and skill development but neither took a holistic 
approach with new overarching goals guiding it. Both provinces shifted from a low commitment 
to mixed commitment strategy. 
5.5.1 Problem-Focused Approach: Balancing Traditional and Knowledge-Based Industries 
 
 
The problem in Atlantic Canadian provinces post-2008 financial crisis was less about the 
shock’s immediate effect on access to finance and more on how to balance growth, diversify 
finance and commercialize technologies. Traditional industries such as forestry, fisheries and 









knowledge-based industries. The challenge was how to diversify sources of risk finance away 
from government-funded R&D toward “angel” investors, government-backed, privately 
managed VCs, partner financing, out-licensing and sales of new technologies and products. 
Similar to Quebec and Ontario smaller provinces struggled to translate basic research into 
commercial technologies. 
Provinces believed that diversification of finance would relieve pressure on government 
budgets and help facilitate industry growth.
106
 The Atlantic provinces began to focus on products 
with shorter times-to-market and entered at different points along the value chain. Larger clusters 
like Quebec and Ontario worried about filling the financing gaps along the entire process of 
discovery, development and distribution of bioscience products.  
Smaller jurisdictions understand they cannot be “all things to all people” and must focus on 
their competitive advantages. Some strategies are relatively successful such as PEI’s focus on 
bioactives with application to human and animal health. Even established biotech regions must 
find their competitive advantage. After 2008 Quebec stakeholders agreed to concentrate on 
personalized medicine. 
In addition to how to create a strategic focus all provinces are concerned that “we’re growing 
them to leave...how much do we support them?”
107
 For example, a NL aquaculture firm was 
purchased by VCs in British Columbia and transferred its R&D and product commercialization 
to that province. FDI is also moving out of Ontario after benefiting from tax credits and other 
incentives over the years. The challenge is how to retain homegrown firms, attract and keep FDI, 
and facilitate spillover effects conducive to growing the industry. 
The data in Table 3 indicates change in bioscience commitment strategies across the three 
institutional areas and all four provinces since the 2008 financial crisis. The data helps to 
understand whether or not finance, skill development and corporate governance rules and norms 
became complementary representing a holistic/high commitment strategy. 
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Table 13 Bioscience Finance, Skill Development and Corporate Governance (Pre/Post-2008 Financial Crisis) 
 Finance Skill Development Corporate Governance 
1st Order – Settings Biotech R&D spending (US$) Tax Credits – Scientists, Technical specialists Make or Buy Decision – Amount of R&D in-house  
New Brunswick ↑Fed/Prov funding–2006 - $1,718,967 - 10.1% 
growth in R&D funding to universities from 1993-
2006; Largest single NBIF invest in bioscience - 
$1m in 2013; ↓Fed funding - ACOA/AIF funds 
74% from 2007-13. 
Provincial credits mostly for university 
researchers/research institutes, not corporate 
researchers/managers 
 




↑Fed/Prov funding -2006 - $5,524,003 - 10.1% 
growth in R&D funding to universities from 1993-
2006; ↑Fed funding– ACOA/AIFfunds 260% from 
2007 – 2013. 
 
Note: fastest growth in fed R&D 
2007 – No provincial S&T skills tax credit. But 
access to federal sources; 2014 - NL R&D Corp 
provides 75% of the salary for a Ph.D. graduate 
in science or engineering. Note: little indication 
that bioscience is targeted 
Mostly in-house (largely unchanged); out-license 
technologies 
Nova Scotia ↑Fed/Prov funding - 2006 - $28,659,659 -10.1% 
growth in R&D funding to universities from 1993-
2006; ↓Fed funding - ACOA/AIF funds 74% from 
2007-13. 
Note: highest amount of Gov’t R&D, but also 
highest private sector 
Pre – 2008 - 15% R&D tax credit 
 
No change in settings 
Mostly in-house (largely unchanged); out-license 
technologies; increased global sales 
Prince Edward Island ↑Fed/Prov funding - 2006 - $804,616 – 
23.8%growth in 
R&D funding to universities 1993 – 2006; ↓Fed 
funding - ACOA/AIF funds 13.5%; ↑ overall R&D 
Invest 48% 2004 - 2011- leveraging private invest 
Note: fastest increase among provinces 
2012 - Specialized Labor Tax Credit on Personal 
Income 
Mostly in-house; increased density of local bioscience 
network; increased number of ties between PEI, 
Canadian and global organizations; Nature of 
relationships have changed to include financing from 
foreign customers, R&D partnerships, sales; increase 
out-license technologies 
2nd Order – 
Techniques 
Diversification of finance sources Program Changes Diversity of R&D models 
New Brunswick 2013 – expansion of existing programs; BUT Few if 
any NBIF VC investment in bioscience firms; Some 
in agriculture/food-related. Mostly digital 
media/ICT applications. 
2013 – 3 New Brunswick Innovation Research 
Chairs, 1 Biosciences, 1 Medical Devices to 
work directly with industry on applications; 
expansion of existing programs 
 
Little change. Mostly individual firms leveraging 
provincial and federal sources of R&D funding. 
 
AIF (ACOA) Funding – requires Advisory Board for 
each corporate recipient of R&D grant; 
NewFoundland & 
Labrador 
2009 – New RDC founded. Funding for proof of 
concept, prototyping; federal sources  
No Invest in bioscience firms yet. No formal 
bioscience strategy 
2014 – new Venture Capital Tax Credit; Two 
Venture Capital Funds – Gov’t. But, horizontal 
approach. No bioscience invest yet. 
2007 – SR&ED;  
2014 – RDC S&T skills tax credit program. $1m 
annually. 
Little change. Mostly individual firms leveraging 
provincial and federal sources of R&D funding. 
 
AIF (ACOA) Funding – requires Advisory Board for 
each corporate recipient of R&D grant; 
Nova Scotia Gov’t agency reorganization NSBI/Dept. Econ. Dev. 
“OneNS”; federal sources; Innovacorp 30% 
investment in bioscience firms; No formal provincial 
2007 – no MBA biotech-focused program; 
Dalhousie law school training patent lawyers; 
Dalhousie medical school training researchers; 
 
 







bioscience strategy medical technician training at NS Community 
College & Univ. Cape Breton 
 
2014 - Workplace Innovation and Productivity 
Skills Incentive (WIPSI); Productivity and 
Innovation Voucher; SR&ED 
each corporate recipient of R&D grant; 
 
Prince Edward Island New - Discovery & Dev. Fund; provincial-NRC 
partnership; non-local partners with PEI firms 
provide financing 
 
New - Bioscience Tax Incentives (to biotech firms) 
2010 – MBA program in Biotech Management 
at UPEI; Holland College Centre for Labour 
Force Innovation – 2 year Bioscience 
Technology Program; Review of Provincial 
Immigration Policy 
2012 – education/training program for QA/QC 
and Regulatory Affairs Specialists  
PEI firms increased # partnerships with global firms in 
areas of finance, market access, R&D collaboration 
projects. 
 
AIF (ACOA) Funding – requires Advisory Board for 
each corporate recipient of R&D grant; 
 
3rd Order – 
Overarching Goals 
(Paradigm change) 
Core focus shifting (e.g. basic-commercial 
research, niche application areas, niche science 
areas, global partnerships) 
Core focus shifting  Core R&D strategy shifting 
New Brunswick No significant change 
 
No Change No Change 
NewFoundland & 
Labrador 
No significant change. No Change No Change 
Nova Scotia Change in Overarching Goals: 
Collaboration; Fundamental change in attitudes, 




Greater government intervention through skills 
incentives; OneNS focusing on “people”, 
investing in them 
Balance Individual firm strategies with project 
Collaboration among partners; private sector-led 
growth, but partnerships with gov’t 
Prince Edward Island Paradigm shift began in 1999. Continuation of 
strategy, with regular 3-year evaluations, developed 
in 2005. No change in overarching goal since 
2007. 
Province-wide HR development strategy (in 
collab. with federal agencies) 
Focus on Collaboration projects 
Firm Internationalization 
Continue to support the role of the Board of Directors 
of PEI BioAlliance, Inc. as the mechanism 
(“Innovation Intermediary” for aligning vision, setting 
priorities, and allocating resources to achieve goals 










5.5.1.1 New Brunswick 
 
New Brunswick made changes to finance and skill development institutions but did 
not pursue a high, holistic commitment strategy with overarching goals guiding it. Policy 
communities and separate niche bioscience clusters existed in different parts of the 
province. And even though New Brunswick created a lead agency, BioAtlantech in 1997 
which transformed into Bio New Brunswick (BioNB) in 2014, to mobilize bioscience 
interests and execute strategy, the process is still evolving. No KOST developed resulting 
in a mixed bioscience commitment strategy. 
Policy Communities and a Mixed Commitment Strategy  
 
 New Brunswick’s response to the 2008 global financial crisis was led by 
successive government policies, not industry. Government restructured and created new 
economic development agencies to balance central management with local decision-
making. Newly elected officials and their policy community, not a KOST, drove change. 
And changes did not represent a paradigm shift in thinking about the bioscience industry. 
Government and industry did adjust spending levels, program types and rules governing 
them so that finance and skill development were more closely linked. The result was a 
mixed commitment to bioscience. What was missing were clear indications that firms 
were improving their competencies by hiring skilled labor, forming alliances among each 
other and externally, and investing more in R&D. The sequence of decisions and events 
elaborated below strengthens our understanding of the case.  
In 2012 the Progressive Conservative party created a new Action Plan, “Rebuilding 
New Brunswick: Growing Together,” stretching from 2012-2016 and designed to support 
six targeted growth industries, including bioscience. Sectors were chosen based on their 
applications across economic sectors and ability to build on existing resources and 
capacity. The same government restructured and renamed the province’s economic 
development agency, the Department of Economic Development and created a new 









The change reflected the province’s recognition that it needed to create efficiencies, 
coordinate economic development efforts and balance central management with decision-
making at the community level (NBDED, 2012). It also needed to ensure that the various 
government agencies within which target industries fell engaged in a seamless approach 
towards facilitating support. Those agencies that participated in the strategy would also 
take on an implementation role associated with action items established jointly with 
industry and in consultation with ACOA, the federally funded regional economic 
development agency. Finally, the province sought to increase its global reach by 
attracting more FDI. 
But by 2014 the Liberal party came into power and implemented its economic 
development ideas. A new economic development agency was created in 2015, 
Opportunities New Brunswick (ONB), and incorporated the activities of Invest New 
Brunswick and the Department of Economic Development. The ONB differs from the 
previous agency in that it is a crown corporation operated by a private sector Board and 
CEO that applies a “client-focused” approach.
108
 This organizational and institutional 
change is designed to help the provincial government learn from the private sector about 
society’s needs and how to more efficiently deliver services. But it is too early to 
determine whether or not this new strategy will be more effective. I argue that these 
organizational changes are the result of political discontinuities more than industry-led 
commitments.  
In parallel with these cross-cutting institutional and organizational changes, the 
province’s Department of Agriculture, Aquaculture and Fisheries and the federal agency 
ACOA committed $622,000 to BioNB, the province’s lead bioscience agency in 2013. 
The funds are to be used to support pre-commercialization development, training, and 
business case development for bioscience incubators. This action demonstrates New 
Brunswick’s interest in encouraging commercialization of R&D in its resource industries 
but that government is still a key partner in the process if not driver. 















Did financial institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
New Brunswick has not benefited from significant provincial or federal investment in 
bioscience R&D compared to the other provinces and competing industries. Even though 
existing institutions are expanding like the New Brunswick Innovation Fund and its VC 
investment arm, most financing is committed to university bioscience and medical 
technology R&D through Innovation Research Chairs. Competing industries including 
agriculture, digital media and ICT received more funding that bioscience firms.
109
  
The mindset in New Brunswick continues to view university R&D as the driver of 
technological innovation. Individual firms can benefit from traditional R&D tax credits, 
but no new corporate incentives or programs were established after 2008. However it 
increasingly supports university – industry collaboration projects. In 2013 the province 
established three Innovation Research Chairs at the University of New Brunswick in 
bioscience and medical devices. These chairs are tasked with working directly with 
industry on applications. While the investment in Innovation Chairs signals a willingness 
to commit to specific research programs and scientists in support of the province’s 2012 
strategy, there is still uncertainty about the new role of the ONB economic development 
agency. 
 
Did skill development institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
 
New Brunswick continued its 2003 talent recruitment program after the global 
financial crisis through its Innovation Fund that finances professors, research assistants 
and research technicians. However, the province’s traditional industries in food, wood 
processing and growth industries like ICT benefit more from skill development programs. 
 
Did corporate governance institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
The way in which biotechnology firms in New Brunswick create competencies relies 
mainly on hiring skilled individuals and collaborating more with the university. FDI 
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collaborations and strategic alliances are less common, which limits knowledge spillovers 
necessary to grow the industry. Firms continued to receive little if any NBIF provincial or 
ACOA federal funding. In fact rules governing NBIF limit disbursements to new rather 
than existing firms in the province with high product commercialization potential. 
Despite these limitations New Brunswick firms leverage provincial and federal sources of 
R&D funding more than private sector sources. 
In 2014 the province counted 23 core biotechnology firms that develop new 
technologies and 80 that actually use them in their operations. Most individual firms are 
small with up to 10 employees. The founder is often a university scientist spinning off his 
or her company based on a discovery. The organizational structure of the firm typically 
includes the founder as CEO and is increasingly required to establish an Advisory or 
Governing Board before the firm can receive VC R&D funding through NBIF or ACOA.  
The agglomeration of small biotechnology firms is complemented by two large 
anchor firms, the Woodlands division of J.D. Irving Company and McCain Foods. Both 
continue R&D investment in advanced seedling production technologies and food 
products including potato varietals. The Irving Company is known as a steward of New 
Brunswick’s forests, investing in environmental projects associated with protection and 
cultivation of plants and trees.
110
But these firms are relatively insular and do not engage 




5.5.1.2 Newfoundland and Labrador 
 
Similar to New Brunswick, Newfoundland increased spending and developed new 
programs in finance and skill development as part of a normal policy process but did not 
pursue a high commitment strategy. Competing policy communities did not take a 
strategic approach toward developing the bioscience industry. Instead they began to take 
incremental steps to create bioscience niche areas including genomics, bioinformatics and 
marine biotechnology that competed with environmental and traditional industry 














interests. No KOST developed despite some competency improvements within 
government, Memorial University and the broad-based technology industry association.  
 
Policy Communities and a Mixed Commitment Strategy  
 
Newfoundland is an increasingly resource-rich province benefiting from offshore 
oil and gas. Its economy grew between 2003-2013 by many measures including a rise in 
GDP, decrease in provincial debt, and an increase in employment and private investment. 
These improvements had little effect on bioscience industrial policy. 
The province encourages investment in the oil and gas and related industries but labor 
reports claim that few Newfoundlanders have benefited through employment options in 
this industry. And oil price volatility along with a tradition of high poverty levels, 
outmigration of working age population, and provincial underinvestment in social and 
physical infrastructure threatens Newfoundland’s positive economic growth trends 
(Gibson, 2014). 
Post-2008 Newfoundland did not establish a formal bioscience strategy within this 
context.
112
 The province pursues potentially conflicting goals similar to other 
jurisdictions. Commercializing bioscience products in order to create highly skilled jobs, 
new firms, and retain existing firms competes with efforts to decrease healthcare costs or 
to conserve forests. Furthermore, there is no consensus on a strategy and work plan that 
will help reach these goals.  
Newfoundland has pursued incremental changes. The province identified niche areas 
with competitive advantages – genomics, aquaculture, and health IT – but only now are 
they starting to integrate the various actors into a coherent entity where all assets can be 
leveraged. Disagreement exists within Newfoundland and between provincial and federal 
agencies like ACOA regarding whether strategy should cultivate big successes at the 
“macro” level, or, start small with discoveries from individual researchers that could turn 
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over the longer-term into major successes.
113
 Other challenges involve encouraging all 
stakeholders including provincial governments to take a long-term approach towards the 




Unlike Newfoundland’s prior experience of incremental social learning and relatively 
fragmented bargaining, coordination among stakeholders and a higher rate of institutional 
creation and change related to science and technology is increasing. For example, the 
Research and Development Corporation (RDC) was established in 2009 as a non-profit 
organization. It is designed to improve R&D in Newfoundland and Labrador by 
providing funding and leveraging university and private sources of financing. The 
organization operates at arm’s length from provincial government. 
To create RDC the government selected a CEO who then assembled a small number 
of individuals to help develop its organizational framework and role in supporting R&D 
in Newfoundland. RDC consulted different stakeholder groups across the province and 
researched international jurisdictions that successfully designed and implemented R&D 
strategies. The result is a baseline study of existing infrastructure and core R&D assets as 
well as lessons learned from the international study. This social learning process resulted 
in the creation of RDC. The institution is similar to investment agencies in other 
provinces that have learned that operating separately from political decision-makers can 
ensure that investment decisions are based on economic fundamentals rather than on 
competing non-economic goals. Despite this positive step, a review of RDC investments 
since 2009 reveals bioscience firms have yet to secure RDC investment finance. 
Evidence indicates that firms in the fields of geology, oil and traditional value-added 
industries have benefited. 
Like New Brunswick, in 2014 Newfoundland created a new economic development 
agency, the Department of Business, Tourism, Culture and Rural Development. This 
agency took over implementation of activities from the former Department of Innovation, 
Business and Rural Development. While this change was made after the 2008 global 
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financial crisis it is difficult to make the causal link between the global shock and the 
institutional change.  
The province changes its economic development agencies’ structure every few years 
often in relation to a new government taking power. This change could simply be a 
continuation of a long tradition. But it also implies that previous efforts by the province 
and industry association, however small and incremental, to support bioscience may not 
survive successive governments. In fact, there is a high level of concern in the province 
that this has always been a major risk.
115
 With a renewed focus on traditional service 
industries such as tourism and culture and resource industries including oil and gas 
combined with new R&D funding programs, the province is trying to rebalance its 
industrial structure within the current global environment. Newfoundland’s commitment 
strategy toward bioscience is mixed. 
 
Did financial institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis? 
 
Amounts and types of financing changed after the global financial shock indicating 
learning by government but not as part of an overall strategy. Newfoundland established 
the RDC to fund pre-competitive activities such as proof of concept and prototyping but 
the RDC has yet to invest in any bioscience firm and its projects.
116
 Firms still rely on 
ACOA and its innovation fund, Atlantic Innovation Fund, for R&D support. 
In November 2014, much later than the other Atlantic Canadian provinces, 
Newfoundland agreed to commit $10 million to the pan-Atlantic Canadian regional VC 
fund, Build Ventures. It also created a new institution, the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Venture Fund with a budget of $10 million to invest in start-up Newfoundland firms. 
This institution is similar to New Brunswick’s Innovation Fund and Nova Scotia’s 
Innovacorp except that it has engaged a private sector fund manager, Growthworks 
Atlantic, with current investments in the provinces. This fund also leverages sources of 
finance from BDC Capital and from private individuals through the Newfoundland and 
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Labrador Angel Network (NLAN). The decision to engage a private sector fund manager 
was made in reaction to NLAN’s difficulties in finding lead investors to identify and 
quality potential investments. Newfoundland began to leverage and coordinate assets.  
Creation of these new financial institutions represents a change in the way that 
Newfoundland frames its economic development challenges as well as solutions to them. 
The changes are also attempts to leverage existing and diverse financial sources in order 
to address each stage along the company’s development from start-up through growth 
phase. The new financial institutions were also the result of the Newfoundland 
government conducting baseline studies, capturing lessons learned from neighboring 
jurisdictions and combining them with lessons from their own previous experiences 
especially in developing tax credits and other company financing schemes.  
Despite these increases in settings, new programs and institutions the province still has 
no formal bioscience strategy. Newfoundland has made efforts to increase R&D funding 
in targeted industries but bioscience still relies more on federal funding with some 
provincial and private finance provided through FDI. Changes were largely driven by 
government-led policy communities. 
 
Did skill development institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
 
Before 2008 Newfoundland did not provide specific tax credits or funding for highly 
skilled technicians, scientists or managers. In 2009 RDC prioritized support to fill the 
skills gap and now provides up to 75% of the salary over two years of a PhD graduate in 
science or technology. This is a $1 million fund. But there is little indication that 
graduates in bioscience disciplines are benefitting. This could very well be because there 
are a smaller number of bioscience companies compared to Newfoundland’s traditional 
oil, ocean technology and Arctic development.  
Firms rely on Memorial University, its main vocation training center, the College of 
the North Atlantic (CAN), as well as graduates from other Atlantic Canadian provinces as 
a source of skilled labor. Training programs at CAN include Medical Laboratory 









These are largely designed to train laboratory technicians necessary to support research 
programs and clinical services directed or managed by those with PhDs and MDs.  
The new RDC program, however, is not tied to securing labor from Newfoundland. 
Firms can source labor globally. The perennial challenge for innovative firms is how to 
secure the specific skills related to niche areas of marine biotechnology, bioinformatics 
and environmental technologies as well as managers with successful experience in 
commercializing new technologies. 
 
Did corporate governance institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
Biotechnology firms in Newfoundland create competencies mainly by hiring skilled 
individuals, collaborating with the university, NRC and customers. Some firms operate 
based on a “virtual” model sourcing finance in Toronto, researchers from Memorial 
University and independent business development and legal experts throughout Canada. 
Similar to New Brunswick, FDI collaborations and strategic alliances are less common, 
which limits knowledge spillovers necessary to grow the industry. 
Firms are primarily small start-ups where the CEO is also the scientist-founder. But 
these few firms do have an advisory or governing board as part of their corporate 
structure because of provincial and federal financing rules requiring them. Such firms 
include Research Avenue and Semintha Nutraceuticals as well as those located in 
Memorial University’s technology incubator, the Genesis Centre.  
MNCs like Johnson and Johnson placed a regulatory affairs office in St. John’s but 
not an R&D or manufacturing facility. While the province and individual stakeholders 
helped establish a BioEast, the bioscience industry association in the early 2000s, the 
organization was unsustainable and was folded into the more broad-based high 
technology industry association, Newfoundland Association of Technology Industries 
(NATI).  
Newfoundland’s fledging bioscience industry is reliant on provincial and federal 
R&D financing with a few exceptions. Corporate structures have been forced to change 
since they are coupled with government financing requirements. The intention is to create 









governing board members bring. It also prepares these firms for exit strategies including 
acquisitions by FDI. Government drove these incremental changes. 
 
5.5.1.3 Nova Scotia 
 
Since 2005 Nova Scotia has had no formal bioscience strategy. However, the 
province, ACOA and private sector have invested more in R&D than other Atlantic 
Canadian provinces. Individual firm strategies have led growth rather than industry in 
partnership with the provincial government. The industry association, BioNova, has led a 
weak KOST sharing information and lessons learned among its members but not creating 
consensus around common goals, ways of achieving them and internal competencies. 
Since the 2008 crisis the bioscience industry has contracted. By 2014 the province 
created a new way of thinking about Nova Scotia’s pursuit of economic sustainability 
through its “OneNS” initiative. It is still unclear as to whether or not this attempt to 
change the province’s mindset around the role of the state and private sector in 
facilitating economic growth will succeed. 
 
A Weak KOST and Mixed Commitment Strategy  
 
Unlike New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia has 
traditionally favored an individual firm-based industrial development strategy. It has no 
formal, written bioscience strategy. This is despite benefiting from both provincial and 
federal R&D and commercialization programs and technology incubators including, the 
BioScience Enterprise Center, InnovaCorp’s VC fund and ACOA’s Atlantic Innovation 
fund. The accepted norms centered around individual firms developing their own growth 
strategies and taking advantage of government financial, technical and infrastructure-
related resources.  
Before 2008 the private sector comprised the majority of R&D spending at 100 
million dollars even though four firms produced 85% of total sector sales (BioNova, 









This contraction occurred after a seven year growth period from 2002-2009 where the 
number increased from 28 to 50.
117
 The decline could be explained by the fact that 
bioscience firms in Nova Scotia were more exposed than firms in the other three 
provinces to global risk finance and markets. However, it questions whether previous 
forms of governance are becoming outdated and incapable of meeting industry needs.  
By June 2014 Nova Scotia engaged in a highly disruptive social learning process built 
around the idea of “Collective Impact.”
118
 This new approach highlighted a major 
impediment that needed to be overcome: a lack of vision and commitment to economic 
growth. The province framed the debate within a “now or never” call to develop a new 
approach to old problems, acknowledging that previous strategies have failed. Leaders 
across sectors, within government and the university claim that a fundamental change in 
society is required. These leaders will first address concepts such as respect, trust in 
institutions and individuals, and avoidance of “parochial” and partisan interests.
119
 
Coupled with major changes in attitudes is the call for more innovative ideas and 
different ways of thinking about the role of government and society. The new model 
centers around three concepts: attitude, people and economic growth. These ideas are 
profound and get at the heart of cultural norms rather than simply formal rules 
constraining the roles of government, industry and the university. 
Government acknowledged the need to reevaluate its role while industry is to lead the 
province’s economic growth. To do so, the province coordinated an independent 
commission known as the oneNS Commission that builds on previous efforts to evaluate 
its economic development programs and recommend changes. Similar to Prince Edward 
Island and even Ontario and Quebec the province created a working group, the oneNS 
Coalition, to design work plans in the three areas discussed above. The province argues 
that a collective response is necessary since the challenge of sustained economic growth 
under the current context is highly complex.  
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The current commission is comprised of 15 community leaders from different 
industries, labor, university and elected government officials including the Premier. It 
concluded that government should create the environment for business to succeed and 
address the needs of industry without controlling the process. Michel Samson, Minister of 
Economic and Rural Development and Tourism stated that: 
 
Politicians should not be picking winners and losers in the economy. Instead, 
government will focus on broader economic objectives, like workforce, sector and 
regional development, as well as having the right policies, laws, and 
accountability measures to foster private-sector growth. ("Private Sector to Lead 
Economic Growth," 2014, p. 1)  
 
This statement at first appears no different than previous approaches and 
understandings of the role of government and industry in Nova Scotia. However, a deeper 
analysis uncovers a call for more social learning among stakeholders and collective 
understanding of and commitment to the province’s goals. To this end, the oneNS 
Commission recommended improved planning and decision-making in relation to 
investments of money, time and expertise in pursuit of economic growth. 
The specific roles of government and industry must change enough to be able to 
govern effectively. For example, the provincial government first must develop the 
capability to understand complex industries like bioscience by employing industry 
experts with deep business experience to quickly and effectively evaluate industries and 
specific business cases for investment. Transitioning to a “learning economy” also 
requires the capability to learn. This involves creating specific learning structures and 
mechanisms that encourage competency-building through knowledge-sharing and skills 
development among a broader range of stakeholders. Sufficient incentives to participate 
in, for example, pre-competitive collaboration projects, as well as monitoring and 
evaluation are necessary. This approach is not designed to take the place of individual 
firm strategy but to coordinate in areas of unusually high complexity and uncertainty. 
Industry takes a similar perspective. BioNova’s approach is to assist all members 









dedicating all resources around those few firms with the highest potential to bring ideas 
to market especially since the collective understanding is that only one in 10 will 
succeed. BioNova has long resisted NS government efforts to lead a specific industrial 
strategy around bioscience and the association shares this view about not only the role of 
government but the industry association: 
 
If you’re not comfortable with government picking winners and losers, just 




Nova Scotia’s approach to growing its bioscience industry continues to emphasize 
individual firm strategies as drivers with government creating an effective business 
environment and the peak association providing support. 
 
Did financial institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
 
Even though NS records the highest level of R&D spending both in the public and 
private sectors, federal ACOA funding through the AIF program decreased during this 
period. VC funding increased and by 2014 nine of the 31 companies that InNOVACorp 
invested in or about 30% were bioscience-related. These statistics contrast greatly with 
New Brunswick and Newfoundland where government VC investment is weak to non-
existent. Investments ranged from genomics to health IT to medical devices.
121
 Provincial 
funding of R&D increasingly favors the commercialization-stage. 
Institutional and organizational roles are changing under the oneNS Commission 
strategy. Nova Scotia Business Inc. (NSBI) will continue to administer the Capital 
Investment Rebate and the Small Business Development Program. This program provides 
funding directly to firms that reinvest in Nova Scotia. However, the government made 
two changes: Decision-making regarding investment awards will be more arms-length 
and only firms that co-invest along with government are eligible. The province expects 
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that the arms-length decision-making rule will ensure investments will be made based on 




Did skill development institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
 
Between 2007 and 2013 Nova Scotia continued its 15 percent R&D tax credit to 
support the hiring and training of scientists, technicians and researchers within bioscience 
firms. There were few if any changes in settings. In terms of university capacity to supply 
the needed labor, in 2007 the focus was more on training technicians and patent lawyers 
at the Nova Scotia Community College, the University of Cape Breton, and Dalhousie 
University law school. While technicians and lawyers are crucial to the industry, there is 
no biotechnology-focused MBA program-producing graduates with both a science and 
business background required to facilitate the commercialization process.  
By 2008 the province began to address the skills gap to increase productivity and 
innovation by creating new skill formation and training programs. These included the 
Workplace Innovation and Productivity Skills Incentive (WIPSI), which provides grants 
to individual organizations to train staff. In addition, the Productivity and Innovation 
Vouchers program provides financial support to SMEs to acquire technical assistance 
from Nova Scotia universities and colleges. These programs combine with existing ones 
including the federal IRAP and SR&ED. This new approach couples finance with skills 
development institutions. 
 
Did corporate governance institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
 
Many Nova Scotia’s firms are small but well-established. Firms export and out-
license more since just over half are medical technology and device companies 
developing diagnostic kits. These small firms as well as larger pharmaceutical companies 
such as Novartis Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. and Sanofi, the CROs and bioproducts 
company, Acadian Seaplants, Inc., have developed competencies and corporate structures 
                                                 
 
122









reflecting more mature firms. Yet Nova Scotia has not created new firms except in the 
areas of nutraceuicals and imaging technologies.  
Few changes in corporate structure occurred after 2007 since several core firms were 
established in the 1980s and 1990s. Similar to the other Atlantic provinces, start-up firms 
receiving ACOA R&D grant funding were required to establish either a Scientific 
Advisory Board or a Board of Directors. However, a review of each company’s website 
and previous research reveals greater global collaborations between single Nova Scotia 
firms and partners abroad as opposed to formal alliances among local firms (Rosson & 
McLarney, 2004). The lack of local knowledge spillovers is still a weakness. 
This trend, while difficult to attribute as a direct response to the global financial 
crisis, does shed light on the fact that individual firms are unable to address the 
complexity and uncertainty of the R&D process alone. Firms are balancing individual 
strategies with project collaboration among global partners with R&D support from 
government and the universities.  
 
5.5.1.4 Prince Edward Island 
 
PEI maintained its high, holistic commitment to its growing bioscience industry after 
the 2008 global financial crisis. It established a strong KOST in 2005 led by the industry 
association, PEI BioAlliance, which continues to act as industry catalyst in partnership 
with government. The KOST mobilized support for a niche strategy to develop bioactives 
products for human and animal health. It learned how to closely link sources of finance 
with bioscience skills and corporate competencies to achieve its goals. In addition to a 
strong KOST other factors such as an abundance of agricultural and marine resources, 
national support institutions such as ACOA, SR&ED and IRAP funding, the NRC’s 
Institute for Nutrisciences and Health (NRC-INH), FoodTech Canada, and the leadership 
of prominent elected and non-elected individuals helped to maintain high levels of 
commitment to the niche strategy.  
 










Prior to the global financial crisis PEI aggressively began to develop and implement a 
bioscience industrial strategy addressing much needed finance, skills and corporate 
competencies. The structure and nature of the industry includes entrepreneurial 
companies and FDI firms such as Novartis, Genzyme, OmniActive and Sekisui 
developing bioactives for human and animal therapies. Michael Mayne, former Deputy 
Minister for Advanced Learning and Lead Scientist for NRC-INH , in 1999 Initiated by, 
followed by Rory Francis, head of the PEI BioAlliance, these individuals mobilized 
support for the new strategy by creating a strong KOST. The specific bioscience strategy 
fit within the provinces’ overall strategy to transition towards a knowledge economy. 
Immediately after the 2008 global financial crisis the PEI government produced a 
new industrial policy, “Island Prosperity – A Focus for Change.” This strategy allocated 
$200m to help facilitate four key sectors including bioscience, ICT, aerospace and 
energy. The bioscience goals were to increase sales to $300m, raise fulltime employment 
to 2,000, and improve the PEI brand globally as a national center for excellence in natural 
bioactive-based health and nutrition product development. 
In the new strategy Premier Robert Ghiz acknowledged that traditional industries 
underpin and drive knowledge-based ones: 
 
Our traditional industries and our new industries are not two separate 
worlds…Our bioscience sector is creating innovative, competitive value chains 
extending from the fields, forests and sea to highly sophisticated food and health 
products. (Francis, 2010)  
 
As part of the Island Prosperity framework the bioscience strategy and work plan 
have been reevaluated every three years since 2005. The latest review was in 2012 and 
extends the strategy through 2015. This process was delegated by the government to the 
industry association, the PEI BioAlliance, which receives funding from both the 
provincial government and member organizations. This peak association continues to 
lead deliberations among stakeholder groups including individual biotech firms, FDI, 
provincial and national research institutes, university researchers and those from 









strategy whose members and the government collectively agreed to focus on bioactives 
(BioAlliance, 2012). 
The association and its Board of Directors comprised of these diverse stakeholders 
meet quarterly to monitor and evaluate strategic goals. The process provides a “trusted 
space” for community dialogue designed to find common ground among conflicting 
interests. Every three years it “assesses the current state, clarifies vision and mission, sets 
goals, and aligns strategies and priorities to achieve that vision” (BioAlliance, 2012, p. 2). 
Unlike other provinces, the governance process is highly inclusive, encouraging 
social learning. Not only does the KOST regularly review previous goals and tactics, it 
combines this knowledge with new knowledge generated by its membership and 
committees tasked with monitoring the industry. The federal and provincial governments 
have supported the strategy despite changes in power emphasizing “alignment” of 
interests, leadership and focus (BioAlliance, 2012). Sustained commitment to the strategy 
separates the province from other jurisdictions and is an important factor explaining the 
industry’s relative success to date. 
I argue that with this sustained high level of commitment PEI’s bioscience cluster is 
emerging rapidly. Survey data from a collaborative study as well as reviews by the PEI 
BioAlliance reveals that the total number of bioscience firms increased from 30 to 35 
between 2009 and 2013 representing a 17% increase (Alleva-Caceres, 2014) . The 
network of relationships among the growing number of organizations has become dense 
and more firms have developed relationships with global partners. But firms still generate 
most revenue from government R&D.  
 
Did financial institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
 
R&D finance levels and programs changed after the 2008 global financial crisis. 
Federal and provincial R&D funding for PEI universities are more than twice as much 
than the other Atlantic Canadian provinces. PEI increasingly leverages private investment 
and combined they increased 40% between 2004 and 2011. However, ACOA federal 
funding decreased from 11.75 million in 2007 to 10.16 in 2013. These data indicate that 









funding. But it is possible that federal budgets were negatively affected by the global 
financial crisis. 
PEI created new financing programs. These included the Discovery and Development 
Fund seeding high risk, commercialization-focused projects as well as provincial-NRC 
partnerships that finance specific collaboration projects between local firms and the NRC. 
In addition, PEI firms are increasingly developing financial relationships with non-local 
customers and R&D partners. These programs combine with the new Bioscience Tax 
Incentives that are offered to PEI biotechnology start-up firms.
123
 
Shocks like the 2008 global financial crisis affect small, young bioscience clusters 
less than their larger established counterparts since they are relatively insulated from risk 
capital such as VCs that are normally required to commercialize biotechnologies. PEI is 
gradually shifting from government R&D grants disbursed directly to individual firms to 
co-financing of public-private collaboration projects. PEI firms are increasingly securing 
private global sources of finance that they use to leverage public sector funds especially 
from ACOA (Alleva-Caceres, 2014). 
 
Did skill development institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
Since 2008 PEI has made changes in its programs supporting skill development. In 
2010 it created a new MBA program in Biotech Management at UPEI and a two year 
Bioscience Technology Program at its technical college, the Holland College Centre for 
Labour Force Innovation. The province also conducted a review of its Provincial 
Immigration Policy creating more favorable terms for firms to hire skilled individuals 
from abroad. PEI bioscience firms are increasingly hiring and retaining scientists from 




By 2012 incremental changes continued with a new training program to develop 
specialists in quality control and regulatory affairs. Both programs are needed to help 
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facilitate drug and medical device approvals in Canada and globally. During the same 
year the province instituted a specialized labor tax credit on personal income that was 
designed to help firms hire and train scientists and specialized managers.
125
 
General employment within the PEI bioscience cluster grew by about 44% from 455 
to 655 since 2009. The province has made significant progress in creating highly skilled 
jobs. The number of scientist positions held mainly by PhDs has more than doubled. 
Sales, marketing and quality control positions increased by 47% but technicians declined 
by close to half. Non-local scientists increasingly fill Ph.D. positions while local 
universities supply technicians (Alleva Caceres, 2014). 
PEI called for a province-wide human resources development strategy in 
collaboration with federal agencies to sustain its competitive advantage. The change in 
approach from individual organizational policies toward a more coordinative and 
comprehensive strategy should enable the province to leverage resources in support of its 
explicit goal: creating and attracting highly skilled labor for growth industries. Its 





Did corporate governance institutions change after the 2008 global financial crisis?  
PEI firms have created competencies both internally through a change in structure 
and through external ties with customers, suppliers, R&D partners, the industry 
association, provincial and federal governments and the university. Corporate structures 
changed to include either a scientific advisory board or a governing board. In 2009 no 
locally owned firm had instituted any type of board but by 2013 almost all had (Alleva 
Caceres, 2014). It is plausible that firms were responding to ACOA requirements before 
receiving federal financing through its Atlantic Innovation Fund.  
Scientific boards can help young firms evaluate potential therapies and products 
while governing boards can secure financing from outside sources, access global 
networks of contacts to create markets, and provide legitimacy to a start-up. A successful 














entrepreneur is often asked to become a member of a start-up’s board in the hopes of 
creating knowledge-spillovers and as a signal to potential acquisition partners.  
Survey data comparing the nature of relationships and how they changed from 2009 
to 2013 indicates that individual firms are increasingly commercializing their products, 
services and technologies. Ties among PEI firms and between local and non-local firms, 
mostly customers and suppliers, increased 85% during this period (Alleva Caceres, 
2014). R&D relationships increased 10% between PEI firms and private sector 
organizations and by a similar amount with public research institutes. These figures 
indicate that R&D is still conducted primarily in-house but firms are increasingly 
engaging in more collaborative projects locally, within Canada and globally (Alleva 
Caceres, 2014). 
While formal strategies and related goals have changed incrementally since 2008, 
firm behavior has changed in terms of how they learn and manage growth. In the past, the 
provincial government created expectations that it would provide R&D grants directly to 
firms and the university. Formal rules and social norms have changed in support of 
partnerships and collaboration projects that leverage public and private sector finance. 
PEI’s decision in late 1999 to transition to a knowledge-based economy led to the 
creation of a strong KOST in 2005. This team combined with the island’s small size and 
agricultural and marine resources have created a path dependent trajectory toward 
bioscience industry growth despite changes in governments. The industry-led KOST in 
partnership with government sees its role as a “catalytic coordinator” and “innovation 
intermediary” aligning vision, setting priorities, and allocating resources to achieve 
bioscience industry goals (Francis, 2012, pp. 20-21). This process created and improved 
institutional complementarities in finance, skills development and corporate governance 
before, during and after the 2008 global financial crisis. PEI created this holistic strategy 
by shifting paradigms that traditionally favored government-led policies to industry 














All four provinces have invested in R&D and attempted to diversify and coordinate 
financial sources. These include tax credits, grants and government-funded and in some 
cases privately managed VC funds such as in Newfoundland and New Brunswick. But 
not all new sources are designated to bioscience firms. Most are designed to support 
high-tech firms generally across sectors such as ICT, clean technologies, biotechnologies, 
geology, oil and gas. 
Firms rate highly federal funding such as the AIF and the IRAP. But access to these 
programs was difficult due to bureaucracy and lack of awareness. In addition, the public 
and private sectors invest in R&D but at different levels depending upon the province. 
For example, Nova Scotia’s private sector accounts for 65% of overall R&D spending. In 
Prince Edward Island government still funds a significant amount of R&D even though 
product sales and angel investments are increasingly a source of individual firm revenue. 
The continued reliance across regions on federal and provincial R&D capital raises the 
question as to the sustainability of these bioscience clusters. Will provinces assume that 
some government role and funding is necessary over the long-term? After 2008 is the role 
of government changing significantly as it increasingly embeds itself in networks and 
industry-specific processes? 
Provinces differ in their skill development strategies. New Brunswick continues to 
channel support for university research. However, the province’s strategy to finance 
bioscience Chairs at the university requires university-industry collaboration on specific 
projects. While Newfoundland established a new program to cover a significant portion 
of recent PhD salaries, helping to offset costs to local firms, there is little evidence that 
bioscience firms have benefited. Competing industries in oil, geology and clean 
technologies appear to take advantage of the new scheme. Finally, recent strategies 
announced by provincial governments in Nova Scotia and PEI indicate a rethinking of 
skills needs at a much more disruptive level. The new approaches call for province-wide 
human resources strategies across industries in order to identify and fill gaps.  
Corporate governance structures and competencies are slowly changing. ACOA and 
provincial funding agencies now require that companies applying for financing establish 









management competencies and networks required for corporate growth since they are 
spin-offs from university research. Norms related to R&D and commercialization 
strategies are also changing. In Prince Edward Island firms are increasingly developing 
commercialization ties with both local and non-local customers, R&D and technical 
partners as opposed to relying solely on government R&D grants, though still quite a few 
firms do. Even in this case, government is increasingly requiring firms to secure a private 
sector financial partner in order to leverage federal ACOA and provincial sources of 
funds. 
The nature of economic governance in Atlantic Canada is also changing. Federal and 
provincial governments generally coordinate their financial and services support for 
economic development to avoid duplication. But unlike Quebec and Ontario, Atlantic 
Canadian provinces have difficulty aligning their niche bioscience interests and small 
discoveries with federal strategies emphasizing big discoveries and applications.   
The role of government is changing as well from arms-length decision-making to 
embeddedness in the strategy process along with the private sector and universities. This 
change is evident in Prince Edward Island in the most pronounced way as government 
partially funds the formal bioscience network, PEI BioAlliance led by industry. This 
network acts as “catalytic coordinator” of the industry with its multi-stakeholder 
membership. The nature of embeddedness is different in the other provinces where 
government leads the process as it interacts with the private sector. 
 
5.6.2 Theoretical Findings   
 
The evidence from aspiring bioscience provinces supports hypo 1 and 2 but not hypo 
3.  
Prince Edward Island is the smallest of the provinces and represents a least likely case. In 
2005 before the global financial crisis the province created a strong KOST led by the 
industry association, PEI BioAlliance, in partnership with government at all levels, 
individual firms, the University of Prince Edward Island and PROs. The KOST mobilized 
stakeholders around a common strategy focusing on bioactives and created and changed 









The strategy was industry-led with government as a financial partner. It involved new 
infrastructure, increased financial support, creation of university degrees programs, and 
an improved business environment for FDI. But firms were start-ups tied to government 
R&D financing and collaborations were rare. Up to and after the 2008 financial crisis the 
KOST strengthened, the number and diversity of firms increased, their competencies 
improved and the cluster increased its international ties. These changes created 
opportunities among KOST participants to regularly deliberate existing strategy, new 
tactics, goals and to adjust in light of this new knowledge. The efforts positioned Prince 
Edward Island to pursue a holistic, high commitment strategy that withstood the 2008 
global financial crisis.  
 Nova Scotia, the largest of the provinces, maintained a weak KOST leading to a 
mixed commitment strategy both before and after the financial crisis. The province’s 
individual firm-level strategies continue to lead its bioscience industry. Neither New 
Brunswick nor Newfoundland created a KOST and few if any policy communities 
existed before the crisis resulting in a low commitment strategy. But bioscience clusters 
were developing in niche areas including plant science, aquaculture, bioinformatics and 
marine science. After the crisis, policy communities evolved in both provinces drawing 
attention to the economic and health benefits of bioscience creating mixed levels of 
commitment.  
The provinces’ bioscience industries did not contract immediately after the global 
financial crisis as they did in Quebec and Ontario but changes occurred. The number of 
bioscience firms declined in Nova Scotia while they grew in PEI. I argue that the 
presence and strength of a KOST played a significant role. 
The Atlantic Canadian provinces compared to Quebec and Ontario were less tied to 
global sources of risk finance including VCs and pharmaceutical firms. Were these small, 
rural provinces responding to the global financial crisis or simply pursuing path 
dependent trajectories and making incremental changes to their commitment strategies? 
Most provinces still rely on government funded R&D with the possible exception of 
Nova Scotia. However, local public-private VCs, angel investors and large global 










Other explanations interact to impact commitment strategy levels and changes. 
Different natural resources within each province defined their core bioscience 
competencies from bioactives to bioinformatics to marine biotechnology. These resources 
shaped commitment strategies in all four provinces involving finance, skill development 
and corporate governance as provinces developed baseline studies and bioscience asset 
maps from which to develop strategies.  
Rival industries competed for resources. However, provinces like PEI reframed the 
debate claiming that traditional industries like agriculture provide a platform to develop 
knowledge-based industries like nutraceuticals. Finally, each province has access to the 
same national financial institutions including the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency 
(ACOA), IRAP and SR&ED R&D funding. PEI firms and research organizations are 





5.6.2.1 Potential Variables Affecting Bioscience Industry Performance 
 
The study revealed important variables for future research. These omitted variables 
include:  
 
 The nature of networks and clusters;  
 Disconnectedness from global risk finance;  
 Lack of receptor capacity and economies of scale;  
 Federal – regional misalignment of strategic interests;  
 Policy discontinuities from one government to the next;  
 Lack of public awareness;  
 Lack of “patient” capital; and  
 Weak labor markets.  
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Some explain levels of and changes in commitment strategies. However, those 
explanations such as the misalignment of multi-level governmental agency strategies and 
policy discontinuities are accommodated by the definition of different types of KOSTs. 
The nature of networks differs depending upon the province. PEI demonstrates “small 
world” network characteristics where the majority of its 35 firms and support institutions 
are formally connected. By 2013 PEI’s network had begun to internationalize and had 
increased its density of ties locally. This presages high levels of learning given the ease 
with which participants were able to share information and knowledge creating trust. The 
local, strong KOST led by the PEI BioAlliance since 2005 drove the process. PEI 
stakeholders and their neighbors in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick recognized the role 
of the KOST in sustaining this is positive trend.
128
 However, a heavier reliance on 
government grants and contracts is still a challenge.  
Nova Scotia was not considered to be a full-fledged cluster since its participants did 
not rely on the local market for customers and suppliers (Rosson, 2003). The industry 
does not consider itself a “cluster.”
129
 With 50 firms plus support institutions, bioscience 
is seen as firm-led, not government “choosing industrial winners” and forcing firms to 
behave according to a dominant, government-led strategy.
130
 Bioscience is “entrepreneur-
driven, not curiosity driven” and responds to “market pull.”
131
 Hence, a variety of 
individual corporate strategies ranging broadly from “home-grown” approaches to FDI 
and mergers and acquisitions drive growth. Despite the individual strategies high levels 
of trust among firms exists and has helped the industry to grow.
132
 
Rosson and McLarney’s research reveals that Nova Scotia’s industry is networked 
locally and globally through finance and supplier relationships (Rosson & McLarney, 
2004). While anchor firms and individual researchers are relatively more connected 
globally, the vast majority of firms, most of which are small, do not have the capabilities 
to reach beyond their own provinces and sometimes beyond the firm’s boundaries. 
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However, third parties such as bioscience industry associations help fill this gap by 
enabling access to information, knowledge and international contacts. 
The region’s ability to protect itself from the negative effects of the financial crisis is 
due largely to the fact that it was not as connected in the first place to external sources of 
funding. Rather, firms rely primarily on domestic sources even though we see this 
changing as lead local firms have become more sophisticated in leveraging local public 
sources with private global ones.  
The region faces many challenges despite the above positive characteristics. The lack 
of receptor capacity is a major weakness in small markets like those in Atlantic Canada. 
One interviewee in New Brunswick praised the relative success in increasing the number 
of new bioscience firms over the last decade but lamented that the province and the 
region was “research rich, innovation poor.”
133
  Most technology is licensed out rather 
than developed and manufactured in the region and exported as new products.
134
 
The lack of scale and the great diversity of small, niche bioscience activities that are 
somewhat disconnected among each other depending upon the province is another 
difficulty. One executive in Nova Scotia noted, “we have everything from soup to 
nuts.”
135
 It is difficult to develop a strategy meeting the needs of the entire bioscience 
industry. Nutraceutical manufacturers will require different resources and incentives 
compared to pharmaceutical developers or CROs given the divergent nature of their 
technologies, processes, products and services.  
Inter-niche learning is beginning to address the situation. Industry and government in 
New Brunswick did not discount the possibility of knowledge sharing between potato and 
aquaculture R&D. Despite some knowledge-sharing, bioscience is still disconnected. 
This condition presents a challenge to policy-makers. Is it more effective to choose 
leading niches demonstrating the highest promise for successful innovation and growth? 
Since markets for new products do not yet exist, how do governments and industry 
stakeholders measure uncertainty and risk in order to select growth industries? Is it 
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politically possible to consider an Atlantic Canada-wide bioscience strategy in the hopes 
of creating a regional, collective strategic intent and economies of scale? 
National – regional political misalignment presents another regional challenge. 
According to one interviewee and corroborated by others, Atlantic Canada is considered 
“a bit of an annoyance” by the federal government, which sees the region and its 
bioscience industry, particularly agricultural biotechnology, as “artisanal.”
136
 Western 
Canadian provinces, Ontario, Quebec and Agriculture Canada continue to shape national 
agriculture and agricultural biotechnology strategy. These policies establish how 
financial, technical and infrastructure resources are distributed. The Atlantic provinces 
must focus on niches and long-term return on investment.  
While there may be strategic misalignment in agricultural biotechnology, provinces 
benefit from the NRC Centers of Excellence. Nova Scotia houses the new center for 
research, diagnosis and treatment of brain disorders. There is also evidence that the 




Political discontinuities also affect the sustainability of previous bioscience strategies 
and ultimately industry growth. “As governments change, policies change” lamented one 
interviewee.
138
 Each Premier brings his or her own policies to bear on economic 
development. Selecting “high road” versus “low road” policies, in other words the choice 
between dedicating resources to knowledge versus traditional industries is highly 
susceptible to the political process.  
Agriculture and the fisheries are traditional constituents in each province and 
Premiers are often forced to choose between these and knowledge industries promising 
longer return on investment though with highly uncertain prospects. Often a hybrid 
strategy is pursued. With a public unaware of the benefits of dedicating government 
resources to bioscience, political parties in power tend to either support the industry and 
are now engaging in public awareness-raising efforts, or, there is a fear that this support 
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may not last. These contingencies depend upon each province, their election cycles and 
the individual Premiere who may or may not share the long-term visions of his or her 
predecessor. Elected politicians may choose to discard policies established under 
previous leadership in order to implement his or her own values and vision. Industry 
leaders must lobby both political parties in order to affect political continuity in support 
of a longer-term bioscience strategy. Looming elections still threaten to stall progress 
right at the moment when the region is beginning mobilize stakeholders in the form of 
policy communities and KOSTs. 
While the region increasingly accepts the economic argument for investing in 
knowledge industries resulting in higher paying jobs as well as new and sustained 
company growth policy-makers face political challenges from primary industries 
including agriculture. For example, bioscience is defined by a boundary such that potato 
farmers will not be “saved” by R&D and innovation in bioscience. The two industries are 
separate and distinct. However, the Potato Institute in New Brunswick is highly 
innovative producing several varietals each year and spinning-off over 70 companies 
with specific capabilities. The R&D developed at the institute may be shared with 
bioscience niches to develop and commercialize new, non-potato related products. 
Farmers, a strong, traditional constituency benefit less from resources dedicated to 
bioscience. 
The regional financial market has been weak until recently with the establishment of 
pre-competitive and seed financing, public-private VC funds, angel investors, and partner 
firm financing. Local banks maintain strong relations with anchor firms but they lack the 
knowledge to assist small science-based firms. Other institutions such as the Community 
Business Development Corporations help to fill the financing gap through seed capital, 
low-cost loans and guarantees. Local strengthening of financial institutions help to offset 
the probability that global VCs will remain reluctant to invest in Canada let alone 













Weak labor markets in specialized areas of regulatory approvals, management of 
commercialization processes, and research directors exist but it is not difficult to find 
qualified technicians. Strong local technical institutions combined with weak global 
networks help explain this outcome. By 2013 PEI and NS had expanded global ties and 
individual firms began to learn how to successfully recruit skilled labor within shorter 
time-frames (Alleva-Caceres, 2014; S. Casper, Krause J., MacNevin A., 2010) 
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6.1 Summary of Findings 
 
Countries and regions within them that “learn-to-learn” are better able to transition to 
knowledge-based industrial growth. The learning structures they create break down silos, 
leverage resources, share knowledge and create competencies to help sustain high level 
bioscience commitment strategies especially in the face of global shocks such as the 2008 
global financial crises. Those that rely on past approaches involving fragmented policy 
communities struggle to adapt. 
The most significant finding of this research is that those Canadian provinces that 
established a strong knowledge-oriented strategy team (KOST) prior to the 2008 global 
financial crisis “puzzled and powered through” to maintain high level commitments to 
their bioscience industries afterwards. I use empirical evidence from the six case studies 
to evaluate the three hypotheses presented in chapter one.  
 
Hypothesis 1: A strong KOST in place prior to a global financial crisis is likely to 
maintains a high commitment strategy afterwards. 
 
Quebec and PEI cases support this hypothesis. The prevailing social norm in Quebec 
valued government intervention through industrial policies. In the 1980s the province 
took a strategic approach towards developing its bioscience industry. This experience 
provided the platform to construct strong KOSTS in Montreal, Quebec City and 
Sherbrooke prior to the 2008 global financial crisis. After the crisis BioQuebec and the 
Ministry of Economy, Innovation and Export helped to facilitate a meta-network of 
KOSTS across the major bioscience industry clusters. Organizations within the network 
took a hybrid approach by participating in the province’s new bioscience strategy while 









The presence of a strong KOST does not always immediately prevent significant 
fluctuations in industry performance after a global financial crisis. But it did help Quebec 
quickly respond to these shocks by learning about new opportunities and threats, creating 
consensus around new overarching goals, and adjusting tactics to reach them. The result 
is a strategy that connects changes in finance, skills and corporate governance institutions 
into a holistic commitment strategy. 
Small, rural provinces like PEI with a strong KOST led by its bioscience network 
organization, PEI BioAlliance, prior to the 2008 global financial crisis also maintained a 
high, holistic commitment strategy. The Atlantic Canadian provinces are less connected 
to global sources of risk finance shielding them from a sudden scarcity of funding. But 
they suffer from lack of skilled labor, lower productivity and income levels and 
knowledge spillovers. Despite these obstacles PEI, the smallest of these provinces, 
continues to grow its bioscience industry. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A weak KOST in place prior to a global financial crisis is likely to 
maintain a mixed commitment strategy afterwards. 
 
Ontario and Nova Scotia cases support this hypothesis. Ontario shifted from a weak 
KOST led by its industry association before the 2008 global financial crisis to fragmented 
policy communities afterwards as the province struggled to adjust. New policy 
communities including a second industry association competed over resources and goals. 
These dynamics maintained a mixed level of commitment and prevented institutional 
complementarities among finance, skills and corporate governance. Ontario suffers from 
old industrial structures framed within a “states versus markets” mindset applied to 
bioscience. However, the province is beginning to signal a change in mindset as it 
acknowledges the need for public-private partnerships to address the inherent market 
failures in bioscience.  
Nova Scotia pursed a similar path. The province maintained a weak KOST and mixed 
levels of commitment to its bioscience industry before and after the 2008 global financial 
crisis. Since 2005 the province has not developed a significant strategy despite success in 









individual firms and their networks have generated their own commitments with an 
explicit understanding that neither government nor industry should “pick winners”. The 
public-private VC fund is active in investing in local bioscience firms. But without a 
strategic approach involving social learning among bioscience organizations as part of 
individual firm strategies, I argue that Nova Scotia’s performance has suffered since the 




Hypothesis 3: When no KOST is present prior to a global financial crisis a low 
commitment strategy is likely to persist afterwards. 
 
No cases support this hypothesis. Neither New Brunswick nor Newfoundland created 
a KOST and few if any policy communities existed before the crisis resulting in a low 
commitment strategy. However, after the crisis policy communities evolved in both 
provinces drawing attention to the economic and health benefits of bioscience creating 
mixed levels of commitment. Incremental social learning occurred within these 
communities but not among them because of competing interests. Newfoundland 
developed its niche in bioinformatics and marine biotechnology while New Brunswick 
reinforced its efforts to mobilize its bioscience sector by increasing funding in BioNB, its 
lead bioscience agency. Major changes in these provinces were the result of newly 
elected governments and university-industry collaboration, not industry-led.  
The results of the case studies demonstrate the significance that a strong KOST plays 
in creating and sustaining bioscience commitments. Without one, regions within 
countries either continue along a negative path dependent trajectory, or, they make 
incremental changes leading to slightly higher commitment levels. However, it is 
plausible that this latter approach will become less effective as global competition 
heightens and rapid innovations in biotechnology continue. A strong KOST brings the 
necessary mindset and built-in learning mechanisms that inform strategic process 
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 According to data from Nova Scotia’s industry association, BioNova, the number of members has 










management. It enables regular monitoring and evaluation of industry goals and changes 
in them. These changes can occur in light of new information gleaned from reviews of 
current and previous strategies as well as from global bioscience trends including 
innovations and competitor analysis. The competencies of the strong KOST and its 
participants improve and sustain as this process ensues. They are not lost when new 
governments are elected or new policy groups arise.  
The table below matches empirical evidence from the cases with the independent and 













Table 14 Case Study Results 
























Pre-2008 Post – 
2008 
Change 








Strong Disruptive Disruptive Coordinated Coordinated High High/Holistic 
 
+ 
Ontario Weak Policy 
Communities 
Incremental Disruptive Coordinated Fragmented Mixed Mixed 
 
0 
Nova Scotia Weak Weak Incremental Incremental Fragmented Coordinated Mixed Mixed 
 
0 
New Brunswick None 














Incremental Incremental Fragmented Fragmented Low Mixed 
 
+ 








Why do similar regions within countries pursue different bioscience commitment 
strategies?   
 
The research reveals a significant role that a knowledge-oriented strategy team 
(KOST) plays in constructing and sustaining commitments to bioscience. Using a most 
similar systems approach to compare the two large, industrialized provinces of Quebec 
and Ontario and separately the four small, rural provinces of Atlantic Canada helped to 
highlight this variable. In addition to the strength of a KOST and multiple policy 
communities, other variables help explain different levels of and changes in commitment 
strategies. Natural resources, rival industries, province size and national institutions also 
interact with a KOST to influence the strategy.  
Natural resources underpin where R&D will be invested, new degree and training 
programs as well as firms’ core competencies. It helps understand why Newfoundland 
invests in bioinformatics with its founder population as a base, why Prince Edward Island 
invests in bioactives with its agricultural and marine resources and why Quebec invests 
more broadly in human genomics given its excellence in university research. Rival 
industries partially explain why Newfoundland commits less to bioscience and more to its 
resources industries like offshore oil and gas. But it does not help explain why Prince 
Edward Island has been able to maintain high levels of commitment to bioscience despite 
other growth industries like aerospace and digital media.  
The size of the province does not affect bioscience commitment levels. The 
likelihood of a large province like Quebec gaining consensus around common industry 
goals is small. Yet, its previous experience with government-industry interventions 
provided a platform to do so. And even though Prince Edward Island’s small size and 
dense network of bioscience organizations has been an advantage, it has avoided the 
“small world” network trap where no new information is shared because of lack of 
network growth. Finally, national institutions like the Atlantic Canada Opportunities 
Agency, the SR&ED and IRAP R&D funding schemes as well as the National Centres of 
Excellence combine with financial and infrastructure commitments at the provincial 








A strong KOST helps firms mobilize these resources, gain consensus around a 
specific strategy and its goals and act as another resource for firms to improve their 
competencies and competitiveness. It enhances rather than replaces individual firm 
strategy.  
 
Does a strong knowledge-oriented strategy team (KOST) help build and sustain a 
high bioscience commitment strategy?  
 
To answer this question and fill the literature gap I created a new variable, the KOST. 
It builds on Hall’s, Howlett and Bennett’s conception of a “knowledge-oriented policy 
community” and Ansell’s “project team” in the social learning process as they change 
policies (Ansell, 2000; Bennett & Howlett, 1992; P. A. Hall, 1993). The key difference 
lies in the role of the state, replacing policy community with strategy team and the 
creation of learning structures. Policy communities are typically led by the state while a 
strong KOST balances roles. The state provides resources while industry leads strategy 
development. It fuses the knowledge-focused part - accumulating and understanding 
previous policies, principles and practices in combination with new information, ideas 
and changing goals accordingly - with the team component signifying a more cohesive 
and deliberative approach. 
A strong KOST is inclusive, flexible, deliberative and engages in disruptive social 
learning and coordinated bargaining processes that build competencies. It accesses the 
latest information and knowledge about bioscience as well as best practices through 
KOST learning structures. These range from  members’ global networks and those 
developed through the KOST where knowledge spillovers occur;  subject matter 
committees tasked with conducting strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
analysis; routine interactions to design and implement work plans in line with industry 
goals; and regular monitoring and evaluations of progress.  
These structures and processes affect ways of thinking about challenges and 
opportunities in light of new information and occur prior to the creation or changing of 
institutions. They facilitate information and resource-sharing among a range of 








Policy communities and a weak KOST can still learn by reviewing previous policies 
and changing them but they do so incrementally and bargaining processes are either 
fragmented or coordinated. The missing link is a systematic review of the global 
bioscience industry, market trends, new ways of facilitating industry growth, and 
changing goals in light of this new information. These governance forms may facilitate 
information but they do not improve competencies. Provinces can commit to one set of 
institutions such as R&D finance but not another such as skills development through this 
process.    
 
Why do some provinces’ level of commitment change in response to a global financial 
shock and others do not?  
 
Scholars predict that when institutional complementarities exist, the formal and 
informal rules do not change leading down a path-dependent trajectory. The only time 
institutions change is after an external shock as interests and power positions realign to 
form a new equilibrium (P. A. Hall & Soskice, 2001; Morgan et al., 2010). But this 
research provides mixed results. Prince Edward Island and Quebec maintained high 
levels of commitment through the crisis and Ontario and Nova Scotia sustained mixed 
levels. The substance of the rules may have changed but their level of complementarity 
did not. Only Newfoundland and New Brunswick shifted from low to mixed commitment 
levels by changing their mindset around the role of R&D finance. They shifted away 
from government grants toward shared risk finance mechanisms. Prince Edward Island, 
Quebec, Ontario and Nova Scotia did not change for three reasons. First, a strong KOST 
in the first two provinces enabled regular monitoring of their strategies in light of the 
sudden scarcity of finance. Quebec reacted quickly due to its previous successful 
experiences in creating interventions in partnership with industry. PEI was less affected 
by the crisis and simply continued to implement and adjust its strategy. Ontario and Nova 
Scotia maintained mixed levels due to their weak KOSTs and fragmented policy 
communities. They struggled to gain consensus around industry goals even though 
competing strategy teams in Ontario like OBIO, LSO and government have separately 








choice as states versus markets forces them to shy away from an industrial policy 
perceived as “picking winners.” Individual firm strategies continue to underpin industry 
development.  
 
How does a strong KOST develop in the first place?  
 
While the dissertation does not address how a KOST, particularly a strong one, 
develops, research did uncover a pattern. A sequence of events and key individuals drive 
the process. First, when a new technology gains legitimacy on a global scale like 
biotechnology a few key individuals gather informally in a particular jurisdiction with a 
vested interest in adopting it, developing it further or expanding its use.  This occurred in 
Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. In Ontario the Toronto 
Biotechnology Initiative was founded early in the 1980s by a group of researchers, 
lawyers, entrepreneurs and government industry and economic development specialists. 
The first meetings were informal sessions where participants shared information and 
knowledge about biotechnology and its potential use and development in the province. 
The other provinces even gave their informal groups a name, the “Belvedere Life 
Sciences Group” and the “BioNova Biotech Working Group” both founded in the early 
1990s in Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia, respectively, as well as the “Ramada 
Group” founded in the late 2000s in Newfoundland. These groups met not only to discuss 
ways in which they could take advantage of the new technology, but within the context of 
cultivating the provinces’ competencies to sustain economic growth. These groups 
represent the first effort to create networks, break down silos and coordinate activities. 
Second, in Ontario and Prince Edward Island the informal gatherings evolved into 
formal organizations while in Nova Scotia it petered out as individual firm strategy began 
to drive growth. And Newfoundland’s group is still informal despite major achievements 
in establishing the necessary infrastructure to research health IT applications. The formal 
organization also helped to gain legitimacy as a voice for the industry to attract FDI and 
resources. Some established as traditional industry association like Life Science Ontario 
requiring membership dues in return for services such as legislative lobbying efforts, 








network of organizations with the name PEI BioAlliance. This organization represents 
what this research considers a strong KOST.  
 
 
6.2 Theoretical Contribution 
 
This research is interdisciplinary. It draws from institutional economics, economic 
geography and sociology, historical institutionalism, and comparative political economy 
to understand institutional change after the 2008 global financial crisis. It treats 
institutions as commitments (D.C. North, 1990).  
The dissertation helps to fill the literature gap by answering the following questions: 
Why do similar regions within countries pursue different bioscience commitment 
strategies?  Does a strong knowledge-oriented strategy team with disruptive social 
learning and coordinated bargaining characteristics build a high level of commitment to 
bioscience? Is it sustained throughout a global financial crisis? Why do some 
commitment strategies change in response to a global financial shock and others do not? 
These are important questions that enhance our understanding of theories of 
institutional change and knowledge industry development. Provinces design their own 
industrial strategies aligned or in parallel with federal policies yet comparative political 
economists focus on national level comparisons. Comparative analyses of bioscience 
institutions tend to be static and results are read-off existing institutions rather than 
dynamic, explaining why and how they were created and changed (S. Casper, 2010). 
What happens before and immediately after a global financial shock is unclear (Morgan 
et al., 2010).   
While economic geographers and sociologists study structures, organizations and 
groups and their interaction within defined spaces, they neglect politics, social learning 
and modes of governance as variables. Economic geographers have extensively analyzed 
various factors explaining knowledge cluster emergence and sustainability. These range 
from a sufficient knowledge base to second generation entrepreneurs to institutional 
reforms. But relatively little work has examined the processes by which institutions are 








multiple governance levels affect them(P. Braunerhjelm & M. Feldman, 2006; S. 
Breznitz et al., 2010; Gertler & Vinodrai, 2009; D. Wolfe & Holbrook, 2000). 
The results support previous research arguing that successful regional strategies 
design local institutions such as financial regulations and labor markets to fit industry-
specific needs (Locke, 1995; Malerba, 2002). They do not simply implement a one-size 
fits all national strategy. But national level policies and global networks do have an 
impact (D. Breznitz, 2007; Edquist, 1997; B. Ä. Lundvall, 1992). National strategies 
often provide funding, technical assistance and rules governing, for example, intellectual 
property rights that coexist, coordinate or conflict with local institutions. Ultimately, local 
individuals and organizations who share similar beliefs about technology objectives make 
bioscience commitments (P. N. Cooke et al., 2004; Segal & Thun, 2001). Generating 
these similar beliefs is a central role of a strong KOST. Explanations of conflict alone in 
generating commitments are not sufficient as the Prince Edward Island and Quebec cases 
demonstrate. 
A path dependence argument partially explains why Prince Edward Island, Quebec, 
Ontario and Nova Scotia did not change their bioscience commitment levels after the 
2008 crisis. Even though the nature of finance, skill development and corporate 
governance rules changed as predicted, their high level of complementarity in the first 
two cases and mixed levels in the latter two did not. For example, in Prince Edward 
Island it was not only that existing institutions provided increasing returns to 
beneficiaries, the existing strong KOST ensured regular monitoring and changing of 
goals in light of new information. Quebec faced a critical juncture as the sudden scarcity 
of global finance caused bioscience stakeholders to search for new ways of maintaining 
its high commitment. This critical juncture acted as a change mechanism, coupled with a 
strong KOST that lead Quebec to another set of stable institutions, or, punctuated 
equilibrium (P. A. Hall & Soskice, 2001; Mahoney, 2000; Thelen, 1999). In both cases, 
the presence of a strong KOST fills the gap in the critical juncture approach. This 
literature does not address how actors react to an external shock and the decision-makers 









6.3 Policy Contribution and Future Research 
 
Growing a bioscience industry is fraught with unusually high levels of complexity, 
uncertainty, risk and costs. By traditional measures – increased numbers of blockbuster 
drugs, mature and diverse biotechnology or pharmaceutical firms, patent counts, or sales 
revenue - most fail. But a closer examination reveals strategies and institutions that can 
begin to overcome these challenges as well as more realistic measures of growth in the 
short and medium-term. These include the quality, density and internationalization of a 
network, number of start-up firms growing to mid-size, and diversity of finance 
organizations. 
The mechanism of “learning-by-learning” represented by a strong KOST explores 
how organizational institutions learn by self-monitoring and engaging in “reflexive” 
processes. These processes apply institutional memory and intelligence to regular 
evaluations of goals, tools and ways to identify opportunities, problems and solutions to 
them (Gertler et al., 2002; P. A. Hall, 1993; Sabel, 1993). But this process of organizing 
intelligence in social ways rather than on an individual basis can either lead to change or 
hold it back. It depends upon the ability of institutions to be reflexive and to monitor their 
success in adapting to changes in environment (Gertler et al., 2002). 
It is possible for small, rural regions to design a strategy focused on niche areas of the 
bioscience industry such as bioactives. Balancing the niche focus with a broad range of 
application areas or markets can increase opportunities for growth while managing risks 
associated with a “one-track pony” path (S. Breznitz et al., 2010; S. M. Breznitz, 2009). 
But the critical factor appears to be what social learning mechanisms and policy 
communities are created in order to establish requisite finance, skills and corporate 
governance institutions.  
Countries and regions attempting to transition to or at least rebalance their economies 
between traditional and knowledge-based industries face many challenges. In science-
based industries committing to this goal requires maximizing knowledge in both the 
science and how to commercialize it. Neither government agencies nor industry nor the 








design interventions that enable rather than inhibit growth by understanding the nature, 
structure and logic of the bioscience industry. 
A strategic approach is necessary. It involves creating a diverse, inclusive strategy 
team and related learning mechanisms that break silo mentalities and unleash knowledge 
that can be shared to help reduce uncertainty and risks while improving competencies and 
creating opportunities. These mechanisms must sustain through successive governments 
and budgets. Creating high levels of commitment to bioscience requires a knowledge-
oriented strategy team led by industry regularly researching, monitoring, evaluating and 
negotiating commitment strategies closely with government as partners. 
While scholars and practitioners alike have identified a multitude of factors related to 
successful cluster performance there is less understanding of what mechanisms enable 
high commitment strategies as well as why they are important in the first place. The 
findings will aid bioscience policy-makers and industry as they puzzle and power through 
the process of creating commitment strategies. They will also help economic 
development specialists as they address convergence gaps within their countries. This is 
especially important when equalizing incomes and services are goals across both “catch-
up” and established provinces. 
This research provides additional conclusions and testable hypothesis for future 
research. First, industry-led KOSTs survive successive governments. Second, sub-
national jurisdictions with a history of creating learning structures straddling public and 
private sectors with industry taking lead are more likely to withstand a global financial 
shock. Third, these shocks provide an opportunity to create social learning structures. 
Fourth, the process of changing institutions is not always conflict-laden. Sometimes 
participants learn during intense negotiations leading to consensus. Social learning can 
unleash new ideas, ways of doing things, and change both mindsets and goals. Fifth, 
cooperation can occur when actors have competing and complementary interests. Firms 
that otherwise compete among each other may participate in a strong KOST when they 
have complementary interests that they cannot meet on their own. PEI and Quebec are 
representative cases. Finally, small regions within countries can learn to successfully 








The research design is structured so that scholars can conduct future studies in 
emerging markets where transition from traditional to valued-added and knowledge-
based industrial development is taking place. Future research can examine the complex 
interaction between networked organizations within a particular regional setting, and, 
their global ties especially as local governance institutions change. Research in Prince 
Edward Island takes this micro-level approach. Future research will involve comparing 











The timetables below illustrate global technological and institutional changes as well as 
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